Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-93-220 *17 November 1993*

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Serreqi, Greece's Papoulias Hold News Conference

AU1611214993 Tirana ATA in English 1340 GMT 16 Nov 93

["'Turning Point in Albanian-Greek Relations'—Press Conference of the Albanian Foreign Minister Serreqi and his Greek Counterpart Papoulias"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, November 16 (ATA)—"The visit to Albania of the Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, was the last stop on his Balkan tour but certainly not least in importance," Foreign Minister Serreqi said opening the press conference held yesterday at Palace of Congresses. This visit, Mr. Serreqi noted, marks a turning point in Albanian-Greek relations. The talks we have had have been realistic and focused on the search for solutions to our common problems. The discussions were characterized by a willingness on both sides to improve relations between our two countries. The talks opened up new prospects for cooperation, not only for our two countries but also for the region as a whole. That Greece will chair the European Community next year, is not only a favourable situation in general, but it will also increase the responsibilities of Greece towards Albania, a friendly neighbouring country.

Mr. Papoulias thanked his Albanian counterpart for the warm reception extended the Greek delegation in Tirana, and the friendly and fruitful talks with Mr. Serreqi, Premier Meksi, and President Berisha. Mr. Papoulias said that he had met with Archbishop Anastasios and had talked with Albanian ministers on various bilateral problems. Negotiations which focused on bilateral and international issues were a success, Mr. Papoulias said. The talks were friendly, and the two governments expressed their political will to develop constructive Greek-Albanian relations. I am leaving Albania with the impression that our talks will open a new chapter in the relations between Albania and Greece. Mr. Papoulias said that he had discussed the issues of the Greek minority in Albania and confirmed that the Greek delegation found understanding and a spirit of cooperation in resolving the outstanding issues. An education law will be passed in a very near future which will settle the issue of the schooling of Greek minority students in Albania. Mr. Papoulias said that he had agreed with Albanian officials to provide facilities to the Greek minority in Albania who constitute a bridge of friendship between the two countries. "We also talked about general cooperation in economic affairs, culture and trade," Mr. Papoulias said, emphasizing that, in addition to the ministerial commission, "the two sides agreed to appoint other mixed commissions to resolve the issue of the Albanian economic immigrants in Greece and to establish appropriate legislation governing their employment."

"We may also look into military cooperation, and another commission will discuss border security. We also talked about the establishment of a commission to regulate the distribution of electric power.

"During the talks we recognized the very important role our countries must play in the Balkans, and concluded that the contributions of Albania and Greece will be very important to the establishment of peace in the region, Mr. Papoulias said. We agreed to the establishment of a joint working group to plan the visit to Tirana of Mr. Papaantoniu, minister of economy, in the near future."

The two ministers then replied to reporters' questions. Concerning the Bulgarian proposal to organize a Balkan conference, Mr. Papoulias said that such a conference should only be held at the end of the war in former Yugoslavia and the resolution of other issues in the region. The conference, which reminds me of the previous Balkan conference held in Belgrade, will treat the topics of multilateral cooperation in the Balkans and the maintenance of peace in the region. I can not estimate when such a conference might be held, but I would like to tell you that all the Balkan capitals have agreed to hold such a conference.

Asked about the resolution of the issue of Albanian immigrants in Greece, Mr. Papoulias said that it will be necessary to appoint a mixed commission to deal with their problems. The commission will be appointed within 10 days and the issue of the Albanian immigrants will be submitted to the Greek Parliament after the two sides will have agreed upon a proposal.

In regard to the Cams, Mr. Papoulias said that "I would like to remind you of my statement which confirmed that the Greeks are very sensitive to historic memories. Consequently discussion about the Cams' return to Greece is out of place and as Mr. Meksi rightfully put it, it is the first time the issue has been raised with me. Concerning properties, the juridical service of the Greek Foreign Ministry should deal with this issue and then submit its report to me."

In response to a question from a reporter from the Greek TV Channel One regarding Albania's attitude toward the Bulgarian president's statement that he opposed the expansion of state boundaries to coincide with ethnic areas, Mr. Serreqi replied that thus far there exists the only case of such a tendency is the current attempt to create a Greater Serbia by conquest. I am not aware that any other Balkan governments have attempted to carry out a policy of extending their borders to incorporate areas occupied by their ethnic nationals in neighbouring countries. The Albanian Government has declared that it respects the present state borders and is categorically against the forceful change of borders.

In my opinion this is the best evidence that the Albanian state does not aspire to establish a Greater Albania. This does not mean at all that the Albanian state will cease defending the interests of those Albanian nationals, who constitute approximately half of all Albanian nationals,

who now live outside the borders of the Albanian Republic, so that they can live in democracy as defined by international charters.

Asked by RD [RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] reporter regarding rumors alleging that the [Socialist Party Chairman Fatos] Nano case had been raised in talks between Mr. Papoulias and Albanian officials, the Greek foreign minister said that the Socialist Internationale, to which PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] is affiliated, has dealt with the Nano issue, and PASOK adheres to the view of the international body.

To the question of the ELEFTHERO TIPIA reporter on reports that during the talks the Albanian Government had favoured the opening of Greek schools even in those regions which are not considered minority areas, Mr. Serreqi said that among the problems of the Greek minority in Albania, we also talked about the schooling in the mother tongue of Greek minority students in Albania. The Albanian Parliament will soon pass an education law, which provides guarantees that the Albanian Government will observe the most advanced international standards. Today there is one teacher per six Greek minority students in Albania and this is not the case with Albanian students.

Greek minority groups are to be found across the territory of the Republic of Albania and this demonstrates two positive tendencies: the first aims at maintaining and strengthening national identity and cultural and spiritual activity and the second is to integrate the Greek minority into the Albanian democratic society.

Concerning the question of PASQYRA reporter who asked if PASOK government would abide by the six points presented by former premier Mitsotakis to improve relations with Albania, Mr. Papoulias said that he was not responsible for the foreign policy of Mr. Mitsotakis.

Asked about by a Greek reporter what Albania expected from Greece as leader of the European Community next year, Mr. Serreqi said that one of Albania's priorities was its integration into Europe, and he explained this not only because Albania is geographically situated in Europe but also because the Albanians are a European people. Mr. Serreqi said that he expected Greece to adopt an European attitude in the Balkans and in its foreign policy in the region.

In regard to the question why was Macedonia not included in Papoulias' visit to the Balkans, the Greek foreign minister said: "You are well aware of Greece's relations with Macedonia. The possibility for dialogue failed because of Mr. Gligorov's attitude. As I wrote to Mr. Butrus-Ghali, we expected Mr. Gligorov to show that he is in favour of a fruitful dialogue with Greece. So we have to wait," Mr. Papoulias said.

Replying to a question addressed to both ministers about the points of agreement and disagreement between them, Mr. Serreqi said that there was a difference of opinions regarding the nature of the crisis in former Yugoslavia and possible solutions. We agreed to make joint efforts to find a solution acceptable to the parties involved, not through war but through dialogue. We agreed to respect state borders. We also agreed that the crisis in former Yugoslavia is a multinational crisis and its definitive resolution will require the concomitant solution of all outstanding and ancillary problems not yet resolved. We agreed that war in Bosnia- Herzegovina is the most tragic situation in former Yugoslavia and that the international community must, first of all, find the means to halt the fighting and undertake urgent actions to prevent the conflict's extension to the south. "But, I don't think we agreed that the tragic events in former Yugoslavia are the result of aggression by the Serbs in order to create a Greater Serbia," he said. "Perhaps, we did not agree that international community should continue to exert pressure or impose more severe sanctions on Serbia and adopt measures to place Kosova under international control, and not only through the return of the CSCE observers," Minister Serreqi said further on.

Regarding this question, Mr. Papoulias said that Mr. Serreqi's reply was clear. He fully agreed with what Mr. Serreqi said. "Naturally, we agree on the basic principles," he said. There is only one way to resolve the crisis, and that is the way of peace. The honourable Albanian foreign minister is fully right to say that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most dramatic point of the drama, and the Greeks consider stopping the conflict to be top priority. Regarding sanctions and other coercive measures, the Greeks hold a different view that the maintenance of sanctions, supported by extremist and fanatic circles, tends to confirm the idea that only armed conflict can bring about a conclusion to the confrontation. We believe that sanctions have produced an intolerable situation for the Serbian people. The hospital situation in Serbia is unacceptable to human standards. And we can ask what was the result of these sanctions," Mr. Papoulias said.

Asked by an Albanian reporter whether is it true that Greece still pretends that Macedonian, Turkish, and Albanian minorities do not exist in Greece, the Greek foreign minister replied that there is only one minority in Greece, and that is Moslem. A Greek reporter of a German newspaper asked Mr. Serreqi how he could explain Albania's membership in the Islamic Conference at a time when Albania is oriented towards Europe. Albania's membership testifies to an open policy, to seize all opportunities, which serve Albania's interests during this period of transition.

Membership in the Islamic Conference does not make Albania an Islamic state, because Albania is by law a secular state. Its participation in the Islamic Conference is on the condition that the conference will always respect the laicism of Albania, which will only accept those obligations emerging from the Islamic Conference that do not run counter to the fundamental law of the Albanian state.

The same reporter then asked if the conditions of Fatos Nano's imprisonment conform to European standards. Mr. Serreqi replied that Fatos Nano's arrest was carried out in accordance with the criminal code and procedures established by Albanian law and upheld by the Constitutional Court. This is not a political trial. It is rather an example of the democratic government's fight against corruption wherever it might arise. Mr. Nano will be given a trial open to the public, and there will be nothing in his treatment that will compromise fundamental human freedoms.

Replying to questions by an OMONIA reporter whether the Greeks in Albania will have their national identity, of which they were deprived by the communist regime, restored and whether the schools closed by the Albanian police will be reopened, Mr. Serreqi said that "Under the conditions of democracy, legal means exist for the restoration of national identities." In reply to the second question, Mr. Papoulias said that the issues of education for the Greek minority will be resolved by the new law on education, adding that President Berisha has confirmed that the functioning of seven schools will be reexamined.

In response to a question from a reporter from the CAMERIA newspaper regarding the return of the Cams to Greece, Mr. Papoulias declared that "I have nothing to add to my statement."

80 Percent of State Buildings Privatized

AU1611205793 Tirana ATA in English 1114 GMT 14 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 14 (ATA)—158,778 out of 214,450 state buildings have been privatized. 54,493 of the privatized buildings have also been notarized, the director of the Housing Department at the Ministry of Construction told our ATA reporter. The figures show that about 80 per cent of the state buildings throughout the country have been privatized.

Meksi Highlights Reform Successes

AU1711091093 Tirana ATA in English 1203 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 15 (ATA)—At the November 14 meeting of the Shkoder Democratic Party, DP leader Eduard Selami declared that "Shkoder has provided powerful support to democracy, since communism could dominate the city neither spiritually nor even as a matter of form. Also present at the meeting were Premier Meksi, the chairman of the DP parliamentary group, Ali Spahia, and intellectuals of the party branch.

Premier Meksi underlined some of the successes of the reform program including the employment of some 110 thousand people in the private sector. Another 500-600 thousand jobs are expected to be created with the complete privatization of the region. The number of the unemployed has been reduced, but 70-80 thousand families, a total of some 170-180 people, are still receiving social assistance, Mr. Meksi said.

Premier Meksi concentrated on issues of privatization. "Experience shows that the rehabilitation of the factories through privatization will create other employment opportunities, which will reduce the number of unemployed and government outlays for social assistance."

Premier Meksi stressed the need to appoint capable people to positions of leadership. He called for continuation of the fight against corruption and nepotism. He told his audience that the democratic government has been drafting a new civil service code following the experience of other countries. Mr. Meksi also spoke about the efforts of the government in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund to insure investment in order to increase the salaries of pensioners, teachers, government employees and others.

Draft Laws, Cooperation Agreements Approved

AU1711091293 Tirana ATA in English 1435 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 16 (ATA)—On November 15, the Council of Ministers approved the draft law on a change to the tax system in an effort to help the activity of local government structures. According to the system, several national taxes will be considered as local taxes, in order to ensure the necessary financial sources of the local government.

In the context of the government's constant care for the persecuted during the communist regime, the Council of Ministers approved the draft law on a change to the existing law on the innocence, amnesty and rehabilitation of the former politically persecuted, which provides them with the same rights as those of the political prisoners and the exiled ones until the end of 1954.

The draft law on the ratification of the memorandum of understanding through the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania and the U.S. State Department was approved on the same day.

The Council of Ministers decided today:

—To approve in principle the Albanian-U.S. agreement, the latter represented by the International Development Agency for the project of supporting agricultural development.

—To approve in principle the Albanian-Russian agreements on trade, economic, technical and scientific cooperation.

Anagnosti, Russia's Sidorov Hold News Conference

AU1711092693 Tirana ATA in English 1426 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 16 (ATA)—Peoples have preserved their mutual sympathies even under dictatorship,

the minister of culture of the Russian Federation, Yevgeniy Sidorov, said in his joint press conference with the Albanian counterpart, Dhimiter Anagnosti, on November 15, at the International Cultural Conference. Culture is subjected to no dictate. Its value is not measured by the size of the nations. That is why relations among nations are necessary. Only that foreign culture which becomes yours, that which is assimilated, is valuable.

The two ministers reported on the signing of a cultural agreement between the two countries which includes cooperation in music, theaters, and variety shows, museums, folk songs and art exhibitions. In this context centers of culture will open respectively in Moscow and Tirana.

'Reliable' Partnership Promised

AU1711092893 Tirana ATA in English 1439 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 16 (ATA)—At his November 15 meeting with the Russian minister of culture, Yevgeniy Sidorov, the foreign minister of Albania, Alfred Serreqi, considered Sidorov's visit to Albania as a special message for cultural cooperation between Albania and Russia. Mr. Sidorov stressed that the establishment of the democracy in our two countries has created new possibilities for developing cultural cooperation. Mr. Sidorov said another agreement will be signed in the future between the two countries.

Mr. Anagnosti informed Mr. Sidorov of the persecution of Albanian culture by communist dictatorship and stressed the importance of the Albanians' cultural identity which provides them with the possibility to be equal with others in roundtables. Mr. Anagnosti also said that Albanian Ministry of Culture follows an open foreign policy and we need to exchange experience and develop cooperation with other countries.

We hope to establish a foundation in the near future which can provide support to Albanian culture since at present it develops under hard political circumstances. The Albanian culture continues to develop in Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro and in the Albanian community in U.S.A.

The Russian minister of culture promised that "Russia will be Albania's reliable partner in fostering cultural cooperation."

Cooperation Agreement Signed

AU1711093093 Tirana ATA in English 1441 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 16 (ATA)—An agreement for cultural cooperation was signed November 15 between the Albanian Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports and the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation. The agreement was signed by the Albanian minister of culture, Dhimiter Anagnosti and the Russian minister, Yevgeniy Sidorov. Present was also the Russian ambassador, Viktor Nerubaillo. The agreement aims to fostering cooperation between Albania and Russia. The agreement plans exchanges in the fields of theatre, cinematography, figurative arts, music, circus, variety shows and libraries as well as the protection and recognition of ancient cultural objects.

Meksi Gives Interview on Eve of Bulgarian Visit

AU1711090193 Sofia BTA in English 1956 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 16 (BTA)—"It is in our interest as Balkan countries to have good political and economic relations with all other Balkan countries," Albania's Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi said in an interview aired on national television tonight. Mr. Meksi is expected to arrive on an official visit here tomorrow, national television said. He is scheduled to meet Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and President Zhelyu Zhelev.

Mr. Meksi's visit was preceded by three visits by Albanian foreign ministers in the last three years. A treaty for friendship and cooperation was signed by the two presidents, Zhelyu Zhelev and Sali Berisha, during Dr. Zhelev's visit to Albania this February.

Albania and Bulgaria have many interests in common, such as the building of an East-West auto route ensuring a transport and telecommunications link, Mr. Meksi said in the interview.

He stressed Albania would resist a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and said a conflict in Kosovo might spark a Balkan war.

Russian General Staff Chief Arrives for Visit

AU1511205993 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] At the invitation of Army General Lyuben Petrov, commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, on 15 November Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Russia's first deputy minister of defense and commander of the Russian Army General Staff, arrived in Bulgaria on a four-day visit.

During his visit the state and prospects of military cooperation between the two countries will be discussed. It is expected that a plan on military cooperation in 1994 will be signed.

Meets With President Zhelev

AU1611123493 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] On 16 November at the Boyana residence President Zhelyu Zhelev met Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, commander of the Russian Army General Staff and first deputy minister of defense, who is making an official visit to Bulgaria.

During the talks opinions were exchanged on the state and prospects of developing relations between the two countries and cooperation in the military sphere. The plan on military cooperation between the two Ministries of Defense, which was signed yesterday, was also discussed.

President Zhelev highly assessed the actions of the Russian Army during the events in Russia last month. [passage omitted]

Meets Petrov, Aleksandrov

AU1611123293 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] On 16 November Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, commander of the Russian Army General Staff and first deputy minister of defense, met his host, Army General Lyuben Petrov, commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, and then Valentin Aleksandrov, minister of defense.

Issues related to the Bulgarian Army requirements for material and technical supplies of spare parts, engines, and main aggregates for military equipment were discussed.

At the meeting with Minister Aleksandrov the situation in former Yugoslavia was discussed, and opinions on this issues were exchange.

Col. Gen. Kolesnikov is now meeting Prime Minister Berov. Later he will be received by President Zhelev.

Describes Talks as 'Candid'

AU1611123693 Sofia BTA in English 1141 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 16 (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria today received Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of General Staff of the Russian Army and deputy minister of defence of the Russian Federation, who arrived here yesterday.

The presidential spokesman said that the two had discussed the state and prospects of Bulgarian-Russian relations. Particular attention was paid to military and military technological cooperation between the Bulgarian and the Russian Armies with a view to Bulgaria's needs of specific deliveries of spare parts, fuel, lubricants etc.

President Zhelev commended highly the stance taken by the Russian Army during the October events in Moscow, and especially the fact that the army did not split, which would have been the first prerequisite for the outbreak of civil war. Dr. Zhelev believes that the stance of the Russian Army benefits Russia's democratization.

Colonel General Kolesnikov and his host, Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, were received today by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov whom they briefed on their discussions.

The two chiefs of General Staff have agreed that exchanges of military supplies and spare pares will be handled directly between the two Defence Ministries through the mediation of companies.

General Kolesnikov stressed that Russia is a state which has no priority in relations with other states, government spokesman Raycho Raykov told reporters. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, the guest said, it has deep-going historical ties with Russia and occupies a special place in the context of a purely friendly relationship, now devoid of the ideological encumbrances of the near past.

"The Defence Ministries of Bulgaria and Russia have mostly identical assessments and views on the situation in the Balkans," Bulgarian Defence Minister Valentin Aleksandrov said after conferring with Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov. The guest and General Petrov briefed the minister on their talks on cooperation in military technology.

Colonel General Kolesnikov described his talks today with President Zhelev, Prime Minister Berov and Defence Minister Aleksandrov as "absolutely candid." In his words, "views did not diverge" even when he discussed the content of Russia's new military doctrine with the president.

Seeks To Restore Contacts

AU1511210093 Sofia BTA in English 1913 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 15 (BTA)—"I came to restore the contacts in military technology which were discontinued in 1992 because they are in the best interest of

both countries and above all in the interest or their security," Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of General Staff of the Russian Army and deputy defence minister of the Russian Federation, said upon his arrival at Sofia Airport. He is paying a four-day visit here at the invitation of Bulgarian Chief of General Staff, Army General Lyuben Petrov. General Kolesnikov also said future relations will be based on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The two military chiefs will discuss a programme for cooperation in military technology in 1994 between the Russian and the Bulgarian Defence Ministries.

"This year was very difficult for us and I had to postpone my visits to Britain, Spain and Norway, but I thought I should accept General Petrov's invitation," the Russian chief of General Staff said, stressing the significance of his visit to Bulgaria.

The Russian guest is expected to meet President Zhelyu Zhelev, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and Defence Minister Valentin Aleksandrov. His schedule also includes a visit to the Vasil Levski Higher Military School in Veliko Turnovo and various Army units throughout the country.

Dailies Comment on No-Confidence Debate

AU1711115193 Sofia BTA in English 1020 GMT 17 Nov 93

[From BTA's "Press Review"]

[Excerpt] Sofia, November 17 (BTA)—The dailies frontpage comments on yesterday's debates in parliament on the no-confidence motion made by the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), motivated with the social policy of Prof. Berov's non-party government. DUMA, the daily of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), headlines Mr. Berov's statement in parliament that the previous, SDS cabinet (which governed in 1992) handed down a hidden deficit of 8,000 million leva. The DUMA report focuses on Mr. Berov's speech in parliament. Under the headline "Between Public Concern and Personal Interest," DEMOKRATSIYA runs an interview with MP's of all parliamentary groups, asked about the pros and cons of the cabinet's social policy. The daily also runs the speech of Ivan Kostov MP of the SDS and former finance minister, who said consensus between the SDS and the BSP on the economic reform is impossible because they have differences of principle. Mr. Kostov called on the MP's to pass a vote of no confidence in the cabinet and start preparations for elections. DUMA says after the vote on the SDS motion tomorrow, the leaders of parliamentary groups supporting the cabinet—the BSP, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and the New Union for Democracy—will ask to meet Mr. Berov for a discussion on the future cooperation between parliament and the government.

A signed commentary in OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK forecasts the cabinet will survive the no-confidence vote tomorrow but will fall before long. "It only remains to be seen whether Berov will step down with the dignity he has been flaunting recently, or his ouster will be a show lacking in originality," the author says. [passage omitted]

Karabashev, Bikov Deny Deputy's Allegations

AU1711090593 Sofia BTA in English 2101 GMT 16 Nov 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpts] Sofia, November 16 (BTA)—Speaking to the private Radio Darik, Deputy Prime Minister Valentin Karabashev today denied press reports he handed in and then withdrew his resignation. "I don't think there should be deputy prime ministers without portfolios in any cabinet," Mr. Karabashev said, adding this was inappropriate from the point of view of government.

Valentin Karabashev, deputy prime minister and minister of trade, filed a claim for damages against Gincho Pavlov MP who charged him with corruption. Chief Secretary of the Trade Ministry Nikolay Vuzev said today. Meeting the press today, Trade Ministry officials read an official statement on allegations of breaking foreign trade rules by the ministry.

Industry Minister Rumèn Bikov categorically denied allegations by Gincho Pavlov MP of the Fatherland Party of Labour that along with Deputy Prime Minister Karabashev he took illegal actions harmful to the Bulgarian economy.

The Podkrepa Labour Confederation will hand over to prosecutors documents testifying to incompetence, irresponsibility and corruption among high-ranking executives, Podkrepa President Konstantin Trenchev told the press today. The documents concern foreign investment in Bulgaria, arms deals, telecommunications, etc.

The press lately ran reports passing judgements not only on the performance of Bulgarian diplomats, but also on their personalities and private lives, says a Foreign Ministry Press Office release handed to BTA. In a number of cases, labels go beyond accepted norms, even the norms of a free and democratic press, it says.

The campaign against ambassadors appointed by the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) government hurts the image of Bulgaria, said SDS leader Filip Dimitrov today. He described as a backlash tendency the attempts to abolish the practice of appointing ambassadors, skipping steps of the diplomatic ladder. [passage omitted]

The National Council for Tripartite Cooperation asked the government to discuss a national strategy on industry's structural adjustment, after harmonization of the steps taken by separate ministries. The decision was made after hearing a report by Minister Rumen Bikov.

Operators today ran tests of the 440-Megawatt Unit One and the 1,000-Megawatt Unit Six of the N-plant in

Kozloduy on the Danube before putting them back on line following repairs. [passage omitted]

The Bulgarian Socialist Party has critical remarks to individual ministries and ministers of the Lyuben Berov cabinet, Vladimir Topencharov, member of the BSP Supreme Council, told a scheduled BSP press briefing. According to him, the BSP has not taken a formal stand, as the problem of a cabinet overhaul is not yet pressing.

The 41th Regular Congress of the BSP will be called at the end of the third quarter of 1994, said Vladimir Topencharov. The BSP Executive Bureau today also discussed preparations for regional meetings on economic reform and the idea to hold a Balkan meeting of leftist forces hosted by PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).

The BSP Press Office today voiced concern over the increasing number of claims by Gypsies of violations of their constitutional rights and cases of mistreatment of Gypsies. According to the press office, the blame is shared by the media which consciously or not helps shape negative public attitudes.

The prices of goods and services monitored and controlled by the Council of Ministers rose 1.18 percent between October 29 and November 15, said the National Statistical Institute. The steepest rise was recorded for pork and mutton. [passage omitted]

Judicial Council Chairman Responds to Accusations

AU1611061293 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 Nov 93 p 9

[Article by Ivan Grigorov, chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council: "Bulgaria and the Berov Cabinet Are Not Identical"]

[Text] In one of the tabloids of the so-called "yellow" press, Minister of Justice Kornazhev accused me of having "snitched" on Bulgaria (what a refined expression—DEMOKRATSIYA editorial note) in Strasbourg and described my action as a "political provocation" against our country. I am really surprised at his belated reaction. As early as on 31 October, I submitted to BTA and to all Bulgarian mass media the full text of my appeal to the leaders of the supreme judicial organs in 32 countries. Translated into three languages, my message was distributed among all participants and guests at the Strasbourg Parliamentary Assembly session, which includes Mr. Martinez, chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, and Mr. Rolf Ruysdal, chairman of the Strasbourg European Human Rights Court of Justice.

If the minister had read my statement, he would have realized that I was not at all "snitching" on Bulgaria, but rather on the Berov government and on the former Communists who are supporting it. It is possible that some of them may identify themselves with Bulgaria, but this is their own problem and the problem of my colleague Mr. Kornazhev.

It was also claimed that I have "accused the executive power of having inspired amendments to the Supreme Judicial Council bill." I fully agree with Mr. Kornazhev on this point. In case he might have forgotten something, I would like to remind him of the facts, which I submitted orally to the parliament's plenary session on 1 November 1993:

On 18 October 1993, Mr. Berov, together with his Minister of Justice Kornazhev, met the parliamentary group of the former Communists and insisted on certain "personnel changes in the staff of the Supreme Judicial Council." The government's official announcement on the meeting and on the requests affecting the independent judicial power was broadcast over the Bulgarian National Television and through BTA (I even have a cassette with the recording of the government spokesman's voice). On the following day, following the Berov cabinet's instruction, the former Communists submitted their bill to parliament.

On 20 October 1993, the Supreme Judicial Council adopted a unanimous declaration expressing its sharp protest against the gross breach of the Constitution and of the country's legislation on the part of the government. You, Mr. Kornazhev, signed without any objection. A day or two after, you declared at a news conference (there is a more accurate expression than "declare" for what you did, but you know it), that such a request has never been submitted. Whether Mr. Berov forced you to tell the untruth, or it was your initiative, this is none of my concern.

Last, but not least, my dear colleague Kornazhev, I would like to inform you that the effect of your action was positive, as far as the judicial power is concerned. The statements and comments of our colleagues, the high magistrates and guests at the Strasbourg forum, about the government were negative, to put it mildly. Considering that we were not the ones who had committed provocations against Bulgaria, but it was rather your government that did so, you should know that, during my conversations with the colleagues from other countries, I categorically refused to accept any document whatsoever related to your actions or proposing to organize an on-the-spot investigation of the case.

Answering your provocative questions regarding the expenses for my trips abroad, I can answer with a clean conscience: All my travel expenses were paid in full by the organizers of the Center For Democracy Forum in Washington and by the U.S. Frederick [Furt] Foundation.

As far as the questions of who is disgracing Bulgaria, who is undermining its sovereignty, and who is responsible to the law for such actions, are concerned, I can only provide a straightforward answer, namely it is Mr. Berov's cabinet of which you are a member, unfortunately.

Ministry Reports Adequate Bread Grain Stocks

AU1711081693 Sofia BTA in English 1820 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 16 (BTA)—The Agriculture Ministry forecasts bread grain will meet requirements until the new harvest. Fodder grain will have to be imported.

This year's crop amounts to 5.5 million tonnes [t] of grain, Radko Petrunov, chief of the Processing Industry Department with the ministry, said at a news conference today. The output of cereal crops is 3.6 million t of wheat, 957,000 t of maize, and 900,000 t of other crops.

According to Mr. Petrunov, bread grain will last out until the next harvest. Moreover, the cabinet has imposed a ban on bread grain export.

The fodder grain shortfall is estimated at 700,000 t. Domestic requirements will be met through imports, according to experts. Cooking oil prices are expected to go up. Bread prices may be raised at certain intervals.

1.37 million ha [hectares] were sown this autumn, according to statistics released by the Agriculture Ministry. 1.06 million ha were put under wheat, 290,000 ha under barley, and 9,100 ha under rye. The shortfall of land under wheat and barley is 54,000 ha and 71,400 ha, respectively, because the 1993-94 Farming Financing Act was only passed in late October.

Zieleniec, Officers Discuss NATO Membership

LD1611132093 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] [Announcer] Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Josef Zieleniec met high officers of the Czech Republic Army in Cernin Palace [in Prague] today to answer questions concerning our possible membership in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the European security structures. Miroslav Konvalina reports.

[Konvalina] The foreign minister emphasized in front of army representatives that, following the end of the cold war, NATO is the only well-functioning military alliance able to safeguard its members' collective security in a reliable way. Last but not least, it should be considered that this treaty is an acknowledgement of the linkage between Europe and America, which saved democracy for the world in two world wars. Weakening this alliance would be a very poor signal for peace and democracy in Europe. This conviction reflects our immediate historical experience.

These are the main reasons Josef Zieleniec thinks that there is no third option, or why forming new security structures would not correspond to our needs or our historical traditions, and why integration into NATO remains our objective.

Further on Zieleniec's Comments

AU1611151493 Prague CTK in English 1416 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— NATO must overcome its identity crisis, set out new goals for itself, and alter its structure accordingly, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said while meeting Czech Army's higher officers today.

Intensive discussion which has been going on inside NATO, enlivened with recent pronouncements and initiatives by Russian representatives is a sign, Zieleniec said, that the NATO reform process has started.

The Czech Republic clings to its goal of integration into NATO, Zieleniec said, as no third way or creation of new security structures would answer the Czech state's needs and historical traditions.

Either we will actively seek to join along countries whose values we share, or we shall sooner or later suffer the fate of being integrated against our own will—as happened many times before—where we never wanted to belong, he said. The Czech Republic's neutrality is out of the question, as it is just a dangerous lure, Zieleniec said.

The timetable of the Czech Republic's integration into NATO must be considered a gradual process in which the signing itself is more its completion than beginning, he added.

Baudys Supports U.S. Presence in Europe

AU1711091593 Prague CTK in English 2019 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys considers it of vital importance to acquaint the U.S. Government with the Czech Republic's ideas of European security before the January NATO meeting.

Speaking with CTK before his departure for the USA today, he said he believed that the security zone in Europe had to be extended eastwards. I want to stress the necessity of the American, and possibly Canadian presence in Europe, he said. Europe, the USA, and Canada create a certain economic and political 'Euroamerican complex', a certain common civilization space which must be jointly defended, he added.

Klaus on Constitutional Arrangement, Restitution

AU1611183893 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Nov 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Smrcek; place and date not given: "I Feel Responsible for the Unity of the State"]

[Text] In the regular column, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus replies to questions by LIDOVE NOVINY correspondent Tomas Smrcek.

[Smrcek] If representatives of various political parties are elected to head the higher territorial bodies, it allegedly could lead to a slowdown of the reform. Could that be one of the reasons why you are so hesitant in establishing these bodies?

[Klaus] Of course, a change in the constitutional arrangement of the state is a major intervention in its operation. If someone believes that it is not so, he cannot see as far as the tip of his nose. I feel profoundly co-responsible for this change, if it is implemented, not affecting the unity in the building of the state. The reform has political dimensions you mentioned, it has social dimensions, purely economic ones, financial ones, administrative, and cultural. Now and then, countries implement such profound reforms, and nothing prevents us from doing the same. I am only opposing jumping unthinkingly from somewhere to somewhere else.

[Smrcek] How do you feel about the Civic Democratic Party deputies' club voting differently on the resolution regarding the date of the start of the preparations for the public reform?

[Klaus] I believe that it was not the voting of the Civic Democratic Party deputies' club but rather of the Czech Parliament. I would not limit it to this or that political club. What the parliament passed is completely in accord with the logic of the work and discussions of the government. I do not wish to be[illegible]le the deputies' decision, but it does not constitute a reason for the government to

change its orientation towards the submission of its proposals for changes in the state administration or self-administration. Of course, we have such goals. The government has never said a word about it not dealing with this issue or wanting to sweep it off the table. Nevertheless, these simplified statements keep being uttered.

Next week, the ministers will be dealing with the problem of how to implement the reform of the state administration in the form of a debate of the entire government. They will seek a more reasonable solution than the current one. I believe that this is precisely in harmony with the resolution of our parliament.

[Smrcek] None of the Civic Democratic Party representatives wants to comment on the restitution of church property before the congress. Mr. Krycer of the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia came up with the suggestion, however, that the state keep the commercial property. In exchange, the churches would receive 20-year bonds bearing adequate interest.

[Klaus] I heard with interest that something like that was done in Malta. This information pertains to the method rather than to the basic and matter-of-fact decision. It is important to know what we are discussing. The question is how to ameliorate the wrongs inflicted by the communist regime on 10 million people of this country to the detriment of the same 10 million people of this country. The second question is the method of this amelioration. Mr. Krycer pointed out one of the possible methods that spreads the financial costs of this act over generations. What I said to Mr. Krycer about the essence of the proposal is—what you offer is to leave very low-quality coal on a very low-quality grit in a lignite power plant. All you offer is to build a higher smokestack.

Havel on Czech Attitudes Toward Demise of CSFR

LD1611133293 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prior to the visit of Slovak President Michal Kovac to the Czech Republic, Czech President Vaclav Havel granted an interview to the Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA. He noted that most of the suggestions that emerged from the talks between the two presidents in Smolenice in July 1993 failed to be implemented and that state executive bodies did not adopt them.

Havel said that the loss of the common state felt like a wound to the Czechs and that their identification with the Czechoslovak state was probably stronger than that of the Slovaks.

But he opposes the view that Slovak and Czech Prime Ministers Vladimir Meciar and Vaclav Klaus had broken up the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. If Slovakia had not wanted to become an independent state, millions of people would have staged rallies and millions would have signed petitions opposing the separation process, the president added.

He thinks that certain injustice is being done to Klaus by those who suspect him of speeding up and seeking the division, because it would boost the pace of economic reform in our country [in the Czech Republic]. Klaus and the victorious [in parliamentary elections] Civic Democratic Party were worn out after three years of squabbles for power, the Czech president added.

Czech-Slovak Summit Agenda Outlined

AU1711090793 Prague CTK in English 1840 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— Slovak President Michal Kovac is to pay a one-day working visit to the Czech Republic on Wednesday [17 November] and meet with his Czech counterpart Vaclav Havel. During Havel's visit to Slovakia in July, the two presidents agreed to meet regularly for talks. Tomorrow's meeting will be the next one of this kind.

Havel's spokesman Ladislav Spacek presented today to CTK several topics that might be discussed at the meeting. They include the question of the Czech-Slovak border and the two presidents' joint project to establish a chair of Czech and Slovak language and literature at the U.S. Harvard University.

Spacek said that consultations of interior, finance, trade, and industry deputy ministers had recently taken place at the Prague Castle (Havel's seat), which had focused on some current problems in Czech-Slovak relations. Spacek quoted Havel as saying that several matters remained to be settled after his last meeting with Kovac (in July).

Last week, Kovac said that he intended to consult Havel about convoking a summit of the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), or a meeting of their foreign ministers, before the NATO summit scheduled for January.

For the first time, Havel and Kovac met as presidents in Smolenice, west Slovakia, on July 1. They then discussed problems linked to border crossings between their countries and the division of the property of the former Czechoslovakia. In August, the two presidents met unofficially in Bratislava.

Kovac, 63, was elected as the Slovak president on January 16, 1993. Under the Czechoslovak Federation he held the posts of the head of the federal parliament, the Slovak finance minister, and deputy chairman of Slovak Government's Economic Council.

Havel Discusses Issues With Opposition Parties

AU1611151293 Prague CTK in English 1355 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— Czech President Vaclav Havel today met with representatives of the Self-Governing Democracy Movement for Moravia and Silesia (HSDMS) and Liberal Social National Party (LSNS) deputies as part of a series of short consultative talks taking place at Prague Castle. The talks focused on the local government reform, foreign policy, and restitution of church property.

LSNS leader Pavel Hirs said the meeting dealt mainly with foreign policy. LSNS deputies agreed with Havel that foreign policy should be formulated by a coordinating council on which the president, the government, and other democratic forces should be represented.

Deputy Jegla, speaking on behalf of the HSDMS, said that the defaming of parliamentary deputies should not be included in the Penal Code bill, while defaming the president should be punishable, according to HSDMS deputies, as the president is to some extent a symbol.

Both parties' deputies discussed restitution of church property with Havel. Jegla spoke in favor of long-term state-issued debentures as a useful tool for undertaking restitutions. LSNS deputies agreed with Havel on restitution, Hirs said, apart from minor differences concerning the restitution of forests and large stretches of land.

Havel started the present series of consultative meetings with representatives of deputies of all parliamentary parties on November 12, when he spoke with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). He spoke with the Christian Democratic Party (KDS), Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL), Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Left Bloc (LB), and Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) on November 13.

Havel announced on November 12 that he would not speak with the Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC) deputies.

Ruml Criticizes Failure To Ban Communist Party

AU1711090993 Prague CTK in English 1947 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kromeriz, south Moravia, Nov 16 (CTK)— A plaque to commemorate those who suffered under the communist regime (1948-1989) for promoting freedom and democracy, was unveiled today on the building of the Kromeriz District Authority in the presence of Czech Interior Minister Jan Ruml.

The crimes committed by the former Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) can be neither apologized for nor covered by the statute of limitations, like the crimes committed by the Nazis or in the Lenin-Stalin era. They all were committed with the absence of any ethical, legal, and human conscience, on behalf of a perverted ideology and with the ill will pursuing only the criminals' own benefit, Ruml said.

After the fall of communism in late 1989 we committed a serious mistake, the consequences of which we have been still trailing. The error's name is inconsistency and sometimes even ignorance. Our fundamental moral commitment and the gesture of respect to the victims of the communist terror should have been the ban of the KSC as well as a thorough purging active representatives of its policy from public service immediately after November 1989, Ruml said.

Havel Speaks on Eve of Revolution Anniversary

AU1711092193 Prague CTK in English 2027 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— An idea of national understanding and a common will to solve common problems, has created an atmosphere which has prevented dramatic civil conflict since the fall of communism, President Vaclav Havel said on television today, on the eve of the anniversary of the velvet revolution.

Havel mentioned that in the first two years after November 17, 1989, the day the revolution began, most of the basic laws of the new political system, including the cornerstones of economic reform, were passed.

Today, with the political spectrum polarized, perhaps not all of these laws would be adopted, he said.

Times, of course, have changed. We have our democratically elected representative bodies and it's no longer necessary to solve things on the streets and squares, Havel said. Although invited to participate in a Charles University discussion on the heritage law, he said he felt such meetings did not really allow good debate of laws.

October Price Increases Reported

AU1611212293 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Consumer Price Index Rose 1.1 Percent Over the Past Month"]

[Text] Prague—The overall consumer price index rose 1.1 percent during October in comparison with September. Since December 1992, the price increase amounts to 16.6 percent, and since last October to 19.9 percent. These latest preliminary data from the Czech Statistical Office were released by the press spokesman of the Office, Jarmila Lehnerova, yesterday. The overall index does not include the 8.5 percent increase in the price of the [Skoda] Favorit car because of its equipment with the compulsory catalytic convertor. The inclusion of this data would push the increase up to 1.4 percent.

The same month-to-month value of the increase as the overall index have been recorded by the indices for food and non-food merchandise. The indices for public

catering and services grew by 1.2 and 1.3 percent, respectively. The prices of food and non-food goods has grown slowest this year (12.9 and 16.2 percent, respectively), while the public catering and services growth indices were 1.21 and 1.22 (21 and 22 percent), respectively. Among the foodstuffs, meat and eggs marked the largest increase (month-to- month 4.6 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively), and the price of sugar and confectionery also rose above average (by 1.5 percent). In services, communications and day-care fees increased most (7.5 percent and 19.9 percent, respectively).

Kocarnik: Private Sector 44 Percent of GDP

AU1611151193 Prague CTK in English 2127 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Znojmo, south Moravia, Nov 15 (CTK)— An analysis made by the Czech Ministry of Finance shows that the share of the private sector in the gross domestic product (GDP) grew from almost zero in 1989 to 44 percent this year, Czech Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik said today.

(Our) Private sector cannot be compared with any other with regard to its dynamic growth within a very short period of time, Kocarnik said at a meeting with bankers and business people from the Znojmo region.

The Czech Republic will most likely register an overall increase in exports by more than 13 percent compared to last year, according to statistics made at the end of September and October. World prognoses foresee that this year's increase in exports in most advanced industrial countries will be zero compared to 1992, Kocarnik stressed.

He pointed out that this year's gradual economic growth of 0.7 to 0.9 percent was reached after years of decline, loss of part of the Slovak market (trade with Slovakia fell by around 30 percent compared to last year), and a deep recession in advanced countries. Government prognoses forecast an economic growth of two to three percent for next year, Kocarnik concluded.

Fewer Participants in Second Privatization Expected

AU1711091993 Prague CTK in English 1850 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)— The government expects over 4 million citizens to register for the second wave of coupon privatization, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said today after a ministerial meeting.

He said he hoped that the registration deadline set on November 30 would not have to be postponed, but added that if the need for postponement arose, the government would probably be flexible.

The government does not want to prevent anyone from taking part in the second wave of coupon privatization, Klaus, the father of coupon privatization, pointed out. Every citizen over 18 has the right to buy investment points worth a total of 1,000 crowns (about $34) and trade them for the shares of state enterprises.

Property worth about 299.4 billion crowns (over $10 billion) was put up for privatization in the first wave in which a total of 8.5 million citizens from all Czechoslovakia took part. About 6 million of them were from the Czech Republic.

In the second wave, which is to start sometime in the first quarter of 1994, property worth about 150 billion crowns is to be privatized. Klaus said today that a total of 345 investment privatization funds had registered as of the deadline, November 15.

Daily Highlights Problems Facing Arms Plant

AU1611212093 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 Nov 93 p 2

["(is, asa)"-signed report: "Writing Off Our Debts Is the Alpha and Omega"]

[Text] Dubnica nad Vahom—"If writing off the debts of ZTS [Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises] Dubnica nad Vahom had been dealt with fully two years ago, the situation would be different. ZTS would not now be a debtor to the state and its creditors," said Peter Koncier, ZTS Dubnica enterprise director, about the decision to halt special production and to deal with only 60 percent of the stock from the federation level.

The decision of the "federal" arbiter on the obligation to accept semifinished products from subcontractors for special production is closely associated with this, explained Koncier. The enterprise has been operating without credits for two years. Although the Slovak Government has provided guarantees amounting to 2.7 billion korunas [Sk] for development programs, the consortium of Slovak banks has, to date, only paid Sk1.25 billion of this sum. The issue involves the production of mining equipment for which ZTS purchased a license from the U.S. Reda company and which it can export to the countries of the former Soviet Union within the framework of bartering. ZTS is already selling the first part of the project, the production of cables, on the Russian market—so far, for $9.0 million.

The privatization of the state enterprise is being prepared within the framework of an employees' shareholding company. It was founded with basic capital of Sk12 million. Of the overall number of more than 7,000 employees, 900 of them bought shares amounting to 49 percent of the total shares; management (40 people) owns 34 percent, the city of Dubnica owns 10 percent, the city of Ilava owns 3.0 percent, and the trade unions own 5.0 percent. Property worth Sk3.0 billion was included in the privatization. Despite the development of alternative production programs, ZTS Dubnica is also continuing to modernize tank turrets and the "Zuzana" howitzer. The Slovak Army has not shown any interest in ZTS Dubnica's special production for this year or next year.

Emil Potocek from the Finance Department has pointed out that the new credits have already passed their repayment period and that higher interest rates (sanctions) are already being implemented.

For these reasons, each delay in writing off its debts means burdening ZTS Dubnica with more obligations. In reply to a question on whether the enterprise's employees will receive their regular pay checks on 15 November, Director Koncier said that it is not yet 15 November.

Press Comments on Financial Controversy

AU1611212193

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 9 November and Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak on 11 November publish items on the controversy between the Slovak Ministry of Finance and investment funds over an amendment to the Law on Investment Companies and Investment Funds, which the Slovak Government "discussed and approved a few days ago."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 9 November on pages 1 and 5 carries a 1,200-word interview with Ladislav Vaskovic, chairman of the Association of Investment Companies and Investment Funds in Slovakia, by Ivan Podstupka entitled "Harness for the Capital Market." The place and date of the interview, in which Vaskovic specifies investment companies' and investment funds' objections to the planned amendment, are not given.

The main objection, according to Vaskovic, concerns the proposed wording of Article 17 of the law, which obliges funds "to report to the Slovak Ministry of Finance and to the Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 30 days in advance of the sale of securities by mutual funds or investment funds in excess of 10 percent of the value of all securities in their ownership or in excess of 5 percent of the value of the securities of a single issuer." The sale can go ahead only if the Ministry does not voice any objections to the planned transaction, Vaskovic says.

Commenting on this provision, Vaskovic says: "This means, in plain Slovak, that the Ministry of Finance will approve deals at the capital market. This is incomprehensible and a world rarity. The period of 30 days is an infinitely long time on the stock exchange, where decisions must be made in minutes and seconds. Moreover, a state bureaucrat is supposed to decide on whether it is, or is not, permissible to sell property that does not belong to the state. The role of state supervision is understood incorrectly here." Vaskovic warns that, should the amendment be passed in the present form, "the law would become inconsistent with the legal state in advanced markets. We say that we want to attract foreign capital. The approval of this amendment would be a negative signal for many foreign investors. They will regard it as a severe case of state interference. We will present ourselves to the outside world as a country with a legal and economic environment that is full of contradictions. What I also object to is that the players on the capital market will be placed at the mercy of a ministerial bureaucrat, whose qualifications to assess such deals can be questionable."

Vaskovic believes that the amendment betrays a "failure to understand the principles governing the activities of the capital market" and reiterates that it will only "scare off investors." He concedes that an amendment to the Law on Investment Companies and Investment Funds is planned also in the Czech Republic, but points out that the aim of the contemplated Czech amendment is "to

liberalize the law because they consider it too restrictive." In Slovakia, on the other hand, "the restrictive nature is to be even reinforced," Vaskovic says.

Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak on 11 November on page 3 carries a 500-word "jv"-signed report entitled "Capital Market Anew." The report renders account of a news conference given by the Slovak Ministry of Finance in Bratislava on 10 November. J. Magula, general director of the Ministry's Financial and Economic Policy section, is quoted as having said that "the aim of the amendment to the Law on Investment Companies and Investment Funds is to eliminate 'black spots' [figuring] in the original law, which has been taken over from the former federation, and to secure sufficient protection of, above all, small investors." Referring to the obligation to report major transactions 30 days in advance, representatives of the Slovak Ministry of Finance reportedly asserted that the reason for this provision was "to make sure that small investors can be informed in good time about major transfers [of property] and to prevent some operations of speculative nature." This is necessary, in the opinion of the Ministry of Finance, because of the "existing personal and other links between individual investment funds and companies, their founders, and other domestic and, apparently, also foreign entities." The ministry officials argued that "the transparency of operations is in the interest of society" and that regulatory measures are common in "all advanced economies."

Private Sector Increases 3 Percent in September

AU1711132093 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Nov 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "The Private Sector Is Creating 28.6 Percent of Gross National Product"]

[Text] Bratislava—At the end of the third quarter, 27,093 economic entities, registered in accordance with the Commercial Code, were engaged in economic activity in Slovakia. The private sector represents 23,926 entrepreneurial organizations (domestic private, cooperative, foreign and international firms), whose number increased by 639 in September, that is, by 3 percent.

According to the Ministry of Finance, the private sector is responsible for 28.6 percent of GDP. It would be desirable, however, for this figure to reach 50 percent. In the first nine months, private entrepreneurs paid 590 million Slovak korunas in income tax.

FIDESZ, MSZP Lead Public Opinion Survey

AU1711084193 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Nov 93 p 7

[Unattributed report: "The FIDESZ, MSZP and the SZDSZ on the First Three Places—The Leaders Are Closer Together on the Popularity List"]

[Text] The Szonda Ipsos performs public opinion surveys in connection with party preferences every month by asking, on each occasion, a different group of 1,000 people representing the country's population who are of voting age. The surveyed people were selected through a procedure based on statistical chance, in such a way that the sample's composition corresponds to the national average according to age, living place, and gender. Every adult Hungarian citizen who has a permanent address (and can be reached there) has an equal chance of getting into the sample. For this reason, it is very likely that the composition of the sample is also close to the real proportions in other areas (like possession of telephones or interest shown in politics).

Last month, there was quite an upheaval in public affairs, and we can assume that the public will show great interest in many events which can also have an effect on their choice of parties. It is particularly important to emphasize that our survey took place between 4 and 24 October; therefore, the tense situation at the radio and television, and the personnel changes in the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] could not have played a role in forming views on the parties.

The proportion of "votes" cast for the FIDESZ is more or less equal to the rate measured in the previous month (20 percent). However, after the decline in September, the proportion of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] supporters increased again in October and it reaches 17 percent at the moment. As a result, the MSZP has approached the FIDESZ more than ever before. The MSZP's progress is even more spectacular if we look at how active the sympathizers of the various parties are. Taking into consideration the votes of those who, according to their statement, would "definitely" vote at elections of parliamentary deputies "held this Sunday"—exactly half the electors said this—then we can see that the proportion of "votes" is 23 percent each for the FIDESZ and the MSZP.

When we asked our interviewees which party in their view would receive most of the votes at the 1994 elections, the same proportion of people named the FIDESZ and the MSZP as potential winners (19 percent each). The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] followed them in third place with 10 percent, being 3 percent ahead of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF].

Still remaining with the list leaders, it is worth examining the different position of the two parties in the various places of residence. While the proportion of people voting for the FIDESZ is relatively even from this point of view, the MSZP can clearly expect the votes of town dwellers, especially people living in Budapest.

On the other places of the party list, we can only see small movements within the statistical error limits which can hardly be evaluated. The parliamentary parties that have not yet been mentioned have the support of 4 to 7 percent of the surveyed people—which means 6 to 10 percent of the "votes cast" in our public opinion survey because 35 percent of the people did not "vote" for any party at all. Voter support of none of the parties that are outside Parliament at the moment reaches 4 percent. (For the first time, the Hungarian Life and Justice Party also participated in our October survey and received 0.5 percent of the votes.) The latest public opinion polls show that the parties that were voted into Parliament would again be elected on the basis of lists—although in a completely different power structure.

MSZDP Chairman Views Election Prospects

AU1611210093 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Nov 93 p 11

[Interview with Zoltan Kiraly, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, by Istvan Tanacs; place and date not given: "The MSZDP Wants To Evaluate Itself"]

[Text] There is no place for extremism in the recently-united Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP]; we must now build, rather than destroy things—Party Chairman Zoltan Kiraly pointed out.

[Tanacs] How can people representing different trends work together?

[Kiraly] I had a pleasant surprise. One could also hear about opposing feelings when the idea of unification emerged. There were people who said that if Kiraly comes here, the MSZDP will become a branch of the socialists sooner of later. Others spoke about the harmful influence of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] in connection with Istvan Podkoniczki. I thought then that the old reflexes of animosity continued in the party. At the time of Anna Petrasovits, everything depended on her and, as a counterreaction, a terrible competition emerged for every position after Anna Petrasovits left. However, at the congress and in the course of the activity carried out since then, we have seen that it is also possible to argue sensibly, even with people who seem to be the most extremist people, when genuine goals are on the agenda. A good atmosphere creates the conditions for the return of intellectuals and workers who were previously forced into the background.

[Tanacs] You called yourself a left-wing party. Many people claim that the leftist parties are in a crisis in Western Europe too, and in Central and Eastern Europe, leftism is regarded as a nostalgia for the old regime, rather than a modern program.

[Kiraly] I always start from the values. Thus, there can be many common points in the values of the leftist parties and the Christian parties. At the time of the change in the regime, Mihaly Bihari already tried to introduce the concept of democratic socialism. At the time, this concept was discarded in the spirit of a total denial of the old regime. I am convinced that now, after four years of experience, we can accept everything represented by the concept of democratic socialism: A struggle against insecurity of existence, the modernization of the entire society, and the creation of equal opportunities. We think that the state has an important role to play in creating and maintaining social and welfare institutions and in correcting the regional inequalities.

[Tanacs] Considerable economic development took place in dictatorial regimes spanning from Chile to South-Korea, by entire generations making it attractive for foreign capital to invest there, with their cheap labor prices and self-sacrifice. One also hears claims that cheap labor could also be one of our advantages at the periphery of Europe but, after the elementary well-being and relative equality of the past decades, only right-wing parties could use adequate cruelty to force the Hungarian population to make sacrifices.

[Kiraly] In my opinion, this road cannot be followed. Nor could I compare the previous regime in Hungary with South America or Asia. This is Europe after all. The average people here developed different conditions for basic human rights and democracy. I could not accept an economic modernization carried out by selling out the country's property and people. There is a great political risk involved in shock-therapy, and I myself believe in a slower modernization. In 1990, after a freely-elected parliament took office, the new government had a great political capital and it did not begin a dialogue with the society and it did not explain the need for sacrifices. The difficulties of restructuring could have been made more acceptable by less arrogance and a more modest political style. It is possible that we would not be much better-off economically, but the tension against the current government would not be that strong either, a tension that is also drifting toward our democratic institutions.

[Tanacs] What are your relations with the other left-wing party, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]?

[Kiraly] Many people ask the following question: Do we exist one near the other, or one against the other? I do not question the determination of the MSZP and its achievements, so far, on the road toward social democracy but, in my opinion, the MSZP would have not benefited from becoming the only party in the left wing with the sole carrier of the 100-year heritage for which social democracy has fought. There are many older people and their children and grandchildren in the MSZDP who would like to engage in politics in the MSZDP, which represents a historical continuity, rather than in the MSZP. These people say that the MSZP is actually a successor party; if it accepted the heritage of property and infrastructure, it must also accept its legal predecessor in other aspects, to a certain extent. Personally, I have neither a reason nor the right to question the direction in which the MSZP is heading. We must sit down and clarify our relations.

[Tanacs] Do you think that an election cooperation is possible between the two parties?

[Kiraly] Not at all in the first round. We want to evaluate ourselves and see what the voters think about the renewed historical social democratic party.

[Tanacs] Is it possible that your appearance will harm the chances of the entire Hungarian left wing? If, for example, you fail to make it into parliament, a lot of left-wing votes will be lost.

[Kiraly] In my opinion, we can easily get at least 5 percent with solid and honest politics. Besides, in my opinion, there will be more parties in the new parliament than today, and no one will achieve outstanding results.

[Tanacs] After the renewal of the media war and the events in the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], do you regard it as realistic that the liberal bloc becomes a third alternative equal to the left wing and the conservative forces?

[Kiraly] What is taking place in the FIDESZ actually does not contradict the possibility of a three-pole political structure emerging in Hungary in 1994. As a first approach, it would be a good thing for political forces with similar programs to form a stable coalition. It can happen, however, that the election results will dictate differently.

[Tanacs] Would you give an example?

[Kiraly] For instance, the election results would make a FIDESZ-MSZP coalition a rational alternative. I fear that, in such a case, the participants would lack an adequate national responsibility and they would not be able to subordinate the party chauvinism to the national interests. This is a big danger, no matter what party might get into such a situation, because it would bring about an actual crisis situation in Hungary and would make it impossible for the country to function.

[Tanacs] In your opinion, could the government coalition preserve its power by monopolizing the radio and the television?

[Kiraly] No matter what this government does, it does not have any credit any more; nor will it gain any credit if the media keeps telling us about which minister did what, went where, and inaugurated what. The way the WEEK and the NEWS work today, it is the bottom line from a professional viewpoint. They are useless, because they are serving the power in the same way as they did in the old regime. However, people did not like the regime better because of this either. Of course, at the time, the monopolization of the mass media was not conspicuous, because of the dictatorial system. Today, however, in

democracy, this is anachronistic, and the effects of this situation will be felt at the next elections.

Court Registers Torgyan's Party

AU1611082493 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Nov 93 p 4

["Cs.I."-signed report: "Torgyan's Hungarian Future Party Established"]

[Text] Under the name of Torgyan's Hungarian Future Party [Torgyani Magyar Jovo Partja], the smallholders who support the chairman [Jozsef Torgyan] of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] established an election party. The Budapest Court has already registered the new party. Mrs Jozsef Torgyan [as published] recently set up an elections party under the Torgyan Party [TP] name but the Budapest Court refused to register this. As we have learned, similar to the TP, the Torgyan's Hungarian Future Party will run a list linked with the FKGP at the parliamentary elections, and it will set a candidate in all 176 individual election districts. The Torgyan's Hungarian Future Party was set up in addition to, and not instead of, the TP, Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan announced. He said that they had not given up hope and they trust that the Supreme Court will not refuse the registration of the TP, and, at the same time, the goal of the party's founders was to call attention to the violation of fundamental human rights. The chairman of the Smallholders Party does not think it impossible that further Torgyan-parties will be established if the smallholders notice violations of the law.

Vojvodina Hungarians Prepare for Elections

AU1611125593 Budapest MTI in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, 16 November (MTI)—The Hungarians of Vojvodina are politically mature and are aware that if they themselves do not take a stand for their autonomy, then that will not come about, the chairman of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK], Andras Agoston, told the press in Budapest on Tuesday [16 November].

The VMDK hopes to win six to seven seats in the Serbian parliamentary elections on December 19.

Agoston also said his organization has no coalition partner, as no single Serbian political force, not even the reformist democratic parties, want to represent the matter of Hungarian autonomy. Plans of the organization include to perhaps accept Serbian Croat politicians on the VMDK list.

The VMDK will carry out a part of its election preparations in Hungary, in order to convince those living here about the need to participate in the elections, Agoston said. Over the past three years, 10 percent of Vojvodina Hungarians have left their homes.

Parliament Ratifies Treaty With Uzbekistan

AU1611203993 Budapest MTI in English 1740 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, 16 Nov (MTI)—Hungarian Parliament on Tuesday [16 November] unanimously ratified the treaty Hungary and the Republic of Uzbekistan made to found proper inter-state relations.

The five-year treaty says both countries recognize and respect one another's independence and sovereignty, and are friendly states. They undertake to develop political, economic, trade, cultural, educational, scientific, technical, and humanitarian relations.

State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Andras Kelemen dated signing as March 3, 1992, and Uzbek Parliament ratification as May 6, 1993.

Deepening economic ties with Uzbekistan may offer a chance for Hungary to regain and expand its Eastern markets, Kelemen said.

Negotiations showed that Uzbekistan expects Hungarian experts to help modernize the country, the state secretary said.

TV, Radio Directors Appointed; Walesa Critical

WS1611144393 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by B.M.: "All Walendziak's Men"]

[Text] Wieslaw Walendziak became the president of the board of directors of the Polish Television [TVP] SA [joint stock company]. The following persons were appointed members of the board: Bronislaw Borkowski (lawyer, plenipotentiary for transformation of television), Waldemar Budzynski (director of the office of the communication minister), Janusz Daszczynski (former director of the Gdansk branch of TVP, now director of the office of the National Council], and Stanislaw Nowak (program director of TVP), the National Council of Radio and Television informed on Monday [15 November].

In a statement for the radio, President Lech Walesa said that Walendziak's nomination was a major mistake of the National Council of Radio and Television; he added, however, that he might be wrong. Marek Markiewicz said that it was not his duty, right, or ambition to comment on the words of the head of state; he hoped, however, that the council had made the right decision. Wieslaw Walendziak, stopped by journalists as he was entering PolSat headquarters, said that he is not a politician, even though many politicians think he is. He stressed that he is not a successor of Janusz Zaorski and that the date of 1 January, the day the Polish Television SA will be established, will spell the end of state-run television and will give rise to public television.

"I have proposed the board members to the council and I am very glad that they have been approved," said Walendziak to journalists. "Television is a very complicated business, characterized by great complexity. It proves one's maturity to admit now and then that one does not know all about television and to invite experts to cooperate. This is what I have done; however, even the board does not know all the ropes. Therefore, it will invite real experts to cooperate and this will prove not the incompetence, but the competence of this board."

The board will select the directors of the First and Second TVP Program as well as the director of the satellite television. This will be done through competition, because—as Wieslaw Walendziak said—it will minimize the influence of various politicians on filling important positions in public television. The day public television is established, the contracts of persons in managerial posts (over 100 persons) will terminate; however, the board may reappoint them to fulfill their functions again in TVP SA. The entire TVP employs 10,000 people. Will there be any layoffs?

"Judging by the emotions that were whipped up by my candidacy, one should expect that I will belch fire until someone throws a lamb stuffed with sulfur at me. Today I would like to avoid formidable statements, because I would like every statement concerning concrete decisions, such as layoffs or organizational changes, to be preceded by a solid analysis. I do not want to frighten anyone today; I would rather encourage cooperation," said Wieslaw Walendziak to RZECZPOSPOLITA.

The National Council also elected the Supervisory Board of TVP SA. It consists of the following persons: President Piotr Gawel (former director of the Advertising Office of TVP, director general of the Lintas-Poland advertising agency), Jerzy Goral (minister of culture and art in the Suchocka government, member of the Christian- National Union), Jan Gorecki (president of the Main School of Rural Economy), Karol Jakubowicz (expert of the National Union, journalist, mass media adviser to Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka), Jacek Kozlowski (director of the Press Office of the Bielecki government and Suchocka government), Piotr Lazarkiewicz (film director and film journalist), Romualda Lukomska, and Cezary Stypulkowski (president of the Commercial Bank in Warsaw).

The chairman of the board of directors of the Polish Radio [PR] SA is Krzysztof Michalski, currently director of the First Program of PR. Members of the board are the following persons: Roman Czejarek (radio journalist, director of this year's "Summer with Radio" program), Stanislaw Jedrzejewski (director of the Programmatic Office of PR), Marek Lipinski (former director of the First Program of PR), and Wlodzimierz Palka (chief technical expert of PR).

The supervisory board consists of the following persons: Andrzej Berut, Jozefina Hrynkiewicz, Jozef Kowalczyk, Robert Kwiatkowski, Henryk Michalski, Krzysztof Pawlowski, Jerzy Stepien, and Eugeniusz Wisniowski.

On behalf of the National Council, Marek Markiewicz thanked Marek Owsinski, the present director of PR, and voiced a conviction that his experiences would continue to serve the public radio. Only the journalists recalled that no one had mentioned Television Director Janusz Zaorski. Asked about his evaluation of the work of the latter, Marek Markiewicz said curtly: "Thank you."

Finance Minister on Taxes, Pensions, Deficit

WS1611143093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Nov 93 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Marek Borowski, Polish finance minister and deputy prime minister, by Katarzyna Jedrzejewska; place and date not given: "Tax Changes—Yes; Retirement Pension Changes—No"—questions published in boldface]

[Text] [Jedrzejewska] Let us begin with getting some facts straight. Are you in favor of a new, special income tax, as well as a 50-percent tax rate with regard to the personal income tax in effect up to now?

[Borowski] Yes, I am suggesting introduction of the new and special tax you mentioned, although I want to make it clear that nothing has been made definite as of yet. I have no intention of suggesting a higher income-tax rate. The tax thresholds will remain where they are, naturally after a 39-percent valorization. Most probably we will give up the idea of a 50-percent tax threshold you mentioned, because it would be strictly a measure designed to satisfy a sense of social justice. From a purely practical standpoint, the net result would be miserable, and I would even say a bit "too radical." The new tax—which, chances are, we will introduce in 1994—is called a "special tax," precisely because it will only be binding throughout next year. It would not amount to a permanent change in the tax system, but of course the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that some part of the changes will be permanently established as of 1995.

[Jedrzejewska] Do you not think that Polish people already pay enough in taxes?

[Borowski] It depends on who in particular. There are some people with very low incomes who pay too much in taxes, but there are also those who do not pay enough, at least when one makes a comparison with other countries.

[Jedrzejewska] Who do you mean, specifically?

[Borowski] I mean those people with relatively high incomes, that is to say, incomes which exceed the national average by two times.

[Jedrzejewska] The current government has been announcing measures which will facilitate an economic revival. Should not those who—as you put it—have relatively high income levels, be allowed to keep that money so they can invest it, rather than having the money taken away from them in the form of increased taxes?

[Borowski] We should aim at the kind of system where money devoted to investment is tax-free, or at least subject to lower tax rates, whereas money devoted to consumption should be subject to higher taxes. For the moment, the only way we can do this is through investment benefits, the extent of which we intend to widen.

[Jedrzejewska] Will these be typical tax breaks?

[Borowski] There are several options available. An accelerated allowance for depreciation can also be a form of investment benefit. To some extent, the planned reevaluation of part of fixed assets by 25 percent next year, will also be a benefit. This is about those fixed assets which were introduced into routine usage after 1989.

[Jedrzejewska] The special tax you are suggesting would not cover only those with the highest income levels at all. It is supposed to cover those whose before-tax income next year exceeds 7,500,000 zlotys per month. Assuming wages and salaries continue at the real level next year, the special tax would cover those whose earnings today are 6 million zlotys. Did you take into account that imposing an additional tax on that group could be socially dangerous?

[Borowski] Naturally, I am aware of that. We have no intention of hiding that aspect while submitting the tax draft before the Sejm. But on the other hand, those people whose earnings next year will be 7,500,000 zlotys, will not be among the average earners at all. We have to keep in mind that the average income in 1993 will be about 5,200,000 zlotys. So it is not possible to view the proposed tax moves as measures affecting average income earners.

[Jedrzejewska] Your plans mean that those who will be making about $700, will be paying a 44-percent tax next year. Is there any country in the world where one pays 44 percent in taxes on a $700 income?

[Borowski] Are there countries around the world where monthly incomes are in the range of $50? You just cannot approach the issue that way. I am absolutely opposed to linking the issue with income levels. In those cases where taxes are collected through the method of a progressive percentage, the percentage in question is independent on earning levels or the standard of living in a given country. The index of tax progression is dependent instead on governmental policies. One more thing: The biggest fuss is being made precisely about increasing taxes, whereas in fact the measure—let us be honest here—is a rather limited one. It is certainly a less painful measure than what Hanna Suchocka's government did by freezing the thresholds.

[Jedrzejewska] What kind of valorization index on retirement pensions, other kinds of pensions, and of earnings in the budget sector was adopted in the draft budget now being prepared?

[Borowski] It is 91 percent for retirement and other kinds of pensions—so there are no changes there. But what this means is that retirement pension levels will be increasing at a clearly faster rate than prices—this applies in particular to the lowest retirement pensions. As far as the budget sector is concerned, we are planning on a real salary increase of 1.5 percent, which means no index changes compared to earnings in the other sector, but it will still be a real improvement.

[Jedrzejewska] When increasing taxes, is your intention to be able to keep the promises made concerning higher valorization levels of retirement and other kinds of pensions, as well as of earnings in the budget sector?

[Borowski] We are not just increasing tax levels, but we are also, first of all, improving tax collectibility with regard to those people who evade paying taxes. We are doing this to be able to stop the process of degradation of the budget and social sectors. The degradation process takes place through real decreases in expenditures on those areas. An increase of expenditures in the budget

sector does not seem technically possible today, but what is possible, is halting the process of a drop in these expenditures.

[Jedrzejewska] Are you planning on changes in the system of financing retirement and other kinds of pensions next year, naturally not going into the issue of work on structural changes in the retirement-pension system?

[Borowski] I think it is possible to implement some things in this regard. It is possible to approach—after consultations with trade union organizations—changes in the principles of valorization of retirement pensions. We would like to begin a system of valorization in accordance with the index of price increases, not in accordance with the index of income increases. As far as the retirement-pension system itself is concerned, measures must be undertaken which would increase the influx of social insurance premiums payable to the Social Insurance Agency [ZUS].

[Jedrzejewska] Would ZUS premiums then be increased?

[Borowski] I do not think that would be possible. I am waiting for ZUS to speak out on the topic. I think ZUS could approach the issue of premiums in arrears the same way as we plan to go about tax debts. I mean some of the premiums should be remitted, to increase the collectibility of future obligations.

[Jedrzejewska] Is an increase in the retirement age being considered?

[Borowski] Many things must be considered, and the issue of retirement age is one of them. Also included would be transactions of order [a type of civil-law transaction, usually to perform some service within a specified time period], and so forth. When it comes to transactions of order, we want to first of all achieve a precise definition of the term. But all that is up to the labor minister.

[Jedrzejewska] Do you mean having a situation where the orderer would pay a ZUS-premium payment on every transaction?

[Borowski] There are two options possible. According to the first one, the orderer pays the ZUS-premium payment only if he conceals the fact of employing someone. According to the second option, a certain tax burden would be imposed on transactions of order; in that case, it would not be a revenue for ZUS, but one for the budget. The tax burden is then supposed to discourage others from entering into fictitious transactions of order.

[Jedrzejewska] Are you planning on any changes next year, when it comes to financing earnings in the budget sector?

[Borowski] We made it clear in our election program that talks should be initiated with the trade unions, concerning the principles of shaping earnings in the budget sector. That means that a return to a previous law—which provided for a 106-percent valorization rate—is unrealistic. Most probably, what will also be difficult is a return to the principle established by the law in question, I mean the principle of a fixed valorization index in every fiscal year. I think we will have to try and establish something over a longer period of time, for instance over four or five years. That would be the goal then, not a fixed index provided by every case of a budget act.

[Jedrzejewska] What kind of inflation rate, and what kind of increase in the gross domestic product do you envisage for next year?

[Borowski] We are preparing the budget with the assumption of 4.5 percent economic growth, and an inflation rate of 24-26 percent by December. The mid-year inflation rate would then be higher by 1- 2 percentage points.

[Jedrzejewska] How will your main principles in that regard be different from those of the previous government?

[Borowski] The primary difference is in the planned level of foreign-currency reserves. The previous government was planning on quite a substantial decrease in those reserves. That was not discussed with the Polish National Bank. The deficit which was planned according to those principles, was to be financed partly through a decrease of foreign-currency reserves. And it was not a minor figure at all, according to those plans. Today, a major decrease of foreign-currency reserves seems entirely unrealistic, just like the assumption made, that the inflation rate would decrease to 20 percent next year. That was possible with a larger money supply caused by a decrease in reserves. But it is no longer possible today.

[Jedrzejewska] What kind of budget deficit are you anticipating?

[Borowski] I do not know that yet. It is possible that it will be in the range of 80,000 to 90,000 billion zlotys. A lot depends on the possibilities of financing the deficit. If it was not for the proposed tax measures, we would be short of closing next year's budget by about 20,000 billion zlotys. Four very difficult and unavoidable measures are ahead of us next year—a valorization of tax thresholds which is much higher than the inflation rate (40 percent and 27 percent, respectively); tax reimbursements which will be much higher than those in 1993; servicing the internal debt; and guaranteed bonuses. When it comes to servicing the internal debt, previous governments always acted on a yearly basis, without presenting long-term effects or forecasts as to deficit increases.

[Jedrzejewska] I assume this government is promising to do just that?

[Borowski] Correct. When it comes to guaranteed bonuses, it was a very nice gesture by the previous

government, which cannot be simply withdrawn. Still, it implies even higher expenditures for that purpose next year.

[Jedrzejewska] On the one hand, you are proposing that taxes be raised; on the other, however, you say that there will be a fiscal amnesty for those who do not pay their taxes. Are you not afraid that this will be interpreted in the following way: It does not pay to pay more, since the debts of others are annulled.

[Borowski] What we want to do is not a simple amnesty, that is, annulling someone's debts. First, this will only concern taxes that have been or are being abolished, primarily popiwek [tax on excessive wage increases], dividends, taxes on wages. The payments of debts should be spread out over time, and only partially annulled. Thus the situation of enterprises, from the point of view of their current indebtedness, could improve; enterprises would regain the trust of banks and contractors, and they would begin paying other debts. On the other hand, after the amnesty, control over the activities of fiscal organs would be rigorous.

[Jedrzejewska] Why do you not propose to abolish taxes on the private sector?

[Borowski] If we manage to establish that some private enterprises also had to pay unfair taxes, then most certainly a tax break would be necessary here as well. It is not the amount of the tax that is important here. State enterprises were afflicted with the following taxes: dividend and popiwek, which were often calculated in a way that was far from reflecting common sense.

Certainly, we will need an individual approach here as well. There is a difference between the debt, caused by popiwek, in the Polish State Railroads [PKP] and a similar debt in manufacturing enterprises.

[Jedrzejewska] Whose debts are more likely to be annulled—those of PKP or manufacturing enterprises?

[Borowski] I believe that in PKP it is a matter of establishing rules for shaping wages and incomes in this firm. Only when restructuring activities are undertaken, also those concerning wages, could we consider the possibility of annulling part of PKP's 4 trillion zloty debt. It is obvious that such a tax burden will not be paid off anyway. We have to agree how much of this can be paid off and in what amount of time. I emphasize that for the time being, it is only my personal view.

[Jedrzejewska] Will the debts of Polish Airlines "LOT" be annulled as well?

[Borowski] I cannot say anything about this for the time being. However, I would like to warn against incurring debts because there is going to be an amnesty; the borderline will be set retroactively.

[Jedrzejewska] Do you think there is a possibility of departing from the stance taken by Poland in the talks with the London Club, that is, a 50-percent annulment of our debts?

[Borowski] The problem is not whether or not the government wants to insist on something. There is an agreement with the Paris Club, which states clearly that all other reductions that will be applied in the case of Poland must be comparable with the reduction of the creditors associated in the Paris Club. Otherwise they will treat it as an injustice toward them. Therefore, we cannot submit any other proposals. The issue of carrying out the future agreement is a different story. We are not able to pay more than $400 million after 1996. Until that time, we cannot pay even that much.

[Jedrzejewska] Do you see any possibility of changing part of our foreign debt to creditors' shares in the national property that will be privatized?

[Borowski] This is one of the items included in the so-called menu of the negotiations with our creditors. If the entire agreement were satisfactory, and some element of it were a debt for equity [preceding three words in English], then I think that we would consider such a possibility. However, if this method of reduction were agreed on before the final agreement were signed, then, frankly, I would not support such an idea.

Further on Pawlak's IMF Talks

LD1611150393 Warsaw PAP in English 1301 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Warsaw, Nov. 16—[passage omitted] Pawlak told journalists that he sees prospects for "a particularly fruitful cooperation with the IMF [International Monetary Fund]" in developing the infrastructure of transport and telecommunications and improving tax and duty collection. IMF's deputy managing director Richard D. Erb vowed to provide assistance of the bank's experts in accomplishing these goals.

Pawlak said that the government will seek a long-term cooperation with the IMF in dealing with such issues like finance and budget policies.

At present, Poland is implementing the IMF's stand-by arrangement, signed last November. The "performance criteria" set by the agreement, including the amount of the budget deficit, the government's debt to banking sector and the level of net foreign exchange reserves, were met in the third quarter of the year.

The government-sought 8-billion-dollar reduction of its debt to the Paris Club creditors hinges on the implementation of the agreement. If this agreement is successfully implemented, Poland may expect this reduction in April, 1994.

Liberals Consider Merger With Democrats

AU1611174293 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Nov 93 p 3

["WZ" report: "The Last Congress of the Congress?"]

[Excerpt] "There is no need to worry, we are not abandoning the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD] banner," KLD members opposed to a merger with the Democratic Union [UD] said at yesterday's KLD congress. "A weak KLD will not be able to campaign for liberal reforms," said those in favor of a merger.

Those opposed to the merger constituted a firm minority. Among the most skeptical about this merger were Warsaw KLD delegates who fear that following the merger, they might be overshadowed by such UD leaders as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek, and Jacek Kuron. They warned that a small KLD would "melt inside" the large UD, and that the new party would be as nebulous as the UD now is.

"The need for a purely liberal party is going to increase in line with the development of the Polish middle class," one delegate told GAZETA. "Following left wing rule, the pendulum will swing to the right, and the KLD's shares will go up once again."

But ex-senator Zbigniew Rokicki said from the congress rostrum: "Let us not panic just because we lost the elections. Let us not abandon the KLD banner." Needless to say, most KLD leaders supported the motion to merge with the UD.

UD chairman Donald Tusk said: "Even if the KLD gets into the Sejm, it will have no influence on state policy. It will become a mere liberal social club, without the possibility of pursuing liberal reforms."

Jeremi Mordasewicz, holding in his hand the weekend issue of RZECZPOSPOLITA containing news of higher taxes next year, asked: "Do you see what the new government is trying to do? We must form a strong party, because on our own we will never be able to oppose these plans. It is worth giving up the KLD banner in order to continue the reforms."

Other arguments mentioned at the congress in favor of a rapid merger are that the liberals suspect some UD members, including Frasyniuk and Kuron, of wanting to achieve a rapprochement with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The KLD's Tusk, Bielecki, and Lewandowski are reported to be anxious to sit down at the negotiating table with the UD as quickly as possible in order to stop the UD from siding with Kwasniewski's SLD. They claim that the KLD and UD should form a joint election platform for the local government elections, and that the Business Center Club, or Aleksander Hall's Conservative Party, plus such prestigious figures as Leszek Balcerowicz and Father Jerzy Tischner, should be invited to join this platform. [passage omitted]

Central Bank Chief on Need for Independence

LD1611204693 Warsaw PAP in English 1940 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 16—There are no discrepancies between the government and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) as to the sovereign position the central bank should occupy in the modern market economy, NBP President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz said on Tuesday following a meeting with Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Richard D. Erb.

According to Gronkiewicz-Waltz, the central bank should be independent of both the government and parliament who lay down the limits of NBP financing the state budget deficit. The central bank should make sovereign decisions concerning some other issues like the inflation rate and the strengthening of the currency.

The NBP president described all requirements agreed upon with the IMF as equally important and added that not satisfying any of them could bring about the failure to fulfil the other. She said she hopes that an agreement with the IMF, so important for the reduction of the Polish foreign debt, could be agreed on also in the future.

The requirements included in the currently implemented agreement with the IMF refer to the value of the budget deficit, credits granted by the banking system and the level of the budget sector debt.

Pawlak, Glemp Discuss Government-Church Relations

LD1611215593 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 16—Poland's Roman-Catholic Primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp and Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak on Tuesday held talks for more than half an hour. After the talks, the premier said there were "Such areas where cooperation of the government with the Church is necessary and even desirable." He thought this cooperation would be fruitful for everybody.

Glemp termed the talks "very nice" and said he was grateful to the prime minister for paying him a visit. The primate said this was the beginning of work for the prime minister and that is why he wished him "courage, perseverance and primarily good aides." Glemp said the Church would like to cooperate in what promoted the good of society and Poland. He explained that the area where this cooperation should take place would be "youth and family, the main social force oriented towards the future."

Pawlak said he was grateful to Glemp for the opportunity to meet him. The premier said both sides discussed all questions "uniting both sides in taking steps to promote common good."

Kwasniewski Explains Apology for Abuses

WS1711102893 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, SLD Sejm deputy and chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, by Aleksander Geryn in Warsaw; date not given; from the "Sejmograph—Parliamentary Magazine" program—recorded]

[Text] [Geryn] In the 1940's, Aleksander Kwasniewski was not even born yet, he was just two years old in 1956 when the events in Poznan took place, he was 14 in 1968, 16 in 1970, and so on and so forth. Why did you apologize for the Polish People's Republic?

[Kwasniewski] Because the victory of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] generated fear in many social groups—in connection with what they went through—on whether the old ways are not now coming back, whether the bad, past methods would not be reinstated, including limiting freedoms, breaches of the law, and unwise economic decisions. I just wanted to state clearly and concisely, that not only are these old ways not coming back, but also those who suffered deserve that kind of apology, that kind of I am sorry statement. I am not completely sure whether I should have actually have said that—I am kind of perplexed about that myself—but I still think this should have been done. Plus, I also think this was the right moment to do it, because we did this neither under any kind of coercion, nor because we want to be viewed favorably by someone, nor because we are afraid of something—such as decommunization, for instance—nor because someone told us to do this, or expects us to do it. We simply are of this view—I mean myself and my political friends, and also my political party, I think. This just should have been said, whether it was today, or yesterday, does not matter.

[Geryn] Mr. Deputy, why did you apologize now, and why did you do it so late—as some people think?

[Kwasniewski] General Jaruzelski also apologized, during a meeting with the Red Cross in Geneva. There have also been very many self-critical statements made. One of the deputies for the Democratic Union asked me today, why I did not apologize back in 1989. What I said to him was: What meaning would such an apology have had then? Where was I supposed to do it? In a restaurant, on the street; where? I was neither a Sejm deputy, nor a senator then, I was someone who had lost. Today, I am a winner, and as such, I do not want to simply regard our victory as automatically settling the issues, without the apology—that would be a cardinal mistake, an enormous mistake.

Leaders Within PDSR Plan New Cabinet

AU1611212593 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Liana Buligan article: "A Party for the President"]

[Excerpts] A short while ago, and not at all accidentally, the idea of the "opportuneness of a change" was launched in the mass media, as a conclusion reached by the group "A Future for Romania," [a movement of intellectuals from the original National Salvation Front, currently close to the Social Democracy Party of Romania- PDSR, doing analyses and prognoses of the Romanian society; it includes such prominent figures as Vladimir Pasti, Liviu Muresan, Vasile Secares, Dan Mircea Popescu, Mugur Isarescu] after a careful and responsible analysis of the economic and political crisis prevailing in Romania today. What initially seemed to have only been an innocent intervention of a vanguard of the Romanian intelligentsia—devoid of the instruments of political decisionmaking—must now be perceived quite differently in light of the important movements currently taking place within the ruling coalition. [passage omitted]

The members of the group "A Future for Romania," gathered in a circle that enjoys the president's protection, appear to be "signalling" the change, which makes them less innocent than they looked at the beginning. Moreover, they may even "trigger off" this change, which, why not admit it, is more necessary now than ever before. The current government looks quite pitiful, as it stifles in its own compromises and indecision, thus clearly proving that it has run out breath and of all other means for political action. [passage omitted]

Let us not forget that the members of the group "A Future for Romania" are those people who split from the National Salvation Front [FSN] in 1991 after their motion was defeated at the congress—where they nevertheless managed to pick up an honorable percentage of the votes—and rallied around the president, after failing to take over that party. Shortly afterward, they set up another party for the president, namely the Democratic National Salvation front [FDSN]. Now, since they are on the point of also losing this party for the president and taking advantage of the fact that, according to the latest Gallup poll, the public trust in the Vacaroiu government is gone with the wind, while that in the president remains the same, the group has decided to act. Armed with the experience of the past and after having secured, if not a pact, at least the assent of the trade unions and the opposition, the group "A Future for Romania" has all chances of succeeding in taking over power next spring, even without early elections. [passage omitted]

'Displeased' With Own Cabinet

AU1611212693 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Nov 93 p 3

[Ana Maria Vintan article: "The Social Democracy Party of Romania is Displeased With Its Own Government!]

[Text] Sources of the government party told us that the current executive in now longer supported by anyone. "Both the conservatives and the reformists are displeased with the performance of Nicolae Vacaroiu and his governmental team. The first consider the government's monetary and price policy as suicidal, while the others claim that the entire reform program is amateurish and totally inept. The only one who likes, or at leased used to like the government, is Ion Iliescu. His opinion has always been that Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu is a man with whom one can talk. After the failure of the negotiations with the IMF, it seems that the president has also changed his mind," the same source told us. "Ion Iliescu considers our foreign credentials as vital, both for the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and for his image. He knows that the poverty affecting an increasingly larger number of people is discrediting the government party and himself personally. On the other hand, changing the government in order to cling to power is no solution either, since that would amount to recognition of the accusations brought against them by the opposition." Indirectly, I understood that the most honorable exit from this situation would be a repeat of the scenario from September 1991 [the miners' incursion that toppled Petre Roman's government]. The conditions for the trade unions to take the Victoria Palace [government's headquarters] by assault will be just ripe in the coming winter.

Another problem facing the PDSR is its relations with the other parties from the parliamentary coalition. As a matter of fact, this problem also derives from the government's inadequacy. These parties are no longer prepared to grant support to the current executive power. They demand, ever more insistently, the change of the current governmental team and their acceptance as partners in forming a new government. The more vehement of them all seem to be the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]. However, the latter cannot be accepted, since it is compromised by its involvement in the Caritas affair [nationwide Ponzi money-multiplying scheme]. As for the PSM, our source let it be understood that the participation of the socialists in the government is not something to be ashamed of.

Editorial Asks Opposition Not To Isolate PD

AU1711085393 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 9 Nov 93 p 4

[Octavian Stireanu editorial: "Parallel, But More in Front"]

[Text] A picturesque confusion reigns supreme in the arch of the governmental coalition parties regarding who should or should not participate in the cabinet. Mr. Solcanu [Ion Solcanu, vice president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania—PDSR] lumps together the leaders of the other known parties. Mr. Mohora [Tudor Mohora, vice president of the Socialist Party of

Labor—PSM] distances himself from such an interpretation; Mr. Funar [Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR] and Mr. Surdu [Victor Surdu, president of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania—PDAR] want to make a "bloc," which will replace the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] on the pedestal of [founder of the National Peasant Party] Iuliu Maniu's historical, national, and peasant inheritance.

On the other side of the barricade, in the opposition's camp, things are not much clearer either—proof of which is the myriad of liberal parties, some of which are, while others are not, in the Democratic Convention [CDR], but all of which claim to embrace the same doctrine.

Therefore, if the overall situation is not all that clear, a figure apart in our political landscape is struck by the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN) or PD]. This party enjoys several important advantages: The team spirit of certain well schooled and experienced people; the experience of an extremely intensive ruling period at a most complicated time; and the additional experience, equally useful, of more than one year in opposition. With these arguments, the PD managed to impose itself as the opposition's main political force, from the viewpoint of its initiatives, the substance of its parliamentary interventions, and the pro-reform consistency of its entire policy. With such a record, it is quite obvious that the PD's posture and position cannot be exactly to the liking of either of the two main camps in parliament. If one obviously expected nothing else from the PDSR but an exacerbated revanchist political attitude—totally unrelated to a proper clash of ideas—one would have expected a more rational perception of the PD's current role by the other camp, let us say by the CDR or the parties gravitating around [PNTCD president] Mr. Corneliu Coposu's personality. Unfortunately, one can notice here an isolationist attitude, to say the least, on the part of the representatives of the historical parties, who are more pleased with, and interested in, their parliamentary seats, than in a shared, joint action in the political sphere.

Quite significant in this respect are the often-made statements of some prominent leaders of the opposition, such as Messrs. Cunescu [Sergiu Cunescu, president of the Social Democratic Party of Romania—PSDR] and Coposu, with the latter publicly displaying, in a recently published interview, the entire "confusion" (so as not to call it by another name) of the opposition vis-a-vis the PD. In Mr. Coposu's opinion, the discussions on the subject of corruption are nothing else but "family quarrels." We do not know what kind of family he was referring to, since the PDSR-PD parting of ways took place for the very reason that the respective people could no longer belong to the same family. (The same can be said about the National Peasant Party led by Mr. Ion Puiu, a notorious Iron-Guardist, which, we believe, could not have been part of the "family" of Mr. Coposu's party!). Moreover, Mr. Coposu said that he is "not interested in the settling of accounts between the former party-government comrades," thus waiting, as Stalin did in the first part of World War II, to see which of the warriors edges ahead. We believe that such an attitude of making the opposition watch the battle from the sidelines, which Mr. Coposu represents, is not right. He should take a clear and active stand vis-a-vis this fracas, which, by the way, is not among "former comrades," as he puts it. Likewise, we do not know how Mr. Coposu's claim that he challenged the "validity of the measures taken by the National Salvation Front [FSN] government" agrees with the statements made by his party colleague Mr. Ion Ratiu [PNTCD vice president], who, immediately after the installation of the same FSN government in June 1990, clearly said that "the Roman government stole the PNTCD program!." If Mr. Coposu challenged that government, it means that he did not contradict Mr. Ratiu, but—what is more serious—that he took an anti-reform stand. That would be the only other explanation possible.

Trying to further burden the PD's record, Mr. Coposu then added, to our astonishment: "We cannot say that we applaud the bringing of the miners to Bucharest or other mistakes" (of the PD, it is obvious—our editorial note). As far as we know, the miners' incursion (which could not have been organized by the very government that was going to be toppled by it) was even applauded by Mr. Coposu's PNTCD, during that party's national congress that was taking place at that very time!

A kind of verdict on his own confusion in assessing the PD's current stand is given by Mr. Coposu when he claims that he accepts "actions parallel to ours, not in alliance with us" from the PD. We have no doubt that this parallelism functions and that the the PD is in parallel with the opposition, but then—what can one do about it?—it is also slightly ahead. Consequently, the opposition will remain parallel, instead of convergent, to the long-term tranquility of the governmental coalition, unless Mr. Coposu and the parties he is spiritually patronizing manage to rid themselves of their prejudices. Likewise, the interesting games that Mr. Coposu is playing will also inevitably lead to the loss of the political capital that his personality abundantly enjoys, but which is not inexhaustible, unless he "reinforces" it with realistic and rational gestures in tune with today's policy and not with the politicking of 50 years ago.

CDR, PD Set Up 'Resistance Committee'

AU1711084393 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The parliamentary groups of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC], the Democratic Party [PD], the Romanian Ecology Party [PER], the Liberal Party-1993 [PL-'93], the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD], the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], the Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSDR], and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] announced in a communique

released today that they decided to set up a resistance committee against political persecution. The reason for this decision is the worrisome increase in the actions of the current executive power aimed at intimidating, isolating, and discrediting the opposition parties and their leaders. The respective parliamentary groups are convinced that such actions jeopardize the democratic process in our country and the freedom of each citizen.

The communique emphasizes that this decision will be urgently submitted to the ratification of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], to the executive leaderships of the CDR opposition parties represented in Parliament, and to the PD Executive Bureau. They will appoint their representatives in the resistance committee, which will establish its action program at a later date.

Opposition Hails 'National Concord' on 1 December

AU1611154693 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Today, after the conclusion of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], Emil Constantinescu, the chairman of that political alliance, announced that the following declaration was adopted unanimously:

The CDR expresses its joy over the great moment of national concord occasioned by the celebration of 1 December [Romania's national day] in Alba Iulia.

The CDR was very satisfied to learn that His Majesty King Mihai will come to Romania to attend that historic manifestation as a Romanian citizen, without contesting the current constitutional order.

We assess that the participation of the official representatives of the current state together with His Majesty King Mihai in the 1 December event is the sign of national reconciliation we all wished for ourselves. The first of December is the national day of all Romanians and therefore it should unite, rather than divide, our citizens and all Romanians, wherever they live.

Being requested to detail the stance that would be adopted by the CDR member parties if the former Romanian sovereign is not permitted to attend the celebration of the National Day, Mr. Emil Constantinescu stated that he does not believe that the current political power could again resort to tricks or illegal actions that would put such a historic day under a sign of discord.

Talking about other issues, the CDR chairman announced that, during today's meeting, they also decided that all CDR parliamentarians should vote en bloc against the two [draft] articles of the Penal Code, that—in his opinion—would restrict the freedom of the press.

UNHCR Makes 'Last Ditch' Effort for Winter Aid

AU1611184593 Paris AFP in English 1820 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By Jean Michel Stoullig]

[Text] Geneva, Nov 16 (AFP)—U.N. aid officials are to meet leaders of the three warring factions in ex-Yugoslavia here Thursday in a last ditch bid to persuade them to guarantee aid supplies to starving civilians in Bosnia over the winter.

According to UNHCR spokeswoman Sylvana Foa, the three parties will be told in no uncertain times by U.N. High Commissioner Sadako Ogata that they must ensure aid deliveries over the winter. She said: "The purpose of the meeting is to stop all this harrassment of humanitairan aid and start getting winterization material to the nearly three million people in Bosnia-Herzegovina without any means of survival.

"We're going be asking all the parties for free access and secure passage for all convoys, to agree that aid will be distributed impartially, not based on negotiations or reciprocity but on needs assessed by UNHCR."

"At stake is our last ditch attempt to get something there," she said.

The meeting, called by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), will bring together Bosnian Moslem premier Haris Silajdzic, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. They will be accompanied by their military commanders, respectively Stjepan Sieber, Milivoj Petkovic (Croatian deputy commander), and General Ratko Mladic for the Serbs.

Foa said aid deliveries to central Bosnia had been reduced to a trickle since the attack on an aid convoy on October 25 which killed a Danish civilian driver and injured 10 others. Fighting has raged in the region since then.

"We need to be able to move 45,000 tonnes of food, medicine and winter goods, including fuel, blankets, tents, mittens, stoves etc., into Bosnia-Herzegovina this winter every single week.

"Supplies were being hampered in particular by disagreements over the meaning of humanitarian supplies," Foa said, adding that Bosnian Serbs took it to mean only food and medical supplies—clothes were therefore banned.

"Right now we're getting only a very small trickle of that aid" through, she said, adding that the warring leaders had to realise that they could "no longer play political and military games with humanitarian aid."

The president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Cornelio Sommaruga, will also attend Thursday's meeting, Foa said, although international mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen will not.

One dilemma facing the UNHCR is the question of ensuring the implementation of any agreements reached, given the breaches of such accords in the past. Military means in this respect are out of the question, Foa said.

"I think the leverage is the fact there are nearly three million people who belong to all three ethnic groups who are suffering because of the acceleration of the war," she said. "It's not just Moslem windows that have been broken."

Earlier this week, the first snow of winter hit the rump Yugoslav republic, which is critically short of heating fuel because of a U.N. embargo, according to the Belgrade-based TANJUG news agency. The snow was 20 centimetres (eight inches) thick in places and some roads were cut in Serbia Tuesday, while the already unreliable public transport was badly affected in Belgrade. Temperatures reached freezing and were expected to go lower over the next few days, the news agency said.

Karadzic, Boban Confirm Attendance

LD1611164293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1550 GMT 16 Nov 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, Nov 16 (TANJUG)—Sylvana Foa, the spokeswoman of the U.N. High Commissariat for Refugees (UNHCR), on Tuesday informed journalists that the presidents of the Bosnian Serb Reupblic (RS) and of Herceg-Bosna, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, have confirmed they will go to Geneva, while the Moslem side has so far failed to give an official answer.

The meeting of the political leaders and military commanders of the three belligerent sides in Bosnia and which will be chaired by Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and chairwomen of a working group for humanitarian questions, will be held on Thursday to duscuss an urgent relief aid program for Bosnia during the winter, the opening of a humanitarian aid corridor through central Bosnia and the exchange of the prisoners of war.

In question is an urgent session of the group for humanitarian questions which is one of six groups within the international conference on former Yugoslavia.

Thursday's meeting will for the first time be attended by the representatives of the Bosnian Serb Republic, which has a number of times demanded equal treatment within the group. The meeting will also be attended by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Cornelius Somaruga, who plans to visit Belgrade, Zagreb and Bosnia-Herzegovina next week.

Silajdzic To Meet 'War Criminals'

AU1711102793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] We have received confirmation from Geneva that [Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister] Haris Silajdzic will hold talks with war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban tomorrow at the Palace of Nations. The meeting has been arranged by UNHCR chief Sadako Ogata.

Serb Official Cited on Resumption of Peace Talks

LD1511183493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1808 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Obrenovac, Yugoslavia, Nov 15 (TANJUG)—A high-ranking Bosnian Serb official announced on Monday that Bosnia-Herzegovina's warring Moslems, Serbs and Croats might resume negotiations within 10 to 15 days.

Speaking for the local radio in Obrenovac near Belgrade, Vice-President of the Bosnian Serb Republic Nikola Koljevic said that the latest mission of special Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin had given a fresh impetus to the peace process which had been stalled when the Moslem side rejected an internationally drawn peace plan.

The Bosnian Moslem parliament last September turned down the Geneva peace plan for transforming Bosnia into a union of three ethnic mini-states, seeking more territorial concessions than offered by the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

"It is our impression ... that the world will for the first time put pressure on the side which refuses to sign a new agreement," said Koljevic.

The Bosnian Serb vice-president also said that Bosnia would come considerably closer to peace with the signing of bilateral peace agreements, and that only then would it be possible to negotiate territorial concessions.

Koljevic said Churkin's visit was also important because the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia was for the first time directly linked with the acceptance of the peace plan for Bosnia.

During his four-day tour of the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and the new Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin explicitly supported a French-German proposal for a gradual lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia if Bosnian Serbs ceded more territory to the Moslems.

Ganic Says UN Uses Aid To Pressure Government

AU1711135493 Munich FOCUS in German 15 Nov 93 p 224

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Ejup Ganic by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Delayed Execution"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Will the threatening winter force Bosnia to accept the peace plan after all?

[Ganic] No, we will not give in. The United Nations and the European Community decide on the conditions in which we have to live. They decide how much food we get, and when and where we get it. But they cannot change our people's minds. Signing the peace plan would only have delayed the date of our execution. We would have had peace for a couple of months, and then the Serbs would have attacked us again—on the pretext of protecting Serbs living in Sarajevo.

[Correspondent] How can you be so sure about this?

[Ganic] We know that the international community is not going to help us. This would then be called a war of three states within a union, in which one cannot interfere.

[Correspondent] What guarantees would you need?

[Ganic] NATO could be one such guarantee, if it were willing to get permanently involved on the Balkans, and in Bosnia in particular. But I fear that it is not prepared for such a mission. Past experience has shown that a strong Bosnian Army is the only guarantee for our existence.

[Correspondent] What would be a realistic solution?

[Ganic] This depends on the international community; it creates the realities. The present map is very complicated. You need wide corridors and, in fact, the states could blockade one another. This means that dividing the country will not bring peace. A simultaneous solution must be found for Bosnia and Croatia. If the Croats demand a republic in Bosnia, they must also concede this right to the Serbs in Krajina. The same goes for Serbia and Kosovo.

[Correspondent] Muslim leader Abdic in Bihac sees this differently.

[Ganic] He has made an agreement with Milosevic, who supplies him with arms. Abdic is also supported by the United Nations. It has granted his company the exclusive right to import goods to Bihac.

[Correspondent] Will the Bosnian Army force Abdic to his knees?

[Ganic] So far we have been reluctant to attack his 500- to 600-strong forces. Incidentally, they are very well paid in German marks.

[Correspondent] Abdic claims that you want to establish a Muslim state.

[Ganic] We are far too European to become fundamentalists. But our fate will give momentum to fundamentalism in other countries. If we were Christians, we would have been helped a long time ago. The Islamic world will never forgive the West for this.

[Correspondent] Is the United Nations pressurizing you?

[Ganic] Yes, they tell us indirectly every time, if we do not go to Geneva, there will be no convoys.

[Correspondent] Who says that?

[Ganic] Everybody. Every time we break off negotiations, they reduce the humanitarian aid, and they even tolerate the shelling of our cities. On 22 October Sarajevo was heavily attacked. Usually, NATO flies over the city every day. That day, there was not a single fighter aircraft in the sky.

Reasons Behind Croatian Minister's Visits Viewed

AU1611204593 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Last week the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was visited by many world diplomats, including the cochairman of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Stoltenberg, Turkish Foreign Minister Cetin, Russian President Yeltsin's special envoy, Churkin, and Croatian Foreign Minister Granic. This diplomatic activity concentrated in only one week attracts the attention of both our public and the world public and at the same time imposes the question of why has this happened and what for. The news conferences and announcements that followed all these talks only partly reply to this question. One gets the impression that many things have remained unsaid or only partly said. What are the real aims of these visits? Here is the text of a commentary by Muharem Nuhic:

Searching for an answer to this question, we are going to particularly dwell on the (?visits) paid by Granic and Cetin. There is no doubt that Turkish Minister Cetin has once again come to mediate—honestly and with the best of intentions—between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia on the occasion of Croatia's aggression against the sovereign and internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, are Mr. Granic's intentions and aims such? Are they so honest? One can say that the time will show whether they are so. However, may we be satisfied with such a reply? Experience tells us that we must be cautious and suspicious. The talks held so far have yielded almost nothing. We made an effort to respect agreements and implement what was agreed upon. And the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the top leadership of the Republic of Croatia are [words indistinct] for preparing new and stronger assaults on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, [words indistinct] to present themselves to international public as peace-makers. Is there any reason for us to believe that Granic's most recent diplomatic offensive is different from the previous ones? It seems that there is none.

Here are several facts that speak in favor of caution. First: While Granic stayed in Sarajevo, the HVO and the Army of the Republic of Croatia intensified attacks on the free territories of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they continued destroying Bosnian holy shrines, and intensified the expulsion of Bosniaks from their homes.

Second: Immediately after he concluded his visit to Sarajevo, Mr. Granic flew to New York in order to persuade the United Nations and Washington to believe in the readiness of the Republic of Croatia to peacefully solve the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis and in order to try to remove the label of aggressor against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia.

Third: Under ever-clearer public criticism of Tudjman's policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, and even in the Croatian Assembly, Tudjman's standing and the stability of the Croatian Democratic Community, the leading political force of that state, have seriously been undermined. This diplomatic action of Granic's should serve to neutralize the effect of this criticism on public opinion in Croatia and on the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fourth: With this, as well as with some other moves, Granic, that is, the policy of the top Croatian leadership, desires to prevent or at least hinder the spreading of the respect and influence of Croatian representatives in the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Messrs. Stjepan Kljujic and Ivo Komsic, as well as to disable the other factors of Bosnia- Herzegovina Croats who support an entire and indivisible Bosnia- Herzegovina.

We believe that the Presidency and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the Supreme Command of its Army keep all this in mind and that they will not let us be cheated again this time.

SDA Chairman Rules Out Automony Hopes

AU1611165393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Excerpts] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] held a news conference today at which Party President Mirsad Ceman and Enver Kreso, new president of the SDA club of deputies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, spoke. Here is a report by Nedzad Leko:

[Leko] Addressing the journalists, SDA President Mirsad Ceman first spoke of the situation in the Bihac Krajina where he has recently stayed for over a month:

[Ceman] "A carefully worked out aspect of a special and open warfare against the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is under way on the territory of the Bihac Krajina, which is primarily aimed at destroying the unity of the Bosnian Muslims—Bosniaks, as the main pillar of survival and preservation of this state. Fikret Abdic, a champion of such a policy of wide international dimensions, also favors such an option. With the method of coarse, brutal force and arms, which those who support him in Bihac encirclement had given to him so graciously and generously, he has decided to crush the resistance and defense of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by force and military means. The imposed concept, as I have said, forms the basis for the breakup of the political essence of the Bosnian Muslims-Bosniaks, the territorial partitioning of the free territories of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by definitive destruction of the state and the political essence of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

[Leko] Mirsad Ceman emphasized that the problems can be resolved through a combination of political activity, which must continue to be present on this territory, and an efficient and decisive use of all other means by which any other state would defend itself. Here we must also stress the following, Ceman added:

[Ceman] "Not a single communal assembly from this territory, not even Velika Kladusa, therefore, not a single legal organ has supported the idea of autonomy or Fikret Abdic. There have been individual deviations. Individual deputies of this or that assembly have placed themselves at the service of this policy but, I repeat, not a single assembly has. This is a very important political indicator for us and a confirmation that Abdic is using the methods of which we spoke to make it appear that what he favors is the will of the Bosnian Krajina people." [passage omitted]

[Leko] Mirsad Ceman also answered numerous journalist questions. We single out his assessment of the autonomist tendencies that the aggressor is nurturing in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

[Ceman] "This is one of the phases in the struggle of the greater Serbian and greater Croatian aggressors, the international policemen, and so forth, against the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and against the Bosnia-Herzegovina people. In this phase, therefore, we are faced with the destruction of the Bosnian Muslim nation and the patriotic forces from within. The Muslims, that is to say, the Bosniaks, are being offered the idea of autonomy as a solution by simultaneously disputing the mere thought of this for Knin Krajina and Eastern Slavonia, that is to say, Western Slavonia in Croatia or for Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina in the Republic of Serbia, and so forth. An averagely informed citizen knows what it is all about.

"[Words indistinct] to your question. It cannot be ruled out that some people in the free Bosnia-Herzegovina territories, and among them also the Muslims, do not think so. However it is absolutely correct and definitive that there is no talk and can be no talk of some organized aspect of espousing such ideas."

[Leko] Concluding today's news conference, Minister Ceman said that the SDA favors a just peace that will preserve the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina and guarantee the survival of the Bosnian nation."

Izetbegovic Welcomes 'Croatian Civic Party'

AU1611212393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, received a delegation of the newly formed Croatian Civic Party [hrvatska gradjanska stranka] in Zenica today at the Peoples Theater in Zenica. Mujo Delibegovic reports:

[Delibegovic] Emphasizing that he was pleasantly surprised by the formation of the Croatian Civic Party, its program orientation, and by what he has heard from the members of this delegation, President Izetbegovic promised his full support and help, emphasizing that the doors of the Presidency and other state organs are open to them, but that they will not interfere into their policy.

Regarding the party's policy, which was also discussed during the meeting with the president of the Presidency, Croatian Civic Party President Dragutin Zvonimir Cicak spoke at the promotion, which began in the Peoples Theater at 1155, emphasizing that the party's goal is to preserve and [word indistinct] Bosnia-Herzegovina as an indivisible, independent, and sovereign state which is determined by joint borders recognized by the international community and in which the Bosnian Croats, Muslims, Bosniaks, Serbs, and 27 other ethnic groups will live one alongside one another with full respect for religious and other civil particularities.

With the symbolic commencement of today's promotion of the Croatian Civic Party, it was emphasized what the party wants but also what it does not want. According to President Cicak, the party does not want neo-fascism, Nazism, or nationalism of any nation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina into tiny states and autonomous regions. It does not want anyone outside the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina shaping their future and determining the way of life for our citizens. It does not want crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and war as a way of life, but wants peace.

Favoring unified state, legal, and legislative authorities and joint defense forces throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Civic Party in its program rejects cooperation with those parties and associations that have committed crimes, genocide, expulsions, and similar acts. In connection with this, Mr. Cicak

reminded that over the last 75 years the few Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been drawn against their will into dirty political games of the Croatian state and into terrible crimes, violence, genocide, and armed clashes against the Serbs and the Muslims. For the second time in the last 75 years, the president of the Croatian Civic Party said, the Bosnian Croats have been politically led into twilight by the politicians who had embraced neo-fascism, and a Nazi policy that was, is, and will remain a symbol of the Croatian greatest historic shame. [passage omitted]

Izetbegovic Returns From Central Bosnia

LD1711091493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 17 Nov 93

[Text] Following his tour of free territories in our country, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and his aides returned to Sarajevo this morning. Yesterday President Izetbegovic visited Fojnica, where he had meetings with representatives of the area's local authorities and members of the command of the 6th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Article Views Actions of Muslim Leadership

AU1611130593 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 9 Nov 93 pp 40-41

[Article by Tarik Malic: "Through New Offensives to the Islamic State"]

[Text] The bloody reality of the war has definitely convinced us that Serbia, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, is not going to give up an inch of the conquered territory in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it does not want any kind of just peace, in spite of the sanctions that have brought it to its knees. After the recent events in Sarajevo, Vares, and western Bosnia, there is no doubt that the Muslim leadership, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, will not consent to peace for a long time to come—until the plan on establishing the Islamic state is actualized, with Mostar and Neum as "historically Muslim towns." The appointment of Haris Silajdzic as Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister, in addition to the quick acquisition of arms and mobilization of new soldiers, has been interpreted in the foreign media as the complete absence of a "political willingness for peace." Deutsche Welle radio said: "Even if one does not go as far as Fikret Abdic, who is demanding that Silajdzic be prosecuted for carrying out the foreign policy that is fatal for the Muslim people, the new prime minister's formula saying that Sarajevo can not end the war since it did not start it is still not very promising." The members of Silajdzic's new government are less promising yet.

First, only four of the 22 government members are not Muslims. Two of them, Ivo Knezevic and Gradimir Gojer, are Croats, orthodox bolsheviks, and communists, who have, in the course of the war, supported the interests of the most extremist part of the Muslim leadership more than the interests of the endangered Croat population in Sarajevo and central Bosnia. Moving Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, "the man from the shadow," from minister of energy and industry to minister of "specific-purpose production"—that is, military industry—is a new confirmation of Silajdzic's government being committed to work on continuing the war. Irfan Ljubijankic, the new foreign minister, is in charge of carrying out this policy toward foreign countries. Apart from the fact that he speaks Russian, he is also known for his extremism and direct involvement in the bloodiest conflicts between the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Muslim population of western Bosnia, along with Mirsad Veladzic, another new minister.

According to statements by a high official of the 5th Corps intelligence service, who disclosed the secret plan for killing certain prominent Croat citizens in Bihac and Cazin, Ministers Ljubijankic and Veladzic, in cooperation with Mirsad Sejdic, member of the command of the 5th Corps, originated the action called "The Withered Croat Rose," whose aim is to ethnically cleanse the region of citizens of Croat nationality. With the disclosing of the plan, the Muslim aggression on the Croat areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina began.

The Hypocritical Requital With the Mafia

The October events in Sarajevo were very hypocritical. It all began under the pretense of the struggle against crime and extremism, as the beginning of the process of disciplining the mafia. The paradox is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs units started the requital in Sarajevo by taking action against those who had been working under the watching eye of the Sarajevo manufacturers of darkness—Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Alija Izetbegovic, and Ejup Ganic—throughout the war. The state media in Sarajevo wholeheartedly supported Izetbegovic's action against war profiteers and their leaders.

Musan Topalovic-Caco, commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has been killed under very suspicious circumstances, while Ramiz Delalic, deputy commander of the 9th Motorized Brigade of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, known to have participated in the "murder of the Serb fellow" at Bascarsija, which was an overture to the first Serb attack on Sarajevo. Although it was known that both of them were leaders of certain Sarajevo criminals, they had unlimited power because they were supported by President Izetbegovic. Within the struggle "against traitors, informers, fifth columnists" and, criminals, they were removing Serbs and Croats and the insufficiently extremist Muslims of Sarajevo—by killing them at night or by taking them to the front lines, from which they never returned. Immediately before he was killed, Musan Topalovic hijacked a UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] vehicle with the crew in it, about which General Jean Cot, chief commander of the peace forces, filed a strong protest to the authorities in Sarajevo.

The hijacking was part of the Sarajevo leadership's plan, an action against the Sarajevo Chetniks on a local scale, which resulted in Serb retaliation across the city. Sarajevo once again became the center of international attention. Sarajevo authorities could sleep peacefully—Sarajevo and the Muslim people once again bore the halo of a victim. Therefore, they could launch new offensives at the Croat areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they could plan new retaliations against the civilian Croat population. Caco did his job, and he had to be disposed of, as was the case with other people of his kind.

At approximately the same time, Sefer Halilovic, former head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Command Center, also became a scapegoat. He was charged with concealing the crimes that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army had committed against the Croat population, including the massacre of 30 civilians in the village of Grabovica, while the true culprits were not called to responsibility. Among them is Enver Hadzihasanovic, until recently commander of the 3d Corps of Zenica, who succeeded Halilovic. This change marked the end of his career: From a former Yugo-army officer, he first became the untouchable commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and eventually a completely destroyed man.

Disposing of the Witnesses

The requital of Sefer Halilovic was preceded by an attempt on his life, of which his pregnant wife and her brother were victims. In Sarajevo, it was believed that the direct hit of a rocket launcher was the doing of one of the competitor power-wielders, but the entire case had been directed by the top circles of the Sarajevo authorities. Removing the once-praised fighters for a "sovereign and unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina"—Caco, Celo, and Sefer—is much more complicated than one may conclude at first glance. The people who are well informed about the situation in Sarajevo say that Caco and Celo carried out all their criminal actions in cooperation with Sefer Halilovic. Crime simply flourished in this city, which a foreign correspondent has recently called the Wild West. In the beginning, public and private property was plundered, then followed the plundering of humanitarian and other aids, then there were all kinds of smuggling, and finally there was arms and drugs trafficking. This was all supervised by Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, the man from the shadow and the person whose authorities and powers exceed those of a minister. Great amounts of money, paid primarily by the long-suffering citizens of Sarajevo, partly served to finance the military industry and the purchase of arms.

In that context, the disciplining of the mafia and the requital of war crimes assume another dimension—there is the impression that the matter concerns removing the key witnesses to the underhand dealing carried out by the Sarajevo authorities, while, at the same time, the international public is being whitewashed by the Sarajevo authorities "showing" that they are "prepared and determined to establish what order they can in the area under their control".

The key person in the requital with the mafia was Bakir Alispahic, minister of internal affairs. He was determined to complete the action. His ministerial seat was shaky enough, and there was a lot of talk in the corridors that he should be replaced by the old-new minister Jusuf Pusina. The loss of the seat would mean the disclosing of his criminal acts, which he also performed long before the war. Once only an ordinary analyst at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Alispahic, as an SDA [Party of Democratic Action] nominee, managed to become the number one man of the Sarajevo Center of Security Services during the war, which enabled him to conceal the transactions that he, according to certain sources, had conducted with Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the so-called Assembly of the Serb Republic. The most famous of their joint dealings was the stealing of gold bars and jewelry from the Sarajevo gold articles manufacturers. When one takes into consideration the fact that Alispahic's close family was spared in the massacre carried out earlier on in the war by the Chetniks in his native village of Ahatovici, near Sarajevo, there is no doubt that Alispahic and Krajisnik conducted the above "transaction."

Forcing Militant Islam

Alispahic, therefore, knew that the only way out for him was to remain in the position of a minister and not allow former Minister Jusuf Pusina, whom the new prime minister Silajdzic seemed to trust, to come back. Following the action against war profiteers, his first task was to place Jusuf Pusina in custody. All of the above, in addition to the recent tragic events at Vares, shows that Silajdzic's government has entered a long-lasting "just war," striving toward establishing an Islamic state in the heart of Europe.

The former is connected to the recent public announcement by the government and Presidency of the state-forming Parliament of the Autonomous Province of West Bosnia, in which it was stated that the authorities of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia had discovered the essential meaning of the idea regarding an Islamic state in these areas. Irfan Ljubijankic and Mirsad Veladzic presented the plan for forming the Islamic state. The plan was carefully structured and the people and institutions that were to carry it out were carefully selected. The main part of the plan was the change in the consciousness of the Muslim people, on the basis of Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration, and the main motto was the escalation of war. In order for the so-called revolution from the inside to occur, there had to be as many killed and wounded as possible and as much hatred toward the present values. The carrying out of the plan was to be facilitated by the army and the police, with the help of the mujahidin. The next step was to be

the founding of schools, cultural and religious institutions, and state institutions that were to force militant Islam.

It was indisputable that the initial stage of the project for the Islamic state was going to be carried out at the expense of the Croat population and the Croat areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija Izetbegovic confirmed that by consenting to have humanitarian aid delivered through the corridor in the so-called FRY, so that, according to him, the Muslim side would avoid the blackmails by the Croats. This is nothing else but an announcement of new offensives at the territory of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

Croat Military To Crack Down on Crime

LD1611173493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Zdenko Vranjes reporting from Mostar]

[Excerpts] There are no new reports from the Gornji Vakuf area where extremely heavy battles raged yesterday between the Muslim Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. According to the latest official reports, filed last night, HVO formations took important positions around this town and crushed the Muslims' lines in six separate locations.

Mostar has been relatively quiet. The snow that has turned Herzegovina's mountains white is raising concerns for the survival of civilians in central Bosnia among all those who have any knowledge of the grave humanitarian situation in this area. It is still snowing in Novi Travnik and the Lasva valley, while the temperature has dropped to an exceptionally low level. Warm clothes and footwear are in short supply. There is no fuel even for those houses that have sustained only limited damage and are still habitable. There is no electricity and food either in the Lasva valley. [passage omitted]

Following their crushing of the Muslim offensive and successful counterattacks in the Fojnica area, HVO commanders and members of the civilian authorities of central Bosnia have told reporters in Busovaca about their successfully launched operation aimed at curbing crime and smuggling. Full respect for the norms of international humanitarian law and the completion of the legal system were singled out by Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic as the main task of the new government of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna.

Today Prlic and Perica Jukic, his new defense minister, and Colonel General Ante Roso, commander of the HVO Main Headquarters, talked about the consistent implementation of international humanitarian and warfare law on the entire territory of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, and in the HVO's zones of responsibility.

The Defense Ministry and HVO Main Headquarters have already issued orders to the effect that every case of violation of the norms of international humanitarian and warfare law should be met with the most stringent punishment. Every HVO formation has also received a special brochure that lays down in detail procedures regarding POWs, civilians, and cultural and historic monuments. [passage omitted]

Muslim Forces Launch 'Major Offensive' on Serbs

LD1611224893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2148 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Belgrade, 16 Nov (TANJUG)—Encouraged by successes in battles against Croatian Defense Council forces in the Vares area, Muslim forces loyal to Alija Izetbegovic and devoted to fundamentalism have launched a major offensive in the territory of the republic of Srpska, the information service of the main headquarters of the republic of Srpska army reported this evening.

To achieve this goal, Alija Izetbegovic has ordered additional mobilization of military conscripts in central Bosnia, resuming "The Only Solution" offensive, says a statement issued by the main headquarters of the republic of Srpska Army.

Serb Army Reports Attacks by Muslims, Croats

LD1611183293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1523 GMT 16 Nov 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Bratunac, Nov 16 (TANJUG)—Joint Bosnian Croat Defence Council (HVO) units and troops of neighbouring Croatia, as well as Muslim forces, on Tuesday continued attacking Serb settlements and positions held by the Bosnian Serb army, Bosnian Serb army sources said in a statement.

In northern Bosnia the Bosnian Serb army dispersed three Muslim guerrilla-sabotage groups in the region of Mt. Ozren and in the area of Teslic, the statement said.

Along the border between the two former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, in northern Bosnia, joint HVO units and troops of neighbouring Croatia continued infantry and artillery attacks on the Bosnian Serb army positions, TANJUG learned. Croatian tanks have been reported in the Orasje valley, said the Serb side adding it has proof about this.

The Muslim troops in northern Bosnia continued combined artillery-infantry attacks on Bosnian Serb army positions in the region of Doboj and Maglaj and opened fire from anti-aircraft machineguns and snipers on Serb villages, the Bosnian Serb army said.

The Muslim forces also mounted artillery and infantry attacks in the vicinity of Foca, Cajnice, Ustikolina and Zvornik (eastern Bosnia) and close to Kladanj and Olovo (central Bosnia), the statement said.

'Decisive Battles' for Olovo Expected

AU1611192993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Velid Djindjo report from Olovo]

[Text] After yesterday's hellish day, a difficult night, and a stormy morning in Olovo, the activities of the united aggressor have subsided somewhat in the course of the day, especially in (Baktic-Krusevac) part of the battlefield.

The defenders of Olovo resisted several infantry attacks this morning, inflicting great losses upon the enemy on that occasion. The enemy is intensely regrouping its hardware and manpower and this particularly applies to the (Baktic-Krusevac), Lukavica, and Crna Rijeka battlefields.

At the moment the situation is particularly difficult around (Zubet) near Vares where the united aggressor is attempting a breakthrough toward Mt. Zvijezda in the desire to cut off Vares-Olovo communication route and, thus, cut off Zenica and Tuzla basins.

Beside the existing four enemy corps that are attacking Olovo, strong aggressor reinforcements have arrived to the Nisic Plateau this morning. The Nisic Plateau is of particular strategic importance for the lifting of the blockade and liberation of Sarajevo but also the territory against which the united aggressor plans a large-scale offensive in the coming days to take control of the corridor along river Krivaja that links Romanija-Nisic Plateau with Mr. Ozren. It is evident that today's relative lull and cold barrels are merely a break before the decisive battles for these territories.

Muslim Offensive 'Intensified'

LD1711121393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1038 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Bratunac, Zvornik, 17 Nov (TANJUG)—Offensive combat actions by the Muslim units against the Serb side are continuing, TANJUG has learned today from the military sources in the Republic of Srpska. [passage omitted].

Muslim forces have intensified their attacks against the Serb side on the Olovo-Kladanj battlefield. Fighters of the republic of Srpska army have successfully, and without suffering any losses, thwarted several consecutive attempts by the Muslim infantry forces to penetrate into the Serb defense lines.

The Serb side has the information that regrouping and concentration of fresh Muslim forces is continuing in the Olovo-Kladanj battlefield. This has been explained by additional mobilization orders that have been issued in central Bosnia. This is all in connection with a well-planned Muslim offensive of large proportions secretly called "The Only Solution."

The main objectives of the operation are to seize the left bank of the Drina river; to link up with Raska, Kosovo, and Metohija; and to create a Gorazde-Grebag-Sarajevo corridor.

Olovo Appeals for Safe Haven Status

LD1711090893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 17 Nov 93

[Text] The aggressor's latest offensive against Olovo is yet to end. The combined forces of the eastern and western aggressors [Serbs and Croats] are attempting to cut off the Olovo-Vares road. In the fighting against the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their large infantry and artillery forces can, of course, expect no successes. The Olovo war presidency has therefore sent an appeal for the area to be declared a safe haven.

Muslims Use 'Chlorine-Filled Shells' Near Fojnica

LD1611174693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] A general alert was sounded in Mostar at about 1600, followed immediately by several mortar and artillery shell explosions. No other details are available. Zdenko Vranjes reports for Croatian radio:

[Vranjes] The political administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna reported that over the last three days the Muslim army has killed dozens of women and elderly people, some of them over 80, in the Vares area. The Croatian Defense Council [HVO] Ban Jelacic Brigade claims that to conceal its crimes the Muslim army has buried its civilian victims in mass graves. The Kiseljak HVO insists that the crime committed in Vares is behind the failure by the Muslim side to observe an agreement on exchanging the dead and releasing a number of detained Croats. The agreement was to have been implemented three days ago.

Muslim artillery continued to pound villages in the vicinity of Fojnica using chlorine-filled shells. The Kiseljak HVO also reported that Muslim forces set the Croat villages of Scitovo and Zimje Majdan on fire after killing a number of civilians there.

The Muslim side refused to allow UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to transfer the bodies of the two priests killed yesterday, the guardian of the Franciscan monastery, Father Nikica Milicevic, and its vicar, Father Leon Migic. There is concern about the whereabouts of three Franciscan monks and five nuns who were in the Holy Spirit monastery in Fojnica when Muslim forces broke into it. [passage omitted]

Abdic Forces 'Defeat' 5th Corps Units Near Buzim

LD1611234893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The strongest attack the remainder of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has so far launched against the forces of the autonomous province of western Bosnia ended in the total defeat of Izetbegovic's units in the village of Todorovo, near Buzim, where the fiercest fighting took place and which lasted more than 52 hours.

ZBIA news agency reports that about 100 extremists, foreign mercenaries, and mojahedin are still surrounded in the village and are trying to escape toward Cazin.

Sarajevo Radio Reports on 16 Nov Fighting

AU1711105893

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 17 November carries in its regular 10-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic. Reception is fair.

In his report from the Doboj front, Mirudin Aldobasic says that "it has become a rule with the Mt. Ozren Chetniks to attack the free Doboj territories only at night. So, last night the aggressor from (Matinovac), (Pribile), Cevarlija, Potocani, and Jabucic Polje used self-propelled weapons [samohodka], mortars, recoilless guns, Bofors, antiaircraft guns, and machine guns against the residential areas of the free Doboj territories and the defense lines." He says that "there was some provocative enemy small-arms fire at Putnikovo Brdo, (Karuse), Matuzici, and Mravici this morning."

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3d Corps reports on the situation in central Bosnia, saying that "the aggressors have been attacking the free territory of Gornji Vakuf with everything they have. They have been constantly firing with artillery at the defense lines and the town itself. They have been attempting to launch an airborne assault with helicopters from Kola and (Sarajevska Vrata), but our fighters were able to repel this attempt. Several Ustasha saboteurs that have been infiltrated on our territory in the region of Vranica have been eliminated." As for the Vitez front, the report says that "the ustashas have been firing incessantly with small arms and antiaircraft weapons. The heaviest attacks have occurred in the (Gostonja) region, but to no avail. At the Zavidovici front, the chetniks have been firing sporadically with small arms, while the Ustasha artillery from the direction of (Ostova) has been shelling the defense lines and the town of Zavidovici itself." The report says that the other fronts in the zone of responsibility of the 3d Corps have been "quiet."

Reporting from Brcko, Hamiz Deronjic says that "the shelling of the defense lines is continuing. The aggressor is firing with antiaircraft guns at Bukovac, (Kladije), and Djukici this morning. The Serbian aggressor is continuing to regroup his forces that he recently brought to the Brcko front. The reconnaissance units of the 108th Motorized Brigade yesterday afternoon reported the movement of enemy tanks from Lipovac toward the occupied village of Donji Rahic."

The Gradacac Information Center says that "it is quiet again this morning. The snow that has been falling for over 40 hours seems to have cooled the weapons of the soldiers of the so-called Serbian Army."

In his report from Olovo, Velid Djindo says that "the latest and fiercest offensive so far by the united aggressors [Serbs and HVO] continued overnight with artillery and infantry attacks on the Olovo and Vares free territories. The aggressor's heaviest attacks concentrated on the strategically important point of Kremenjaca, some 10 kilometers west from Olovo, in the Vares village of (Zupeta). Throughout the day yesterday, the occupying forces were attacking in the direction of Mt. Zvijezda, with the aim of severing the Vares-Olovo road and, thus, opening the way for a definite splitting of our country at its most sensitive part. The units of the 2d Corps have put in superhuman efforts to halt all the enemy attacks." He says that "the united aggressor took advantage of yesterday to bring in more forces and regroup the existing ones. New reinforcements have arrived from the direction of Srednje to the Nisic Plateau, the Drina Corps, the Eastern Posavina Corps, and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Regrouping has been reported in the wider region of Krusevo and Olovske Luke."

Tudjman Appoints Security Council Members

LD1611170093 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] As some members of the Council of Defense and National Security and the Presidential Council have taken on other duties and new people have in the meantime taken over the functions related to the the council's functioning, president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, by his decision of 16 November 1993, appointed members of the Presidential Council of Defense and National Security.

The following are appointed members of the Presidential Council of Defense and National Security: Stjepan Mesic, president of the Croatian Assembly's Chamber of Deputies; Josip Manolic, president of the Croatian Assembly's Chamber of Counties; Nikica Valentic, prime minister of the Republic of Croatia; Jure Radic, head of the office of the president of the Republic of Croatia; Hrvoje Sarinic, advisor to the president and the head of the Department for National Security; Franjo Greguric, main economic advisor to the president; Pero Jurkovic, governor of the National Bank of Croatia; Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Vladimir Seks, deputy prime minister; Borislav Skegro, deputy prime minister; Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister; Gojko Susak, defence minister; Ivan Jarnjak, minister of internal affairs; Zoran Jasic, finance minister; Mladen Vedris, president of the Chamber of Commerce; Brigadier General Janko Bobetko, head of the Croatian Army General Staff; Luka Bebic, president of the Croatian Assembly's Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security; and Miroslav Tudjman, head of the Croatian Information Service.

The council's general secretary is the head of the office of the president of the Republic of Croatia. The council's secretary is the head of the Military Office. Depending on the agenda the general secretary proposes the list of names to the president of the council's members, or deputies in the case of the members' absence, of the president's advisors and other officials, when and as needed, who are to be invited to the council's sessions. [sentence as heard]

The coming into effect of this decision annuls the decision of 10 September 1992 on the appointment of the Presidential Council's members, and the decision on the founding and appointment of the members of the Council of Defense and National Security of 20 January 1993, and the decison on the founding of the Council for Strategy of the Development of Croatia of 13 February 1992.

The decision comes into effect on the day it is passed.

Granic Holds Talks at UN Security Council

LD1611105893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Mate Granic, the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, in his talks with the UN Security Council president—the ambassador of Cape Verde, Jose Luis Jesus—has opened a new round of consultations on resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.

During his talks with the UN Security Council president Foreign Minister Granic forwarded a letter to Jose Luis Jesus in which Croatia demands that the Security Council take necessary measures for establishing Croatian authority in the so-called pink zones as soon as possible.

Foreign Minister Granic also held talks with the ambassadors of other UN Security Council member-states—New Zealand, France, Hungary, Spain, Argentina, China, and Russia. During the talks he briefed them on president Tudjman's peace initiative proposal and on the peacemaking attempts by Croatia to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mate Granic will continue the consultations in his talks with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and with the ambassadors to the UN Security Council of the United States, Great Britain, and the Czech Republic.

UNPROFOR Takes West Slavonia Villages

LD1611140593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1310 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Knin, 16 Nov (TANJUG)—Members of the Nepalese UN peacekeeping battalion again took control of the villages of Sirinci and Masicka Sagovina in western Slavonia, after the Croatian Army had withdrawn, the main headquarters of the Serb Krajina army said today.

The same source reports that despite the intensive negotiations and a cease-fire agreement the Croatian aggressor forces continue to attack in northern Dalmatia, eastern Slavonia, and in Lika.

They fired from mortars on the Krajina positions in the Novigrad region and from howitzers on the positions in Zemunik Gornji in the wider region of Benkovac. Two civilians were wounded in the attacks. [passage omitted]

Article Views Serbian Krajina's Military Power

AU1711112693 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Nov 93 pp 10,11

[Article by Fran Visnar: "Serbian Cannons Without Gunners"]

[Text] A wise man once wrote that power is a double-edged sword. You can use it to benefit the nation, or to destroy it. Serbs in the rebel regions of Croatia believe that the main reason for the conflict with the Croatian authorities is neither religion nor ideology, but land. "It is land that divides us. We want it, and they want it as well," an anonymous member of a Serbian howitzer crew somewhere near Zadar says, answering a question by

reporters of Radio Korenica and Radio Banja Luka about what the essence of the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats is.

Despite all reasonable peace initiatives, the Serbs are still relying on the power that they were given by the former Yugoslav People's Army. That technological power gives the Serbs the strength to absorb relatively easily several successive strategic defeats, and continue to be a tenacious and tough competitor who does not give up his determined goals that easily. Therefore it would be useful to see finally whether their attitude is a bluff or a myth, or whether they are really playing their trump card. In such analyses, military experts are always interested in the extent to which the Serbian war machine has been exhausted in the Krajinas, how large their reserves of ammunition and heavy weapons are, how high the tolerable limit of losses is, and what the conscription potentials are, since the Serbian population in those regions has been subject to migration.

Staff

The armed Serbian formations in the occupied regions of Croatia number 40,000 men at this moment. Given the additional conscription efforts, and the volunteers from Serbia and abroad, that number will have increased to 50,000 more or less military experienced men by the end of the month. Their army is dressed in rather a motley fashion, so on the front lines they have a rule: "If you see more than five soldiers dressed identically, shoot at once, because those are definitely Croats."

However, such a form of Partizan-like organization is not the crucial weakness of the Krajina defense. The worst trouble is the outflow of the most capable male population. Therefore any loss of manpower (the badly wounded or the dead) is an additional, long-term problem. If Milosevic were to order general mobilization, in Serbia and Montenegro alone the conscripts between 20 and 31 years of age would make up two full divisions (between 23,000 and 26,000 men). By further combing Belgrade and other Serbian towns in search of reservists between 32 and 45 years of age, an additional 10,000 men from the Serbian regions in Croatia would be mobilized, the majority of whom would have exactly the military skills that are now most needed in Krajina.

With such a body of stray conscripts the rebel Serbs in Croatia would have 73,000 at least, or 86,000 men at most in their standing army, which, according to the opinion of their military planners, would be quite enough to face any subsequent Croatian military pressure with ease. However, the staffs of the rebel Serbian forces can count on a mere 7,000 to 10,000 additional conscripts for the time being, which is insufficient to supplement their classic organization of their military system.

Besides, there are police formations that today number 24,000 members (the militia army). They are divided into the border police (just 8,000 men organized into four brigades, who could serve as mechanized infantry if needed), and the internal police (16,000 men organized into eight brigades and trained as light infantry).

Artillery

What gives the feeling of power to the Serbs in Krajina is undoubtedly their large quantity of heavy weapons, and so many light weapons that would allow Croatia to form an additional 10 or so infantry brigades. The proof of this can be found in the Serbian equipment captured after the Croatian raid on the pocket of Medak. A huge amount of equipment was discovered in several smaller villages, which would alone be sufficient to arm much larger Serbian formations than those that resisted the Croatian Army. The total reserves of ammunition throughout Krajina are sufficient for an additional 12 to 14 months of intensive fighting, while the logistical supply chain Belgrade-Banja Luka-Knin has still not been cut (referring also to convoys of military equipment).

In six [number as published] zones of domination (Knin, northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Baranja, western Slavonia) the Serbs have formed a total of 25 standing brigades. However, in reality those brigades are no larger than regiments (with between 1,500 and 2,500 men).

In the past two years the Serbian forces in Krajina have also founded a special purpose brigade, composed of local military staff, as well as of outsiders (their training grounds are situated in Golubic and Bruska near Benkovac).

They are estimated to have between 180 and 200 tanks. There are tanks dating from World War II, T-34's, that are already museum pieces, as well as the standard T-54 and T-55 tanks (most of their tanks are of these two types). Since the arrival of around 30 modern M-84 tanks from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the total number of tanks has risen to 220. There are only around 100 armored transporters and vehicles, because the former Yugoslav People's Army left relatively few of these in Krajina.

Serbian artillery is the most powerful part of Krajina's defense, involving 500 artillery pieces of all calibers, all types of ammunition and ranges up to 31 km, as well as the facility to hit any civil or military objective with ease. The supplies of ammunition for the artillery, howitzers, and tanks (those that are available at any time) are sufficient for many months of incessant shelling, while the remainder of the strategic reserve is stored in several arsenals throughout Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rocket launchers (types: Orkan, Luna-2, and other multi-stage rocket launchers) are controlled by regular Serbian officers and trained crews, and are used with special permission when the regular artillery fails to impress the Croatian side.

Language

This data clearly show that the rebel Serbs in Croatia have too much weaponry, but too little manpower. Which means that they are not able to carry out any major breakthroughs, or start any major, independent offensives against the Croatian Army. They will engage in such operations only with the support of Karadzic's army, or with the direct involvement of regular Serbian troops. Furthermore, their manpower is mostly organized in formations similar to militias. The conscripts in such formations are mostly farmers, whose discipline is rather questionable, while the discipline is mostly kept up by elite professional formations and experts from Serbia.

Still, the skill of the artillery units is making it possible for the rebels to shell vital Croatian objectives from great distances, to keep up the tension among the entire population of the endangered regions, and to dislocate and dismember the Croatian economy and traffic infrastructure. At the same time, the Serbian paramilitary rebel force itself is a hard nut to crack.

How are we supposed to convince such Serbs of Croatia's good intentions, when they believe that Zagreb is ruled by a group of bloodthirsty politicians who will never acknowledge that they are defeated, and that they are being fooled by some local peasants? One should not be too naive and impulsive in reaching such conclusions, particularly not hypocritical ones. Because for the rebel Serbs to survive without Croatia means that they win. For that reason, given a bunch of attractive peace proposals expressed in the dry language of diplomacy, they ought to be told something that the Serbs understand quite well in the harsh realities of their miserable everyday lives, between graves and trenches: You can live in peace only among us.

Deputy Minister Expects CEI To Support Tudjman

AU1711092293 Budapest MTI in English 0824 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Zagreb, 17 November (MTI)—"We expect the meeting of foreign ministers of the Central European Initiative (CEI) member states, to be held in Debrecen, Hungary, on November 19, to support in the closing statement the peace initiative of President Franjo Tudjman, and the Croatian efforts to regain its temporarily occupied territories, in other words, to support implementation of full Croatian sovereignty over the entire country," Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Smiljan Simac said in an interview with MTI.

He said Croatia attaches major importance to its membership in CEI, through which it mainly wishes to create political and economic cooperation with its neighbouring and near-by countries, particularly Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, and Austria.

Simac added Croatia desires that the CEI member states do everything possible to ensure that the international community take more effective measures in creating peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as this is a condition for launching genuine development in the region. The CEI countries could promote this goal with their standings as members of international organizations."

Italian Brigade To Fight Croats in Krajina

BR1611152593 Rome PANORAMA in Italian 14 Nov 93 p 111

[Report by Giovanni Porta: "Garibaldi to Belgrade"]

[Text] "The Zara [Zadar] plan, for the armed liberation of the city from Croatian occupation and its handing over to Italy, is now operational. It is just a matter of assessing the political timeliness of playing the Italian card." In the government building in Knin, the capital of the self-proclaimed republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), the anonymous official spoke quietly, in a conspiratorial tone. Protected by the impenetrable wall of silence erected by Serbian General Milan Novakovic's secret services, the business of the Garibaldi Brigade—some 60 "Italians" organized to fight the Croats in Dalmatia, first mentioned by the Serbian agency, TANJUG—is becoming a real mystery, which could prove full of unknowns for Italy's foreign policy. If indeed the Serbs, with the symbolic assistance of Italian militiamen, were to free Zara and to offer it to the Rome government, our country would face an unexpected crisis with the Zagreb government. The "Italian mayors in exile" of Fiume [Rijeka] and Zara, Claudio Schwarzenburg and Ottavio Missoni, call this a "dangerous and ridiculous" prospect.

So is it merely a provocation? An attempt by the Serbs, isolated in Europe, to drag Italy into the Slav crisis? Certainly, this business embodies all the ingredients of a major international conspiracy—a network of Serbian sympathizers active in our country; recruitment centers for volunteers willing to fight to the death "to wrest Istria and Dalmatia from Croatia and to return them to Italy"; and secret training camps in the Balkans.

The attempt to clarify at least part of the mystery started in Knin, in the heart of Krajina, the region of Croatia with a Serbian majority where the Yugoslav civil war started in February 1991. Many people in town know about the "Italians'" presence, some have seen them, and they are all "pleased that they are coming to take Zara away from the Croats." The RSK's political leaders reluctantly agreed to talk about the Italian brigade, "still being formed and composed of Croatian deserters of Italian origin and Italian citizens."

"They do exist, they are training," Information Minister Milena Tanja admitted to PANORAMA: In order to "strengthen relations with Italy," he has organized a weekly radio broadcast in Italian. The minister named two organizers of the Zara plan: Mladen Kalapac, former Serbian mayor of the coastal town and the political brains behind the operation; and Nikola Matjevic,

another Serb from Zara, whose headquarters is in the Vojvodina region on the border with Hungary and who is in charge of organizing the transport of volunteers. Though we managed to track them down in Belgrade and Novi Sad, they both refused to answer PANORAMA's questions: "It is the military," they explained, "that is organizing the brigade." This was confirmed by the spokesman for the RSK army, Kosta Novakovic, who stated plainly: "We have not yet decided what to do with the Italians. In any case, the real brigade will be presented to the press in a few weeks' time."

One member of the Serbian special forces with whom we met in Knin told us: "The Italians are confined to the Bruska training camp at an altitude of 420 meters on the Orljak hill between the towns of Obtrovac and Benkovac. They are making preparations on the orders of Captain Dragan (a former Serbian mercenary pilot who is training the "Kninjas," the Knin commandos—PANORAMA editor's note)."

The Krajina Serbs were more willing to talk "about the political contacts, about the friends" that they have in Italy: retired General Gianfranco Lalli; Trieste's Socialist Senator Arduino Agnelli ("who is 100 percent on our side"); and the MSI's [Italian Social Movement] Senator Gianfranco Fini. Agnelli who, together with his wife, has received honorary citizenship of Krajina, told PANORAMA: "Of course I am pro-Serbian. With regard to the brigade, I know that it is composed of Croats of Italian origin who do not want to fight for Zagreb, and Italian volunteers: extreme left-wingers who have come to defend Serbia, seen as 'the last bastion of communism,' and extreme right-wingers who have realized that in order to restore our lands to Italy—a possibility that I would not rule out at this time of major geopolitical reshuffles—Secretary Fini's pro-Serbian line stands a better chance than that of pro-Croatian [MSI faction leader] Pino Rauti."

Krajina's foreign minister, Slobodan Jarcevic, spoke openly about the support of General Lalli and the MSI leader, who visited Belgrade in July 1991 to contact political representatives: "I have spoken with Lalli by telephone. The MSI secretary too has called us in Plitvice, giving assurances of his support for our struggle and pledging his party's help." Quizzed by PANORAMA, MSI Secretary Fini did not confirm his contacts with the RSK Serbs, confining himself to describing the Italian volunteers' decision as "a gesture of extreme rebellion against Croatian ultranationalism, which is intolerant of the Italian presence in Istria, Quarnaro, and Dalmatia."

But Minister Jarcevic revealed further details: "It is true," he explained; "in Italy we have people whom we trust, who recruit fighters and send them to Krajina. Most of the volunteers are the sons of your refugees. We bring them in secretly via Hungary, individually or in small groups, in order to evade the Croatian secret services. I have spoken with them, and they have told me that they will fight until they succeed in forcing your government to support us Serbs."

HSLS Convention Adopts Seven Resolutions

AU1711084593 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Nov 93 pp 2,3

[Report by Aleksa Crnjakovic, Goranka Juresko, and Branko Podgornik: "For the Abolition of the HDZ's Monopoly"]

[Excerpts] Zagreb—On Saturday, in the Congress Hall situated within the complex of Zagreb's Fair, the Fourth Convention of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] was held. The Convention started with the election of the working presidency and other bodies, as well as with guests' addresses, after which HSLS Chairman Drazen Budisa comprehensively reported on the activities of the party's leadership since the last HSLS convention in May last year.

Expressing his satisfaction with the results that the HSLS achieved in the parliamentary elections for the Council of Deputies and the Council of Counties, where the HSLS ended up as the second strongest party in Croatia, Budisa said that he considered the opposition's having won more votes than the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] very important. According to him, such a result in the elections has shown that, in Croatia, the policy of equating party, people, state, and fatherland has no perspective in the long run. The elections have clearly shown that the Croatianhood of the HDZ, and the HDZ's concept of the Croatian state and society are not the only options in Croatia. He also emphasized that, after four years of existence, the HSLS does not see any reason for major changes in its party orientation.

"In the last 50 years, the Croatian people has experienced extreme modes of paternalistic and collectivist ideology in the forms of fascism and bolshevism. Without any considerable democratic tradition, surprised, and often bewildered by the political pluralism, faced with the great Serbian aggression, a few of our citizens have responded with the primitive simplicity of the extreme ideology of the Croatian nationalism, reviving it through fascist ideas and symbols, and sometimes conduct as well. It is quite easy to reach the bottom of nationalism, and even Croatian nationalism—one simply sinks into it. What is necessary is moral strength in order to preserve patriotism in compliance with the universal principles, and in compliance with Christian and humanist traditions. Contemporary and future generations will always be thankful to those who were most eager to defend the country, and particularly to those who gave their lives for our country's freedom. However, Croatia must never absolve any crime committed in its name, neither in the past, nor today. Any following generation inherits the responsibility to struggle against the retrograde forms of political consciousness and practice: xenophobia, chauvinism, autocracy, and all forms of political fanaticism," Budisa stressed.

The chairman of the HSLS continued, saying that in the current Croatian state, the propagandistic dilemma of who is for Croatia and who is against it is quite senseless and dangerous. A citizen holding opposite views is constantly pressurized to prove his or her patriotism. The conviction has been created among the people that the only way one can serve Croatia is to be in the authorities, close to the authorities, or at least to have nothing against the authorities. Says Budisa: "In our conditions, the instrumentation of patriotism is one of the forms of authoritarian populism, which does not disclose itself only in politics, but also in culture, education, and upbringing."

As the most difficult and most painful problem for all Croatian parties and the entire Croatian people, Budisa states the status quo in the occupied regions of Croatia, and many hundreds of thousands of displaced and refugees. "The HSLS supported and still supports the efforts made by the Croatian authorities to achieve the peaceful reintegration of the occupied regions, without calling into question our legitimate right to reintegrate the occupied regions in a different way as well. On the other hand, given the current mandate of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], and the lack of cooperativeness on the part of the Serbian side, peaceful reintegration is not possible. Since the beginning, we have been aware, as opposed to the most responsible representatives of the Croatian authorities, that with the current mandate of UNPROFOR, the reintegration of the occupied regions and comeback of the refugees to their homes will fail to come about," Budisa said.

He also remarked that the international factors are likely to recognize the status quo brought about by the great Serbian aggression, so he resolutely refused the recognition of such realities. He emphasized that neither Croatia, nor the entire international community can consent to the recognition of the occupation and ethnic cleansing. "Our destiny, and that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a test for not only the destiny of the peoples living in those two states, but also for the entire international order," Budisa said.

"The great number of Croatian casualties, and the long columns of refugees arriving to Croatia from Bosnia are a great price that is being paid now for the policy that has gone for the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina," the chairman of the HSLS continued.

Budisa emphasized that the arrangement with Belgrade, unfortunately after Croatian help in breaking the international political isolation imposed on Belgrade, has become an actual reality. "On the other hand, the concept of rounding up the Croatian ethnic space has become a tragic reality for more than 60 percent of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no excuse for the policy that cooperates with the aggressor, while making a second enemy out of the other victim of Serb aggression," Budisa stressed. He also added that the primary task of Croatian foreign policy ought to be the preservation of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least in the form of a union, as well as the urgent termination of the Croat-Muslim conflict.

Stating the views of the HSLS regarding the organization of the Croatian state Budisa emphasized that the semi-presidential [as published] system has brought about nothing good to Croatia. According to Budisa, instead of creating the long-desired unity of the Croatian state, the new territorial configuration of the country, and the general centralization of the administrative functions of the state have brought about quite the opposite. The consequence is the seed of dissent sown in the Croatian nation.

Criticizing the existing process of the transformation of state property, Budisa warned that the role of the state is becoming more and more dominant in the economy, while, on the other hand, an uncontrolled privatization is spreading, which, together with the frequent cases of the illegal acquisition of wealth, misappropriation, and the lack of financial discipline, may convert Croatian society into, as he said, a type of society called Latin American. He assessed that the distribution of the major part of the state property to the working class and citizens is a right, necessary, and the only way that is economically and socially justified at the current time.

Budisa warned that the general and drastic impoverishment of the broadest layers of the Croatian population has assumed quite disturbing proportions, adding that no measure or move of the Croatian economic policy has created conditions for new employment possibilities, and the decrease of the great number of unemployed. He warned of as many as 250,000 refugees and their extremely difficult position, saying that the state of war and general endangerment of Croatia by the aggression from outside, as well as poverty from inside, must be a reason, rather than an excuse, for creating conditions for full employment, the strengthening of production, and the construction of a firm basis for Croatia, characterized by social justice and a life fit for a man living in a free state.

Finally, the chairman of the HSLS emphasized that the party will even further support the freedom of the media, and oppose monopolies in the publishing and distribution of newspapers and the purchase of newspapers by public, state-owned firms, while it will make particular efforts to abolish the HDZ's monopoly on the state-owned television, and also, as he said, to abolish the HDZ's monopoly in the Croatian state in general [passage omitted].

In the afternoon, a comprehensive debate on the report by Chairman Budisa was carried out, after which the majority of participants (863) adopted the report through a secret ballot. There were 29 votes against, while two were irregular. Furthermore, the HSLS convention adopted seven resolutions on the economic development of Croatia in 1994, on media freedom in

Croatia, on local self-government (which demands the revision of borders of local self-governing units), on social problems in Croatia, on human rights, on youth, and finally on the position of Croatia in the new world order.

The participants also adopted the changes and amendments to the Statute of the HSLS, by which, among other things, the role of the party's convention with relation to the Major and Minor Councils of the party is strengthened, which adds to the democratic nature of the HSLS. The convention has to convene at least once a year. The next, Fifth Convention of the HSLS has been announced for 20 May 1994, on the fifth anniversary of the party's founding. [passage omitted]

In the concluding statement, Budisa thanked the party leadership for its support, and for its positive assessment of his report on the party's activities in the past period. He emphasized that, in this difficult period, all members of the HSLS have contributed to the HSLS's becoming the strongest opposition party, and the second strongest of all Croatian parties.

"After this convention we are not satisfied with being ranked second. The HSLS has shown its basic qualities: We have shown our good organization, intrinsically liberal and democratic orientation, our European orientation, and our cultural way of behavior.

"With this convention, a race has started among the members of the HSLS for the party elections in May next year. I am convinced that the new statute will make possible a better organization of the party, the establishment of new party branches, and an enlargement of its membership, because the existing numbers do not correspond to the respect that our party enjoys in the electorate. The party feels the entire weight of the moment we are living in, and our responsibility is extremely large. By developing the HSLS we are strengthening the Croatian state for we want to be; a state of social justice, liberal democracy, tolerance," Budisa concluded.

[Box, p 2]

At the Fourth Convention of the HSLS there were 1065 representatives eligible to vote, among them a great number of members of the middle-aged and young generations. The great importance that women are given by the liberals was also shown formally, by the election of as many as five women into the working presidency.

At the convention of the HSLS, there were around 100 guests. Among those present were also Ambassadors Peter Galbraith (United States), Horst Weisel (Germany), Wieclav Walkiewicz (Poland), Salvatore Cilento (Italy), and Bryan Sparrow (Great Britain), as well as diplomatic representatives of 10 additional foreign countries accredited in Croatia. The participants were addressed by the representatives of the German, Hungarian, and Montenegrin liberals, as well as the representatives of the following Croatian political parties: the Croatian Peasants' Party, the Croatian National Party, the Croatian Rights Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, the SSH, the SDH, and the KNS [expansions unknown]. Following the Conference on the New European Order and Cooperation Among the Countries of New Europe held in Ljubljana, the delegation of around 30 members of the Federation of European Liberal, Democratic, and Reformist Countries, which has representatives in the European Parliament, came to Zagreb headed by its chairman Willie De Clerque [as published] following invitation by the HSLS.

Among the guests, no representative of the HDZ was seen, even though an invitation had been sent. At the convention of the rival party that had taken place before, there had been no representatives of the HSLS, which was explained by the HDZ's having invited only the representatives of fraternal parties.

The organization of the convention was simply perfect, starting with the reception of the guests, the organization of the press service, up to the attendance of the guests, and the distribution of propaganda materials. As for the arrangement of the Congress Hall, the liberals have shown that they have already set their foot in Europe. The security service was quite inconspicuous and unobtrusive, even when covering the leaders of the party.

[Box, p 3]

By the resolution on the economic development of Croatia in 1994, it is proposed that, among other things, the state budget be reduced, starting with the reduction of acquired rights of the state administration, with the presidential cabinet, government, and ministries topping the cutback list. It is proposed that the National Bank of Croatia reduce the discount rate by 2 percent monthly, to link the primary emission with the increase of money stock through the purchase of hard currency and an increase in production and exports. It is demanded that the income-tax be called off, the municipal and local taxes be reduced by 50 percent, some particular mitigations be introduced for making new employment possibilities, as well as that equipment manufactured abroad be exempt from duties. According to the resolution, the denationalization should be implemented by physical and fiscal restitution. The HSLS proposes that all stocks whose payment is anticipated in the form of installments following the contracts worth up to 20,000 German marks be dealt out without restitution by the end of this year.

By the resolution on the media freedom in Croatia, it is demanded that the Croatian Parliament urgently designate a chairman of the Council for the Protection of Public Information Freedom. The HSLS demands that in all state-run publishing houses and radio stations, managing boards be nominated, to which the representatives of the parliamentary parties would be accredited, so that no political group would have the majority, regardless of the results in the elections. The liberals also

demand that a law on radio and TV stations be passed as soon as possible, thereby opening the possibility for independent media to work on a commercial basis, and at the same time preventing the monopolization of the media. Croatian Television should be organized according to the constitutional principles regarding the freedom of information, without monopolization by any political group. In the resolution on local self-government, the HSLS demands a comprehensive analysis of the justifiability of the current borders of local self-governing units. It also demands the reduction of the unjustifiably high powers of the state administration, a change of the Law on Local Self-Government, the securing of the right to individuality of local boards, as well as a change of the Law on the City of Zagreb.

By the resolution on the position of youth in the society, the HSLS intercedes for the changes in the existing social and cultural policy, as well as in education and employment policy.

In the resolution on social problems in Croatia, the HSLS protests against the new labor-social model, the further deprivation of workers' rights, and the legally sanctioned plundering of Croatian natural resources. The liberals resolutely oppose the establishment of new proprietary relations in which the activities and organization of trade unions are viewed as a suspicious and anti-national practice.

In the resolution on human rights, the party intercedes for the motivation of citizens to make efforts in the observation of human rights, and to report any case of disregardful behavior, rather than to put such attitudes in a criminal context, and condemn them as unpatriotic acts, which has been the practice so far.

In the resolution on Croatia in the new world and European order, the HSLS demands that Croatia orientate more toward institutionally coalescing with Central European countries in the fields of politics, economy, and culture.

HSLS President Views Coalition Government

AU1611125993 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 93 pp 5, 6

["Exclusive" interview with Drazen Budisa, president of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, by Davor Butkovic; place and date not given: "Members of the Diplomatic Corps Have Advised Me Not To Enter Nikica Valentic's Coalition Government!"]

[Text] **If Croatia continues to be internationally isolated, if the events in Bosnia end up with a factual recognition of greater Serbia, if we do not reintegrate the occupied areas into the Croatian legal system, and if we do not receive international financial help, all this would mean a definite disaster for [Croatian President Franjo] Tudjman's policies and the situation would require early elections.**

[Butkovic] How do you account for the fact that some of the most prominent members of the diplomatic corps in Zagreb were present at the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] convention, while there were fewer of them at the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] congress?

[Budisa] If it is true that the HDZ also invited all the important diplomats in Zagreb to their congress, then their attendance at our convention is certainly a sign of their inclination toward the policies of the HSLS—that is, to the positions on certain key political issues in Croatia that we have presented.

[Butkovic] Do you consider the presence of U.S. Ambassador Galbraith and German Ambassador Weisel at your convention a sign that their countries are hoping for a change in the present government in Croatia or, at least, a change in present state policies?

[Budisa] I would prefer if someone other than a member of the HSLS leadership would comment on that. There is an increasing inclination toward the HSLS policies, which I can say on the basis of my conversations with many diplomats. However, I would like to emphasize that the HSLS does not shape its political positions according to the suggestions of foreign diplomats. The most pressing aim of the HSLS is by no means to win the favor of Western diplomacies.

I am aware that, after the Fourth Congress of the HSLS, there will be public statements about us being an "internationalist party." I would like to quote [HSLS member] Vlado Gotovac. He quite correctly stated that a party that is, in these circumstances—extremely dramatic for the Croat people as a whole, as well as for the Croatian state—burdened by the question of how many votes it will win or lose due to certain political decisions is not a responsible political party! I am, therefore, aware that the HDZ will try to discredit us in public, but we are prepared to take that chance. I no longer consider our public rating one of the main preoccupations. After all, it is not election time. When we left parliament, we expected that this move would cause some disapproval by the electoral body, which is what happened. We did it anyway, because we believe that in these difficult circumstances, the most important thing is not to try to win the inclination of the public, but to tell the truth and carry out principled policies. This is how we will continue to act in the future.

[Butkovic] Do you believe that a constitutional crisis should be brought about?

[Budisa] I still hope that there will be a change in Croatian policies. I believe that the state leadership is not as autistic as it sometimes seems. I believe that Tudjman is aware of the disastrous situation we are in. That is why I would prefer a change in Croatian policies to an attempt to cause a constitutional, or rather parliamentary crisis, in order to put pressure on the state leadership.

We in the HSLS are still considering whether certain radical moves should be made, which could increase the risk of chaos in Croatia. Part of the HSLS leadership believes that it is better to continue to carry out calmer policies. This dilemma will be resolved within the next few weeks when we will see if the state policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina will change. If there are no changes there, we will radicalize our behavior!

That still does not mean that we will cause a parliamentary crisis, as, due to the balance of powers in parliament, realistically speaking, the causing of a parliamentary crisis is beyond the power of the opposition.

[Butkovic] Could all the opposition parties take a joint approach? It seems that Professor [Ivo] Banac [emigre history professor at Yale] is completely right in saying that our political system is in fact a two-party one, and if the opposition wants to seriously oppose the HDZ, then it must take a joint approach.

[Budisa] It is perhaps precisely at a time when it is still too early to talk about new elections that there could be a calm gathering of all, primarily parliamentary opposition parties. We are completely open to that possibility. A productive meeting of the opposition parties could take place soon. Drago Stipac, leader of the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party], welcoming our congress, also suggested that the Liberal Party should start this kind of action.

At the next elections, regardless of when they are held, the opposition must nominate one presidential candidate [preceding three words published in boldface]. We should not have the useless factionalism we had in August of last year. I am personally in favor of the presidential candidate not being [preceding two words published in boldface] president of one of the parties, but someone who is not closely connected to party politics!

[Butkovic] Will you demand early elections?

[Budisa] The opposition can demand early elections, but I am not sure that would make much difference. I am convinced that the elections would be more distant the more that the opposition would demand them! Our insistence on early elections would only unite the HDZ.

[Butkovic] At the HSLS convention, it was said that your party would settle for the reestablishment of the coalition government. Do you really think that the founding of a coalition government would significantly change Croatian state policies, since all the important issues are decided upon by the president of the republic and his closest associates, which the Constitution, after all, ensures?

[Text] [Budisa] We are still open to the possibility of founding a coalition government, even though foreign diplomats have suggested the opposite. At this moment, the founding of a new coalition government would have to be conditioned by a clear political agreement on the basis of which the Government of Democratic Unity was founded in the summer of 1991. The authorities and responsibilities of the possible coalition government, both toward the parliament and the president of the republic, would have to be clearly defined.

[Butkovic] The coalition government would overthrow [Prime Minister] Nikica Valentic, the only Croatian politician from the party in power who, especially after the initial results of his anti-inflation program, has the support of the majority of the public. Do you think that it would be useful to overthrow Valentic at this point?

[Budisa] I do not want to overthrow Valentic! His attitude toward the opposition parties and parliament is much better than any of his predecessors. I believe that with the founding of a coalition government, the preconditions that are almost crucial for the realization of Valentic's program would also be created. Similar anti-inflation programs abroad were based on the political consensus of all the important political factors, not only trade unions, but also, necessarily, parties. Israel is a good example of this.

Considering the good reputation that the HSLS presently has abroad—which was confirmed at our congress, attended, along with reputable ambassadors, by about a dozen members of the European Parliament—I believe that the presence of the HSLS in the Croatian Government would increase the chances of Croatia entering, for instance, international programs such as PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] and TEMPUS [expansion unknown]. Moreover, the founding of a coalition government would allay the danger of introducing sanctions. A coalition government would strengthen the international position of Croatia, and, at the same time, ensure a consensus in Croatia regarding a solution to the present, extremely difficult situation.

[Butkovic] You have known President Tudjman for a long time. You directly participated in the founding of Greguric's Government of Democratic Unity. How would you account for some of Tudjman's moves that are difficult to understand, such as his attack on the independent intellectuals in his speech at the HDZ congress or persisting on the former Bosnian policy, which has turned out to be extremely unsuccessful?

[Budisa] I have known Dr. Tudjman for a long time. We used to meet when we were dissidents in the 1970's and 1980's, but we have never established a close relationship. This is why I cannot speak about the psychological motives for some of his moves, which are indeed very difficult to understand. However, I can tell you that what was happening two and a half years ago, at the time the Government of Democratic Unity was being founded.

Franjo Tudjman did not have a clear concept of the Government of Democratic Unity. He wanted me in the government as minister of information and Vlado Veselica [member of the Croatian Democratic Party] as manager of the Exchange. For Tudjman, this represented an opening up toward the opposition. I declined this

possibility at the very beginning of the talks. I insisted that representatives of all the important parties enter the government. At the time, Croatia was in the most difficult situation possible: The physical existence of the country was at stake. The Yugoslav Army was still in Zagreb and there was serious talk about there being a possibility that they would strike at Zagreb.

On the other hand, the turmoil in the HDZ was as strong as in the preceding months. The right faction was extremely unsatisfied with Tudjman's policies and they wanted to take some decisive action. It was estimated that Tudjman's position was threatened from that aspect also.

At that time, Belgrade expected and hoped for an overthrow of Tudjman. My arguments were very simple: Whatever does not suit Belgrade should be done. If Belgrade hopes for an overthrow of Tudjman, then that means that Tudjman should be supported. I am currently not sure that Belgrade still wants Tudjman to leave and I am not sure that he should be supported in Croatia!

In the course of the above events, I told Dr. Tudjman: "Mr. President, you have become a legend as the leader of the movement that has liberated Croatia, that has been taking Croatia out of Yugoslavia. You are, however, presently in the situation of exiting the Croatian chronicles as a tragic persona." I appealed to him to act as president of **all** the citizens of Croatia and to gather **all** the relevant political forces in Croatia. He agreed and sent me to Greguric to arrange all the details concerning the founding of the Government of Democratic Unity.

[Butkovic] The current situation is, in the political sense, almost as difficult as two and a half years ago. Do you think that you could reach another agreement with Tudjman?

[Budisa] I would like to repeat that the diplomats in Zagreb and other foreign politicians have suggested to me that we not get involved in the new coalition government if it is proposed. I am personally prepared to support Dr. Tudjman again, if he accepts the very clear rules according to which the new coalition government is to act upon. However, I would personally not be a member of the government; I would keep a politically independent position. The HSLS would delegate some other leaders to the government.

[Butkovic] What is going to happen with the occupied areas? Do you have any idea on the possibility of reintegrating these areas in Croatia's legal and political system?

[Budisa] I never doubted that we would establish the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia throughout our state territory. To achieve that, however, Croatia must first reestablish the reputation it had at the time of our just struggle against the Yugoslav Army—that is, at the time of international recognition. Croatia must closely observe the rights of all its citizens. The Croatian authorities must express more willingness for dialogue and cooperation with other political parties. The vocabulary according to which the opponents of the authorities are at the same time enemies of the state and the people must disappear from Croatian political life!

If we manage to reestablish the international reputation that is becoming increasingly destroyed and manage to hold Serbia under international sanctions, then I think we could find ourselves in a much more different situation as early as next spring, which means that there could be a quicker reintegration of the occupied areas. This demands radical moves. For instance, we can not leave things at condemning a certain massacre, while the responsible people remain unpunished. Croatian politics must become credible, which cannot be achieved by mere good faith or political proclamations but by specific actions.

Moreover, the media space should be freed. There are some indications that this is being done. The most important thing is to change the state policy toward Bosnia.

[Butkovic] But Bosnia does not exist any more. At peace talks, there is no mention of the existence of Bosnia as a unitary state. In this situation, what should the Croatian policy toward Bosnia be?

[Budisa] I am also aware of the fact that the Serb conquests have, in effect, been sanctioned and that the existence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state is no longer a subject of the negotiations.

You see, Croatian politics participated in creating this tragic reality. The Croats are actively cooperating with the Serbs not only in the area of Velika Kladusa, but, allegedly, even in Grude, where, according to certain sources, a lot of oil is being poured for the needs of the chetniks in eastern Herzegovina. There is no excuse for the policy that has created another enemy of the Croat people out of the second victim of the Serb aggression! I now propose—as it is obviously impossible for Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman or Boban and Izetbegovic to agree on anything—that a new policy be formulated on the basis of the parliament decisions on Herceg-Bosna, in which it is clearly stated that Herceg-Bosna is only one of the forms of expressing the sovereignty of the Croatian people in that area. That means that the Croat representatives in Sarajevo—that is, members of the Croat Coordination—the majority of whom are priests and also Kljuic and Komsic, members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, should not meddle in the affairs of Herceg-Bosna. Moreover, I propose that the representatives of Herceg-Bosna not meddle in the lives of the remaining Croats in central Bosnia, Sarajevo, and Posavina. Herceg-Bosna should let the representatives of the Croatian people from these areas solve the issues concerning their future in agreement with Alija Izetbegovic!

We can not choose a partner for negotiations in Bosnia. It is illusory to expect that the Croat-Muslim politics could be carried out by Franjo Tudjman and Fikret Abdic [president of the autonomous province of western Bosnia], with aides-de-camp like Mirsad Baksic and Armin Pohara. Tudjman cannot invent "honest Muslims." These "honest Muslims" have acquired the status of an important political factor in our media, when in fact they influence nothing.

Fikret Abdic, who has lately been editor of the "Slikom na Sliku" ["Picture over Picture," a Croatian Television program], has no power in western Bosnia, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has not occupied Velika Kladusa yet only for tactical reasons—to avoid bloodshed among the Muslims. Fikret Abdic has no military force behind him; he will exist politically as long as he is supported by Zagreb and Belgrade!

Because of all of the above, Alija Izetbegovic is the only partner for negotiations. If the Croatian authorities believe that Abdic will protect the Croats, and if that is the reason why they will not talk to Izetbegovic, the remaining Croats in central Bosnia will be in an even more difficult position. They are surrounded by Izetbegovic and not Abdic's army.

[Butkovic] You are, therefore, suggesting that the Croats in Bosnia, regardless of the political leadership of Herceg-Bosna, come to an agreement with Izetbegovic through Stjepan Kljuic and Ivo Komsic and the Coordination in Sarajevo?

[Budisa] Being so greatly concerned about the rights of the Croats in "unitary Bosnia," the Croatian authorities have come to the conclusion that there may soon be no Croats in Bosnia. It is pointless to discuss the rights of those who will not be there any more. The primary aim of Croatian policies must now be to keep as many Croats in Bosnia as possible. To achieve that, the Croats of Sarajevo and central Bosnia must not meddle in the affairs of Boban's state and vice versa.

Moreover, President Tudjman should, regardless of possible personal animosity, find the strength to support Ivo Komsic and Stjepan Kljuic, Croat representatives in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. Ivo Komsic can still communicate with both Zagreb and Grude. He recently sent a letter to President Tudjman asking for his support. The alternative to this is a military passage toward Vitez.

Foreign Ministry Protests Czech TV Documentary

AU1711081293 Prague CTK in English 1941 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 16 (CTK)—The Croatian Foreign Ministry sent CTK a message of protest via the Croatian Embassy in Prague concerning the broadcast of a documentary film on Czech Television about events in Croatia during World War Two. The film, Testament—Twilight of the Century by Croatian film-maker Lordan Zafranovic, received its world premiere on CT 3 in two parts on November 8 and 10.

The letter of protest denounces Zafranovic as an untiring slanderer of the Croatian people and a former paid lackey and collaborator of the Yugoslav communist regime who attempts to portray today's democratic Croatia as a fascist state.

We categorically reject Zafranovic's accusations and his notorious lies, the ministry declares. To suggest, as some foreign commentators do, that present-day Croatia and its governing party, the Croatian Democratic Association (HDZ), are attempting to revive the fascist ustasha inheritance borders on the grotesque, it says. The party's intellectual fathers were not only Croatian nationalists of the 19th century but innumerable contemporary liberals and social thinkers who fought for Croatia's complete independence, the protest reads.

The ministry advises Czech Television and other foreign channels to carefully check the past of individuals who slander Croatia before they take their words and work at face value.

A graduate of the Charles University Film Faculty FAMU, Zafranovic began the film in 1986 in Zagreb but completed it thanks to Czech Television in Prague when his country was at war. In the three-hour film Zafranovic uses both his own film and archive footage documenting the paradoxes of Croatian history.

PRC Reportedly Opposes Sanctions on Croatia

LD1711092693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0903 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation between China and Croatia has significantly improved in political, economic, and cultural areas. This was the opinion expressed last night by the Chinese ambassador to Croatia in a lecture to foreign diplomats. Speaking about the solution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, he said that China, as a member of the UN Security Council, opposed the ill-considered imposition of sanctions against UN member states and he said that such moves would not bring a solution to the problem but would only create additional hardships for the population.

Serbia

Draskovic: Depos To Participate in Elections

LD1611213693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2009 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 16 Nov (TANJUG)—Depos (Democratic Movement of Serbia) will take part in parliamentary elections in December, Vuk Drakovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement and head of all Depos electoral lists, stressed at a news conference held today.

He said that "Depos is forced to take part in the elections under unequal conditions. Depos is forced to do this by less democratic opposition parties, which accept the unequal conditions and which reject a unified electoral list of the democratic opposition" as Depos proposed. [passage omitted]

Kostunica's DSS To Run in Elections 'On Its Own'

AU1611173893 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], has reiterated that his party will participate in the elections on its own, although, in his opinion, the conditions are unequal. Here is Srdjan Savic reporting on the extraordinary DSS news conference:

[Begin Savic recording] Kostunica assessed that the present state cannot protect is citizens' interests and that a national and political consensus is therefore necessary. In the opinion of the DSS, with this ever aggravating economic situation, one may expect virtual social chaos, so it is not certain whether the elections are going to take place at all. Nevertheless, this party has decided to run in the elections, because that is its moral obligation to the voters, Vojislav Kostunica concluded.

The DSS will take part in the elections on its own in all nine constituencies, with the electoral slogan saying that this party is a voice of hope, Dragan Radulovic, member of the Main Committee said. Radulovic reproached all the media for having manifoldly increased the price of the promotion space and time. He pointed out that the DSS will direct its electoral campaign via radio and television stations. [end recording]

SDA Leader Views Participation in Elections

AU1711111293 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Nov 93 p 11

[Interview with Rasim Ljajic, Sandzak SDA secretary general, by Zoran Saponjic; place and date not given: "Neither Boycott Nor Participation"]

[Text] Not even the experts on the Sandzak issue and on SDA [Party of Democratic Action] policy dare predict whether the Sandzak Muslims will appear in the forthcoming parliamentary election. According to the statements made by the SDA leaders, it is difficult to conclude what the intentions of this party are. The only thing that seems to be certain is that the SDA is stalling for time. The final decision is expected to be passed in the Main Committee meeting.

Rasim Ljajic, the Sandzak SDA secretary general, speaks to BORBA about the Muslim reasons for and against the election.

[Saponjic] Are there suggestions that the SDA would participate in the forthcoming election?

[Ljajic] The meeting of the Executive Committee has been postponed, so that we can consult the representatives of other political parties in the meantime. After that a final decision should be passed. The members of the Main Committee, which is the authority in charge of passing important political decisions, will hear reasons for and against the election. I hope that—after a democratic and liberal discussion—we shall pass a clever political decision.

Milosevic Is Breaking Up the Opposition

[Saponjic] As one of the main reasons for the boycott of the elections last year the possibility was mentioned that the Muslims could have won on the local level, and that in response the Serbs could form Serbian communes in Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin, which could in turn lead to conflicts. What is the situation like this year?

[Ljajic] This problem is eliminated this year for the simple reason that these are elections only for the Serbian parliament. I have already stated that the best thing the democratic opposition can do is to boycott the announced elections and organize an antielection campaign. The conditions for these elections are worse than for the two previous elections. I am afraid that the results could be the same as last time. I am not telling you anything new if I state that Milosevic has succeeded in breaking up most of the opposition parties.

As far as the SDA is concerned, I can say that there is a campaign in the media against the Sandzak SDA. Apart from that, Sandzak has been divided into two election units, which is a disadvantage for us; after all, you can see how Hungarians are treated in the parliament.

I assume that the safety of our parliament members would be endangered in this parliament. Apart from that, every political party in Serbia would seriously consider whether to participate in the elections if its party chairman is threatened with a possible arrest.

On the other hand, the SDA participation in the elections, and the good results we would certainly achieve, would be another confirmation of the political legitimacy of the Muslim population in Sandzak; at the same time it would deny the pseudo-argument of the official authorities that we want the secession of Sandzak from

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I think that we are confronted with a difficult decision because the reasons for and against are approximately equal.

[Saponjic] The decision already passed to participate in the elections last year was called off by Mr. Ugljanin. Will the influences from abroad, especially from Islamic countries, and by Mr. Ugljanin play an important role also this year?

[Ljajic] There will be detailed consultations with people with different political views before any political decision is made.

I would like to point out, however, that we make visits abroad because we live in a country in which our political requirements are not understood.

The influence from abroad is mystified too much, the influence of the Islamic countries is especially glorified. The Muslim population of Sandzak and Bosnia is a part of the European ethnic structure and we shall ask for understanding of our political attitudes primarily here.

A Dialogue Is Possible, But...

[Saponjic] Sandzak is more and more often mentioned in the Conference on Yugoslavia. Is this connected to your decision about the forthcoming elections?

[Ljajic] It must be taken into consideration which influence our decision would have on this conference. We have to predict which decision would be more favorable for our negotiating position in the conference.

[Saponjic] It can often be heard in the opposition that the national minorities, the Albanians and the Muslims, could significantly influence the distribution of power in the Serbian parliament. Have you perhaps discussed this topic with the Serbian opposition?

[Ljajic] We have had talks with the representatives of the Albanians and the Hungarians. The Albanians will certainly not participate; we might participate, but these two factors cannot change the relation of powers in the parliament. We shall try to establish contacts also with the representatives of the so-called opposition, which is—we have the feeling—afraid of the talks with us, for the simple reason that this might affect their political rating.

[Saponjic] You have very often mentioned that a new democratic regime in Serbia could offer possibilities for a dialogue. How can this dialogue be reached if the minorities boycott the elections?

[Ljajic] The democratization of Serbia is naturally the most important condition for the materialization of our political requirements. We have no illusions that this could be achieved in any other way, but it is indicative that the opposition remembers Muslims and Albanians only before elections. There are some exceptions, but the opposition in the rule does not mention the dead, kidnapped or displaced Muslims, their destroyed houses and other forms of human rights violation in Sandzak.

We consider the elections to be not the only topic that should be discussed with the representatives of the opposition. We are ready for the talks with them without requiring that certain conditions be fulfilled first.

[Saponjic] Before last year's elections, Ugljanin mentioned in some of his statements that the elections should be boycotted, stating that the Muslims who participated are not "real." What are you suggesting to your people this year?

[Ljajic] I do not want to predict the decision that will be taken by the Main Committee, which will consider all relevant facts before it passes a decision. Politics is, however, much more than the clear-cut division between good and evil. There is a series of decisions that lie in between.

Serbian Unity Party Presents Electoral Plans

AU1611174193 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Party of Serbian Unity has completed electoral lists for all nine constituencies. This was announced at a news conference. Here is a report by Radovan Pantovic:

[Begin Pantovic recording] In all constituencies and at the joint [zbiran] electoral list, this party will have the place number three, behind the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party, Borisav Pelevic, party vice chairman and spokesman, said.

The Party of Serbian Unity has been given the right to send a representative to the expanded composition of the Republican Electoral Commission and it appointed Vladimir Kilibarda to that post. Pelevic announced that in conformity with the Electoral Law, the Party of Serbian Unity is going to send delegates to other electoral bodies as well.

The party will open its promotion campaign with a meeting in Pancevo on 20 November. After this, 62 promotion meetings will be organized in all largish towns in Serbia. This tour will last until 16 December and all promotion meetings will be addressed by Zeljko Raznjatovic "Arkan," party chairman and head of all electoral lists. All deputy candidates will be presented at these promotion meetings.

Spokesman Pelevic also said at the news conference that Patriarch Pavle yesterday received party chairman Zeljko Raznjatovic and blessed the idea of Serbian unity and all those people who are fighting today for rifts among the Serbs to be overcome. [end recording]

Poll Shows Socialists Maintaining Lead

AU1611171193

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 15 November on page 11 carries an approximately 2,500-word report on the results of an opinion poll on the popularity of politicians and the main political parties in Serbia prior to the 19 December elections. The main parties are: SPS—Socialist Party of Serbia; SRS—Serbian Radical Party; Depos—Democratic Movement of Serbia; DS—Democratic Party; DSS—Democratic Party of Serbia; SPO—Serbian Renewal Movement.

The poll was conducted by a BORBA research team on 13 and 14 November and involves "350 respondents from nine electoral districts. The number of respondents in each district is proportionate to the number of voters. The respondents were selected from the telephone directories using the random sampling technique. One should bear in mind that the sample includes only telephone owners, who, according to social research, represent a special category of the population (the sample includes, for example, a negligible percentage of the rural population)."

The results of the poll are expressed in percentages and summarized as follows:

"Which politician, in your view, instills most confidence"	
S. Milosevic (SPS)	30
V. Kostunica (DSS)	8.6
Z. Djindjic (DS)	6.4
M. Panic	6.1
V. Draskovic (SPO)	5.8
V. Seselj (SRS)	(about) 5
D. Cosic	(about) 3
D. Micunovic (DS)	(about) 2
Others	(about) 6
None	(about) 29

"Who will win at the elections?"	
SPS	57.2
SRS	2.8
Depos	2.8
Others	3.9
Do not know	33.3

"Inclination of voters in Serbia"		
	22-23 Oct	12-13 Nov
SPS	32.28	24.44
SRS	(about) 4.5	4.75
DS	6.34	9.72
Depos (figure for Nov. includes DSS)	15.85	19.88
Others	(about) 4.7	4.7
Do not know	(about) 27.50	30.00
Will not vote	(about) 8.00	8.00

Businessmen Launch New Party in Sandzak

AU1611145893 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 93 p 4

[Article by Z. Saponjic: "Businessmen in the Political Circle"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] A handful of Muslim businessmen recently founded a new party in Novi Pazar—this time without the colorful background of two years ago, and for now, without ideological and dissenting epithets. The party is called the Alliance of Sandzak People [Sandzaklije] of Yugoslavia, and the main founder is the extremely wealthy Nedzib Kacar, described by the well informed as owning millions of German Marks and several private companies in this town. [passage omitted]

In response to a question as to whether this attempt at breaking up the monopoly of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] would end the same way as the one two years ago, Kacar said: This party is comprised of people, intellectuals, and it is very hard to set them up.

First reactions in Novi Pazar to the founding of this new party of Muslims is that this is a party of businessmen (both big and small) and that the Alliance of Sandzak People will primarily try to maintain a stable political situation, which is the only thing that suits the large network of Sandzak business. The Serbian side, however, claims that this is a new political reshuffling of the Muslims, the goal of which is to gain financial supremacy in these areas, followed by political supremacy.

Kacar himself, in response to a question as to what is new in this party, says: We favor the solving of political problems on the bases of acknowledging the interests of the milieu, respecting the interests of the Serbs. This is a policy of integration, not disintegration.

The novelty in comparison to the policy and goals of the SDA, which dominated Novi Pazar in the past, is the fact that the Alliance of Sandzak People does not mention autonomy or special status, at least not in the proclaimed political goals.

We do not favor any solutions outside the institutions of the system. The basis of our policy is the development of Sandzak and Yugoslavia, the equality of all peoples who live here. As for the eastern Sandzak communes of Prijepolje, Priboj, Nova Varos, Sjenica, Tutina, Novi Pazar, Leposavic, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Zubin Potok, which are the state territory of the Republic of Serbia, we will try to establish a county of eastern

Sandzak. We have no particular demands in Montenegro, we do not wish to meddle in things that are not regulated by the laws of this republic, says Kacar.

In addition to stressing that this is a civic political party, the Alliance of Sandzak Citizens of Yugoslavia claims that the main characteristic of its policy incorporates both the pan-Slavic and the international spirit. The Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosniaks are three peoples of the same ethnic tree. It is in our interest to develop all three branches of this tree, concludes Mr. Kacar.

'Information System' for 'Serbian Lands' Viewed

AU1611214393 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Milorad Vucelic, director general of the Radio and Television of Serbia, has met in Belgrade with representatives of the radio and television centers of the republic of Srpska: Miroslav Toholj, minister of information of the republic of Srpska; Ilija Guzina, director of the Serbian Television in Pale; and Milan Zoric, chief editor of the Banja Luka Television Center. The meeting was held with a view to creating a unified information system on the territories of Serbian lands. On this occasion, the Program Council of the Radio-Television of the Serbian Lands was founded. Milorad Vucelic, director general of the Radio and Television of Serbia, is the chairman of the council. Here is a report by Ikonija Vostinic:

[Begin recording] [Vucelic] This cooperation and the founding of the unified Serbian information arena started with the events of the breakup of Yugoslavia. It is known that the Serbian people was under an information blockade, that it was the only people to be under an information blockade, and that the parts of the former Yugoslavia populated by the Serbian people could not receive even the information regarding the Serbian people's motherland, that is, Serbia itself. You who lived in Sarajevo know—and I have learned this from your stories and from my direct experience—that you also experienced a sort of, not to use a stronger word, concealment of your cultural and political identity, even if there was such a thing. In fact, even if it did exist, it was mainly in Yugoslav organizations and in Yugoslav, well, political forms, forms that had a Yugoslav mark.

[Vostinic] The television information system on the territory of Serbian lands will link the centers in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Banja Luka, and Pale. The initiative originated from the Serbian top political leadership and the idea was to strengthen natural links between Serbian peoples undermined by the blockade.

[Toholj] I think we will never be grateful enough for the help offered to us. It remains for us to do everything that can be done with these few cadres that have been left, with these few experts, but with a large number of enthusiasts and amateurs. I believe that it will not be below a decent professional level.

[Guzina] I must say that, in this technical field, we have always had excellent cooperation with the technical sector of the Serbian Television, much better than we—I say we, but there is much of my own responsibility here—cooperated in the editorial sphere, although in the editorial sphere we were restrained by these [word indistinct] and connections, and until recently they were very insecure.

[Vostinic] The program will be complete and will include all video segments ranging from information to entertainment. The Radio and Television of Serbia will offer help in expert and technical spheres and the efficiency and homogeneity of this significant information project will be supervised by the Program Council of the Radio-Television of the Serbian Lands. Council Chairman Milorad Vucelic, director general of the Radio and Television of Serbia, and representatives of other television centers will invest much optimism and enthusiasm in the coming period with a view to consolidating the existing systems of connections and creating new ones so that the enterprise could start working in practice as soon as possible. [end recording]

Macedonia

Article Views Detection of 'All-Albanian Army'

AU1611121393 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 12 Nov 93 pp 10-12

[Report by Vladimir Jovanovski, Mirka Velinovska: "The Police Are Arresting 'Soldiers'"]

[Text] Last week, in a joint Interior and Defense Ministry action, the headquarters of the so-called All-Albanian army, organized and prepared for actions on the territory of Macedonia, was broken up. The Macedonian public, as well as Europe and the Balkan countries, have already been informed of this. An analysis of the event and assessments on the Macedonian Government's position are expected to be made in the next few days.

As for the scandalous event, which exploded like a bomb among the public, and was officially described as "detecting and breaking up a smuggling channel in which citizens of Albanian origin were participating" (however, without a political background), it was, at least in the first phase, completed by an action in which some of the top leadership of this paramilitary formation was arrested, some of the arms were confiscated, and more importantly, the computer center in Gostivar, where the whole structural data and strategic acts of the so-called All-Albanian Army were stored, was discovered.

As a result of this big action the following were arrested:

Husein Haskaj, deputy defense minister;

Hasan Agusi, former Yugoslav National Army officer from Kosovo, on PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]

payroll, in charge of operational activities for the formation of the All-Albanian army, sent at the recommendation of the leader of the Kosovo Democratic League Ibrahim Rugova;

Burim Murtezani, computer engineer, on the All-Albanian army payroll, in charge of computer operations and the coding of evidence and documentation on its members;

Ejupi Resmi, in charge of supply services (supply of equipment and arms to the army);

Selam Armazi, Akif Demiri, and Abdiselam Arslani, members of the top military leadership of this paramilitary army.

This list is just the tip of the huge iceberg called the "All-Albanian army." Besides the aforementioned, there are names of other active Macedonian Army officers of Albanian origin, a general included, as well as some politicians from the ranks of the PDP.

The first information showed that the initiative for the formation of this military formation started on 7 November 1991, a couple of days before the Macedonian Constitution came into force, when its main headquarters were created. The idea was to have several tens of thousands of soldiers, and until the state bodies' action, 21,630 potential recruits had been taken on. The army was divided into several battalions, with the aim of covering towns with a majority Albanian population, like Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Struga, and Kumanovo, with another brigade in charge of police army security. The main headquarters of the so-called army was divided into a military and a political part. The arrested, mentioned above, belong to the so-called military command, while sources close to PULS say that members of the PDP leadership ran the political body.

Information obtained so far reveals that the aim of this paramilitary army was the realization of the ILIRIDA project (25 December of this year is mentioned) and its annexation to Albania. The organization of this paramilitary formation was perfect. During the past two years information was collected about the organization of the Macedonian Army with the goal of using this in possible conflicts. Thus, for example, according to some evidence, mobilization plans for a large section of Macedonian Army military formations were discovered, which are of foremost importance in possible war conditions. The data at the disposal of the headquarters of the so-called All-Albanian army were so precise, that it was supposed that, in a possible war conflict, the 14th Macedonian Army brigade, in charge of the northwest border near Tetovo, would be liquidated in less than an hour.

As far as the technology of collecting and presenting data of operational interest for this Albanian army is concerned, it was based mainly on the connection in the Macedonian Government. Making use of his privileged status, Husein Haskaj, deputy defense minister, collected the documents, and Imer Imeri, deputy health minister, in the role of messenger, in official government cars, took them to the main headquarters and to the Albanian Defense Ministry. Well-informed sources told PULS that the Interior Ministry discovered correspondence between Haskaj and Deputy Defense Minister of Albania Shehi, in which the latter is asked to give a more defined status to the All-Albanian army, on behalf of headquarters. On the one hand, according to what has been learnt so far, this Albanian politician was directly in charge of practical assistance in the establishment of the All-Albanian army, and on the other, the whole project allegedly had logistical support from the top Albanian political leaders, from the President of neighboring Albania Sali Berisha (who, on the other hand, expressed his satisfaction with the development of bilateral relations, which they were keen to promote), from the Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, and from the Defense Minister Safet Zhulali.

As regards the status of this formation, there were three alternatives: According to the first, it was envisaged as a formation within the framework of the Albanian Army, the second was to be in the ranks of the military forces of former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia), and the third was to act as independent in our state. The written agreements between the domestic and the Albanian leaders on the three options about the status of this paramilitary army have also been confiscated by the Macedonian police.

All this implies that Albania is directly involved in the scenario for breaking up Macedonia's territorial integrity, although the first official reactions from our neighbor's side deny any connection with this activity. On the contrary, Minister Zhulali stated that the whole affair has been deliberately set up to damage relations between the two states. However, regardless of the variety of statements from this country, there is the possibility that the formation and equipment of this army was performed with total support and practical aid from part of the political leadership of this country. Moreover, there are rumors that the professional training was carried out in several specialized military camps near the towns of Korce, Tirana, Vlore, and Kukes. In addition to the training, part of the arms supply came via Albania by collecting money from Albanian emigres. According to our information, which is certainly not exhaustive, some 600,000 German marks were collected, two-thirds of which have been received so far. The alleged purpose of this money (the reason given to the public) was financial aid for the military hospital in Tirana.

In the past year or two, some of the supplied arms could be seen in particular Interior Ministry actions. Then some smaller quantities of rifles and munition of Chinese origin were detected, however these actions were never connected with a larger project in Macedonia, such as the one we are here writing about. In an effort to draw a complete picture, it is necessary to go back to, so to say, sporadic information predicting a storm in Macedonia's

political life. That is, we have heard from different channels in the past three weeks of visible nervousness in the ranks of the PDP representatives, in the government, and in the parliament. We could not identify the nature of the nervousness, but it was evident in several public statements made by the top PDP leadership for some international organizations and news agencies, and also in closed circles. Probably here lies the reason for the refusal (the fourth consecutively) by the official representatives of the Albanian minority to go to Geneva and sign the document of the working group led by Gert Arens, in connection with previous discussions and negotiations with the Macedonian Government.

Consequently, last Saturday, at the very moment the action at the discovery of the so-called military command of the All-Albanian army in Macedonia was carried out, on the second anniversary of its formation, a counterrally was scheduled in the Theater of Nationalities for the celebration of the anniversary of the Bit-Pazar events, and now it seems, it was de facto the celebration of the day of the formation of this paramilitary army (7 November). It is now clear that this celebration—a political requiem, did not have an effect, at least as far as the possible interethnic conflict is concerned. As for the rest, it will be worthwhile to wait for passions to calm, and then to analyze the event and its implications. However, it is now sure that the answers will not be innocent and painless.

Now we can see the reasons for the nervous reactions by some people from the PDP leadership. They lie in the knowledge that the whole idea about the All-Albanian army was on its way to being detected, which implied they themselves would have difficulties in finding excuses. And very significant "VIPs" were involved. For example, there are indications that this Party leader Nevzat Halili approved the letters and documents sent to Albania from Macedonia with his personal signature; Methad Emini, the "moderate" secretary of the same party, who is, according to our sources, supposed to be the commissioner of the headquarters' political body; one of the main strategists is said to be Bekir Zuta, the current deputy chairman of the parliament, and the person who personally insisted on the nomination of Haskaj, the main "push button" for military documents, to the position of deputy defense minister, despite the opposition of Minister Vlado Popovski, who presented the government with the discoveries of the army intelligence service.

At this stage it is impossible to avoid recalling the behavior of the persons in the PDP top leadership in all the phases of the constitution of our state: the census, the referendum, the Constitution, the admission of Macedonia to CSCE, the request for a major presence of Albanian professionals in the key ministries. By the way, speaking of the latter, we have been told that after the aforementioned action a document was found that clearly and precisely explains why the Albanian political leadership insisted on a major number of Albanian officers in the Macedonian Army and in the Interior Ministry. That is, as we have been told, it said that it would enable the members of the All-Albanian army to have a military training free of charge for their own purposes, although the whole world, and the Macedonian public too, were being persuaded that it was their wish to be more successfully incorporated into the state they considered their own.

On the other hand, what additionally complicates the present situation is the way in which the political authority acted after the police action, when it used all available means to minimize the dimensions and the importance of the whole affair. We do not know whether it was out of a sincere wish to maintain stability in international relations or just an ordinary struggle for the maintenance of the current coalition. However, the wish to neutralize the public interest was highly present also at the news conference of the Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, who tried hard to avert the journalists' interest from the PDP and its leadership, describing those arrested as a "group of citizens."

All these pieces of the mosaic explain why a great part of the PDP leadership has kept itself at a distance from the Macedonian state since the very beginning. A few days ago the incertitude hanging over all of us and over our country was well elaborated by the ever well-informed Slobodan Milosevic. That is, after the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias, he stated the following, showing an outrageous insolence and arrogance:

[Text] "The Albanian separatist movement is very well-developed in that Republic. It is becoming even stronger with the support of the Skopje authority. Now we have there the phase of creating a state of two peoples, therefore soon western Macedonia will be separated from the Skopje republic. I fear that, due to the policy conducted in this republic, at the citizens' expense, Greece will soon have nobody to recognize there." This certainly leads us to think that the man with the whole intelligence machinery at his disposal was not only well informed about what was going on in our country, but perhaps he and his affiliates had their fingers deeply involved in the whole affair, at least in setting up the Albanians and the Macedonians to finish the whole job of preventing the revival of the geographic and strategic west-east link, for the sake of the "Hilendar Corridor," which is of interest for some European countries, particularly Serbia and Greece.

Very "accidentally," at the same time, Radovan Karadzic conveyed a message to the Macedonian authority and a signal to the Albanians in Macedonia with his statement for the Balkan Information Pool in Sofia, saying that the alleged Bosnian experience "can teach them how to atomize Macedonia without bloodshed and with negotiations." Both statements are certainly the result of the previous Greek elaboration. Let us remind you that Papoulias' letter to the UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali warned the world's community that if Macedonia is recognized too soon, it will certainly share the Bosnian fate. He also announced that the

Albanians can start with the realization of their plan, because, as Papoulias said, they are not interested in the existence of a Macedonian state.

The delicacy of the situation Macedonia is faced with now becomes even more obvious. It is more obvious because the members of the coalition are in a two-sided situation. On the one hand, with the successful action for the detection of antistate and anticonstitutional activity the executive power demonstrated its capability and efficiency, but on the other, it could not avoid facing an avalanche of critics and attacks by the opposition, and even abusing the fact that the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the LP [Liberal Party] were ready to enter a coalition with the party of the most numerous minority in Macedonia. The least that may happen to them is to be blamed for collaborating in destroying the territorial integrity of the country and then taking advantage of that out of narrow party interests. It makes the whole political situation unbearable in every sense and great skill will be necessary, as well as cool heads and rational actions, to safeguard peace and stability in the country.

Certain political parties, first of all the so-called turbo-Macedonian, are a long way from the necessary sobriety and good manners at this moment. For instance, the front man of the VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party] Vladimir Golubovski, always neurotic when the Albanians are in question, demands curfews and the death penalty, exclusion of the Albanians from the bodies of state special interest, interruption of the discussions mediated by Gert Ahrens, suspension of the assemblies in Tetovo and Gostivar, as well as of the PDP and NDP, until the final confirmation of their responsibility in the present affair. And, on top of all that, Golubovski offered 12,000 of his members and followers as ready to stand in the defense of the vital national and state interests of Macedonia in this dramatic period. His ex-party colleague Ljupco Georgievski from VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Party-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] welcomed the event of the Albanians' paramilitary army with a broad smile. Except for the routine placing of responsibility on the government coalition, which "in trying to minimize the event put basic democratic principles at stake," he also pointed out the thesis that, here, now, finally "we have seen what kind of people we are forced to live with," meaning, generally, those of "Albanian preorigin," as he himself called them. "The Duke" [Georgievski], just as a reminder, was prevented in the recent Security Office action "Duvlo" from accepting the offer from the Bulgarian General Asparuhov for the training of a 10,000-strong paramilitary formation of the VMRO-DPMNE. PULS has heard rumors that this Security Office action can soon be resumed.

However, regardless of the Macedonian hawks' extremism, it is undeniable that some relations will be seriously disturbed in the Macedonian state. The political fate of the government is, moderately said, complicated because now, as we mentioned above, many will ask about the responsibility of the Macedonian side in the executive organs, that is to say about the coalition with the alleged "traitor" PDP. There is no doubt, though, that the PDP is in the worst position. If the clearing up of the affair comes to a real end, a great part of this party's leadership could be put behind bars. One of the possibilities for saving what can be saved is to sacrifice a couple of important heads in exchange for the survival of the party. In that sense, there are rumors that the departure of the already quaking Nevzat Halili and of some of his colleagues is expected, and in the meantime the PDP could publicly and bluntly distance itself from the activities of the patrons.

The situation is horrible, but not hopeless. What is encouraging is the fact that after the authorities' action and the explosion it caused in the public, there is no information of any interethnic incidents. It will contribute to a more or less normal ending of the whole affair, as should be the case with every serious country. What is of utmost importance in these delicate times is to maintain a basic level of confidence among the citizens. We here mean, first of all, the Macedonians, who are probably feeling the challenge to complete their own picture of the Albanians, as a people who do not give any kind of community a chance. Such a paranoid conclusion, certainly in favor of the present extremists, is extremely dangerous for the survival of the Macedonian state, because it consequently assumes interethnic conflicts and widespread bloodshed on the soil of Macedonia.

[Box, p 10]

Deputy Minister in Asylum

In the past few days one of the names more frequently heard among the public has been that of Deputy Health Minister Imer Imeri. On Tuesday evening several media announced that of all the players involved in the whole affair this is the highest-ranking person in the state hierarchy in Macedonia.

PULS discovered that Deputy Minister Imeri is now having a rough time. He first tried to obtain political asylum at the German Consulate, where his request was rejected. Then he asked for protection from the CSCE, and this being refused, he knocked on the door of the Turkish Embassy. At the time of publishing we have no information on whether or not this person will be sheltered in Turkey.

After the journalists' direct question in connection with the involvement of Deputy Minister Imeri, the Macedonian police chief Ljubomir Frckovski refused to comment, referring to the official statement given by the Interior Ministry.

[Box, p 11]

Imprisonment for the Plotters Who Organized the Albanian Paramilitary Army in Macedonia?

On 5, 6, 7, and 8 November eight persons, citizens of the Republic of Macedonia were arrested and charged, suspected of committing the criminal act of "associating for the purposes of hostile activity" under Article 136, Paragraph 1, in connection with Article 114 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia "attack on the constitutional order." The charges were presented against: Haskaj Husein, born in 1951 in Gjakovica, FR Yugoslavia, living in Skopje; Arslani Jusuf Abdiselam, born in 1946 in Tetovo, living in Tetovo; Murtezani Refet Burim, born in 1964 in the village of Odri, Tetovo, living in Tetovo; Ejupi Nesat Resmi, born in 1948 in the village of Lakavica, Gostivar, living in Gostivar; Elmazi Lazam Selam, born in 1948 in the village of Simnica, Gostivar, living in Gostivar; Demiri Abdula Akif, born in 1941 in the village of Cegrane, Gostivar, living in Gostivar; Agusi Sabit Hasan, born in 1960 in the village of Klokotnica, Doboj, Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Kosovo origin, citizen of FR Yugoslavia, temporarily living in Gostivar, in flight.

The aforementioned persons have, from the end of 1991 until today, worked on the creation of military formations and the supply and illegal infiltration of arms, explosives, munition, and other military equipment in the republic, for which purpose they cooperated with institutions and services of foreign states.

[Box, p 12]

Silence Is Not Golden

After the news conference held by Ljubomir Frckovski some dilemmas arose, the greatest of which is why the government did not turn its obvious success in securing the country's territorial integrity into positive capital? Why did it choose to be silent when it should have spoken and why does it try to minimize the political dimension of the whole event?

Let us not speak now about the fatal assumption that our public can be underestimated, that it is still described by some as juvenile, thus it will easily swallow up scanty, washed up information without asking any questions. Here lies the question that follows directly from Minister Frckovski's assessment that by the discovery and imprisonment of a group of plotters the circle of the plotters against the Constitution has been practically closed down. That is, does this group contain the main leader of the organization or are these just some of its "extremists," which can easily be sacrificed? Our experience after all the events that took place in former Yugoslavia, including the ones preceding the wars in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia indicate that keeping silent over the facts has the short-term effect of calming the public, and later on the darkest alternative comes to light. Therefore, although we can suppose that some facts were not stated for the sake of the security bodies' further activities, is it not too soon to state that "the circle of players has been closed down?" As far as the political implications are concerned, the government must take into account that the silence it has adopted on this affair could return to us like a boomerang.

In this case, a wonderful opportunity has been missed to bring to light what can de facto not be hidden, and perhaps to protect stability and interethnic relations, and even the coalition, more efficiently: In such a way as to eliminate all suspicions and speculations, after clarifying positions in the relations of the political parties.

[Box, p 12]

Did the PDP Know?

Let us suppose and accept the official claim that the PDP leadership was not directly involved in the affair of the creation of the "All-Albanian army," that is the way Ljubomir Frckovski characterized the "arms smuggle." However, what is of interest to every citizen is whether the PDP leadership was aware at all that its members had engaged in such activities, and whether it was intentionally or unintentionally silent about that. They should also be prosecuted, if they knew, of course.

VMRO Asks Albania To Stop 'Open Interferences'

AU1711063593 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 16 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "VMRO-DPMNE Memorandum to Albanian Government"]

[Text] VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] yesterday sent a memorandum regarding the Macedonian-Albanian relations and the activities of the parties PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and NDP [People's Democratic Party] in Macedonia to the diplomatic representative of the Albanian Government to the Republic of Macedonia.

According to the party announcement, the memorandum contains the request that the Albanian Government immediately stops with its, up till now, open interferences in the internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. Also, the PDP and NDP leaderships are requested to dissociate themselves from the activities of the extremists in their ranks and to solve the problems in a democratic way, through the institutions of the system.

The memorandum has been distributed to all diplomatic-consular representations in Skopje.

Urges Deportation of Albanians

AU1711082093 Skopje MIC in English 16 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Opposition: 'The Government Must Step Down'"]

[Text] Ljupco Georgievski, the leader of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] emphasized yesterday that after such a political scandal the Government has the moral obligation to submit its resignation.

In her discussion, the Vice President of VMRO-DPMNE Dosta Dimovska quoted a number of statements made by leaders of the Albanian parties PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and NDP [Peoples' Democratic Party] in relation to the establishment of an autonomous region "Ilirida" which actually presented the formation of a state within a state. She directly addressed Prime Minister Crvenkovski with a suggestion to resign in order to retain his dignity. Dimovska stated that VMRO-DPMNE has pointed out the specific situation in Macedonia, where the interests of a number of neighboring states crossed each other a number of times.

Mitko Atanasovski from VMRO-Fatherland appealed to a true unity between the citizens of Macedonia and asked for a more elaborate report from the Interior Ministry over the last [word indistinct], which would be presented at a closed Parliament session.

Vladimir Golubovski accused the Government of directly instigating a plot against the Republic of Macedonia. He stated that it was necessary to pass a vote of non-confidence in the Government and called upon all Macedonian deputies to support the idea for new elections, or the forming of a new Macedonian Government, which would deport all disloyal Albanians and suspended one-national Assemblies in Tetovo and Gostivar.

Democratic Forum Denounces Arrest of Albanians

AU1711114093 Tirana ATA in English 1115 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Tirana, November 17 (ATA)—The Democratic Forum for the Human Rights Defence in Macedonia denounces through an appeal the arrest of some Albanian citizens by the Interior Ministry of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and calls on individuals and collectives in Macedonia and the international opinion to help in overcoming the tense situation created in this country after these arrests. "We demand," the appeal says, "cool-headedness and wish that the present situation change into one serving peace and welfare, because it quite easily may escalate and assume undesirable proportions." Further on the appeal invites all associations, political subjects and parties, government institutions, precisely the chairman of the republic and the government, that through concrete decisions to contribute to overcoming of the situation.

Interior Minister Dismisses Opposition Criticism

AU1711084093 Skopje MIC in English 16 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Ljubomir Frckovski: 'The Opposition Goes at Hand to Foreign States'"]

[Text] "The opposition's thesis that a civil war will break out in Macedonia completely coincides with the statements made by the leaders of some neighboring countries, and the final aim is to proclaim Macedonia a crisis region. This means," [Interior Minister] Frckovski said [at 15 November session of the parliament], "that they want to push the Republic of Macedonia to the conference over the crisis in former Yugoslavia, where it will be discussed at a foreign table."

"It's a fact," Frckovski emphasized, "and that can clearly be seen from the last police action that the government is in complete control of the situation in Macedonia, which knocks out the trump cards from the hands of the opposition."

In reply to the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] accusations of intentionally minimizing the entire case Ljubomir Frckovski said that the action was carried out after two years of investigation and tailing of the suspects, who were arrested when sufficient evidence was gathered to bring criminal charges against them.

"Following this," he said, "the national opposition is in an uncomfortable situation, because they were surprised by the action of the Interior Ministry which clearly goes to show that the government institutions are holding the situation in their hands."

Frckovski emphasized that under these circumstances, the opposition had to say something, for example, that it had made warnings about this a long time ago, that coexistence was impossible in Macedonia, and what was particularly interesting in this entire case, that the Interior Ministry was placed in a different basket from the government which was being attacked on all possible fields, forgetting that a short while ago, that same opposition talked about the Interior Ministry.

According to Frckovski, consciously again, falsification under the pretense of informativeness was used, which presented an unscrupulous politization of the entire case.

Defense Ministry Denies Intelligence Leak

AU1711084293 Skopje MIC in English 16 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Vlado Popovski: 'The State Defense Plan Has Not Been Breached'"]

[Text] Answering to the numerous accusations by the opposition, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia Vlado Popovski said at yesterday's session: "I state most responsibly that so far there are no indications that the mobilization scheme of the Macedonian Army, or the defense plan of the Republic of Macedonia, have been breached."

He added that no one has at his disposal such documents and that notions of some sort of alleged fear or threats

should not be created. "Let that be proven with arguments," said the top man at the Ministry of Defense.

In relation to the question over the alleged need for quotas in the Macedonian Army, Popovski said it was an invented category in the political rhetorics between the opposition and the position.

Popovski also turned to some elements regarding the Defense Ministry in VMRO-DPMNE's [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] explanation for the request for a vote of confidence in the government, calling them statements which had no connection with that government sphere. "A thesis that there are some kind of political activities and organization in the Defense Ministry is being planted," Popovski underlined, adding that he would submit his resignation if such evidence was presented. If the rumors about the infiltration of foreign intelligence structures in the defense system of Macedonia were also supported with concrete evidence, then his resignation would be repeated, according to Popovski.

"A complete insight into the case was made at the Defense Ministry, and no proof of manipulation with secret document or confidential information was discovered," said Defense Minister Vlado Popovski.

Article View Prospects of Dispute With Greece

AU1611123893 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 14 Nov 93 p 2

[Commentary by Zaneta Skerlev: "Time of Intermission"]

[Text] Failing to find "a solution acceptable to both sides," the European Community, preoccupied with and mired in Bosnia, assessed that the additional problem of Greek-Macedonian relations and disputes could only add to the already large number of problems in the community. After a string of unsuitable decisions adopted at its summits, which not only failed to solve the Macedonian-Greek situation but complicated it even further, the Edinburgh summit, assessed as the "collective psychotherapy and spiritual relief" of the European 12, decided to give financial aid to Macedonia, as a way of "easing its conscience" for not being able to reach a decision on recognition.

Knowledgable people realize that the deadlock in the community on this issue will not be overcome because of the tough stance of the Greeks, although they all officially admit that "it was getting on their nerves." At that stage many predicted the whole matter would be passed over to the United Nations, giving the European Community two opportunities. First, to gain time to solve its own problems free of preconditioning, for which a common spirit is necessary, and second, to get an "alibi" from the United Nations—in the event Macedonia was accepted under its constitutional or provisional name, or not accepted at all—that would have been a decision taken by the United Nations, which would affect the situation. Particularly because all the EC members are also UN members. By doing this the responsibility would have been released, the situation monitored, and data collected for the joint foreign policy. In the meantime things happened, recognition of Macedonia followed, and it was admitted to associations and agencies, though slowly, helped by the establishment of contacts. The third thing the community tried to do was to decide not to give up mediation in the Macedonian-Greek dispute, which was visible in its influence on the Security Council.

Variations on a Theme

The matter was shifted to the United Nations, however, and after the admission of Macedonia under its provisional, descriptive, or trade name, the UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, appointing Cyrus Vance as mediator, promoted confidence-building measures between Macedonia and Greece as a way of establishing better relations between the two countries and solving the questions in dispute, the most important of which were—the name and the flag. Although terms were established, they were neglected—and then it was presented as a normal procedure. The prolongation, on the other side, was not "sanctioned" by some official pressures over the two sides to move faster in the negotiations, the terms were prolonged and in the meantime—things were taking place. Deliberately or not? However, the August meeting between [Greek Foreign Minister] Papoulias and [Macedonian representative to talks with Greece] Tosevski, when it was decided to resume the negotiations, promised to break the deadlock, despite the unofficial interpretations that "the matter is completed" and that only a suitable moment was awaited to inform the domestic public in the two countries about the results. The postponement of the scheduled term occurred due to the early elections in Greece, and the further postponement requested by the new Greek Government, it seems—came not as a surprise. As a matter of fact, it became an integral part of the way in which the United Nations deals with the Macedonian-Greek dispute.

It was clear that neither at the time when the European Community was dealing with the issue, nor now when the United Nations is involved, has the Macedonian-Greek problem reached the top of the priority list, although attempts were made to do it in another way, and this is the point where the reasons for postponement should be sought. The fate of the dispute depends, however, on what the interests of the directly involved sides are. Therefore, the attention paid to the steps (not) undertaken by the international organizations is fully understandable, and looking for a "sense" in the proposals submitted directly or indirectly in reference to, for example Macedonia—are normal for the country striving for a more stable international identity.

"New" Initiatives

Butrus-Ghali's proposal to hold a new conference, or resume the old London conference, the reiterations of the 12 European countries showing that they "do not intend to give up the settlement of the Balkan situation," as expressed at the two last meetings in Brussels and during the Balkan tour of the head of the Greek Foreign Ministry Karolos Papulias as a part of Greek preparations for taking over the chair in the European Community in the next period, combined with the slowdown in the realization of the aid allocated to Macedonia, and the refusal to compensate for the damage suffered in Macedonia as a result of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are reason to ask whether plans have been made to return the fate of Macedonia to European soil? There are such signs, and our official circles are certainly upset when Macedonia is linked with the situation on the territories of former Yugoslavia and upset with attempts to solve the Balkan problems according to the principle "all in one basket." Moreover, there is an unofficial disagreement with the possible shifting of the Macedonian-Greek dispute into the hands of the European Community, that is, the European Union, which reinforced its determination for a joint foreign policy after 1 November. All that, accompanied by the fact of the Greeks in the chair, are reason enough to view the votes to shift the "Macedonian question" back to Europe as something possible and disturbing. The possibilities for postponing (which has become a trade mark in the negotiations) the solution of the Greek-Macedonian dispute are multiplied, and the connections of the issue with the Cypriot issue are back, as in the times when the European Community was discussing the recognition of Macedonia.

[Text] In the meantime the situation is changing, and that is probably what the EC countries inclined to Macedonia count on—Macedonia has been recognized by several countries, negotiations are under way with the IMF on Macedonia's admission and on financial arrangements, diplomatic and other offices are being opened, attempts are being made for a greater, if not influence, then at least participation of Macedonia in the world's organizations and institutions. On the other hand, Macedonia is constantly repeating that it will not accept being treated in a packet with the other former Yugoslav republics, emphasizing its peaceful policy, equal distance with its neighbors, the determination to solve the problems through negotiations and the need for greater financial aid for its exhausted economy. It is one thing whether these voices are loud enough and speak at the right place. Another thing is that, even if what comes from Macedonia is heard well enough, the interests and the policy, at least regarding our country, have always had different rules, according to which Macedonia has regularly (at least hitherto) been left with nothing. That is the reason that the concern has remained since the day of its independence. The various scenarios and projects, according to which the name of the country is regularly mentioned as a possible field of "gunpowder which will explode with enormous consequences" are constantly hanging over the everyday life of its citizens. Concern is growing—when some, out of "best intentions" proposes a new, or somewhat altered, way of solving the Greek-Macedonian dispute. Hitherto Macedonia had less difficulty dealing with its "enemies." The "friends" postpone the solutions, the exaggerated attention often retards the processes, and we still have not learned to be careful. Therefore, it seems that the best times for Macedonia are exactly those intermissions when most often "things happen."

Is such an "intermission" ahead of us, or are things going to be intensified? Will the United Nations take more effective action to resume negotiations, or will it "pass the ball" to the European Union, where "everything started"? Are there now enough forces in the European Union to avoid the errors and to demonstrate, at least in solving the Macedonian-Greek dispute, that the European foreign policy can be fruitful in the Balkans, too, or is it only "the wish" of Greece? The fact is that the "intermissions" can turn out either way, and no matter how much we try to prove we are an international factor which must be taken into account—others will give the answers to the above questions. Even to the fatal ones.

Defense Minister Calls Turkey 'Proven Friend'

AU1611133493 Skopje MIC in English 12 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Turkey—a Proven Friend of Macedonia"]

[Text] Macedonia's Defense Minister Vlado Popovski, following last night's return from the Republic of Turkey, said that Turkey was a proven friend of the Republic of Macedonia and that friendly relations on all fields have yet to be developed. He also stated that concrete cooperation with the Turkish Defense Ministry has been established.

Popovski said: "In Turkey we established cooperation with the Ministry of Defense. We were convinced that the Republic of Turkey is one of the most persistent fighters for peace and a factor of the stability on the Balkans, as it is permanently interceding for the implementation of the international norms, particularly regarding our situation. Turkey is fighting for there to be no changes of the borders by using force, to achieve just peace and to uphold the entire, so far, accomplished results over the recognition of Macedonia." [sentence as published]

President Gligorov received yesterday the ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Macedonia Suha Nojan.

According to the officials announcement, the Turkish ambassador repeated that his country pays a lot of attention to the retaining of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, as a sovereign and independent state, and state member of the UN.

As it is known, the Turkish Defense Minister Mehmet Golhan recently stated that if the military fire spreads to Macedonia, whether its wants or not [as published], Turkey will have to become involved in this war.

U.S. Contingent Begins Military Exercise

LD1611130093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1137 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Skopje, 16 November (TANJUG)—Members of the American military contingent within the UN Armed forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia yesterday began a military exercise, which will last until 18th November, on the Krivolak grounds near Negotin on the river Vardar, the UN troops command in Skopje has said.

The statement says that live ammunition will be used in the exercise.

Media representatives and other observers are not allowed to be present at the grounds during the American maneuvers, the statement says, for security reasons.

Although the statement says that this is a routine military exercise by UN troops the observers in Skopje assess that it is an activity linked with the U.S. interest in militarily installing themselves in the former Yugoslav republic on a longer-term basis.

Kosovo

Court Sentences Five Albanians to 14 Years

AU1611180893 Tirana ATA in English 1420 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prishtina, November 16 (ATA)—The Serbian Court of Prizren sentenced five Kosovar Albanian to over fourteen years of imprisonment. Three of them had been political prisoners before. They are accused of collaborating for hostile activities. During investigations, they were maltreated by police forces.

The accused and their defenders turned down the accusations as baseless and framed by the Serbian authorities. They said they are being sentenced because of their political views and not as participants of the movement for the republic of Kosova.

Two members of Helsinki Watch, present in the court, were arrested by Serbian police when they began taking pictures at the moment when the public was leaving the tribunal.

Parties Condemn Imprisonment of Albanians

AU1611185293 Tirana ATA in English 1423 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Prishtina, November 16 (ATA)—Albanian political parties and public in Kosova maintain that the imprisonment of Albanians in Macedonia is a dangerous act which intends destabilisation in the country and serves the anti-Albanian policy and Serbian warmongering purposes.

The Parliamentary Party of Kosova maintains that there can be no stable Macedonia without a stable constitutional position of the Albanians in Macedonia, a statement of the party says adding that the latest reprisals against the Albanians by the Macedonian authorities have been a reaction towards Albania's veto against Macedonia's admission to the CSCE.

The Peasants' Party of Kosova maintains that the imprisonment of the Albanians in Macedonia also testify to a plotted repression also related to the bloody events in Bit Pazar of Skopje, several months ago.

Serbian Military Reportedly Patrol Villages

AU1711114293 Tirana ATA in English 0923 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Pristina, November 17 (ATA)—The Information Center of Kosova reports that great Serbian army forces have been recently concentrated in the Baice village of the Lipjan Commune and the Nekoc village of Gllogovc. Serbian militarymen patrolled in these villages on trucks and other vehicles. In the Nekoc village, Serbian police made pressure on the inhabitants under the pretext of looking for weapons. According to reports, the situation in these two ethnically Albanian villages is tense.